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Since their creation in Europe in the seventeenth century, pension funds have grown 
to become one of the main sources of capital in the world. A number of role players 
ultimately manage the pension money of members on their behalf. Accordingly, the 
focus of this study is on the role players involved in the actual investment of pension 
fund money. For the purposes of the study, the key role players in the pension fund 
investment chain are identified as pension fund trustees, asset managers and asset 
consultants. These role players have a specific responsibility in terms of the service 
that they ought to provide. One of the key aspects of this dissertation is therefore 
determining whether their responsibility is a fiduciary responsibility.  
The main purpose of the study is, however, to answer one overarching research 
question:  
Does fiduciary responsibility create barriers to the implementation of responsible 
investment in the South African pension fund investment chain? 
Clearly, there are two key terms in this research question, fiduciary responsibility and 
responsible investment. It is suggested that responsible investment takes at least two 
forms: a “business case” form1 in which environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
issues are considered only in so far as they are financially material; and a social form 
in which ESG issues are considered over maximising risk adjusted financial returns.  
Three key questions were asked in order to find qualitative descriptions and 
interpretations of fiduciary responsibility: 
Question 1: Are the key role players in the pension fund investment chain fiduciaries? 
Question 2: If so, to whom do the key role players owe their fiduciary duty? 
Question 3: What are the fiduciary duties of the key role players in the pension fund 
investment chain? 
It is also suggested that the duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries could be 
described as the all-encompassing fiduciary duty. Two main interpretations of the 
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 Richardson “Keeping Ethical Investment Ethical” 555. 
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“best interests” of beneficiaries (as the focus of fiduciary duty) are used in 
interpretation matrices, which correlate with the two suggested interpretations of 
responsible investment that will be used to address the overall research question. It is 
shown that, for the key role players in the pension fund industry in South Africa, 
fiduciary responsibility can in some instances be a barrier to the implementation of 
responsible investment. 
Some recommendations arising from this study are that the members and beneficiaries 
of pension funds may benefit from a restatement of the different role players‟ 
fiduciary duties in legislation. The following research questions could also be 
clarified: What are the “best interests” of pension fund members and how can they be 
determined?  
KEY TERMS 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Fiduciary responsibility continues to be advanced as an important barrier to the 




 In other quarters 
and under certain assumptions, it is fervently argued that there is no barrier.
4
 The 
suspicion at the outset of this study was that at least part of the reason for these 
apparently opposing views might lie in the heterogeneity in the interpretation of the 
two underlying concepts, fiduciary responsibility and responsible investment. 
Confusion at the interface between two heterogeneous topics is almost inevitable. 
With this in mind, the dissertation sets out to provide extensive descriptions of the two 
key concepts. This qualitative study specifically aimed to address the following 
research question:  
Does fiduciary responsibility create barriers to the implementation of responsible 
investment in the South African pension fund investment chain? 
This research question echoes the basic question that was addressed in the seminal 
Freshfields report in 2005,
5
 which explored the scope of fiduciary responsibility in 
nine jurisdictions (i.e. Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, the 
UK and the US). This was followed by a United Nations publication entitled, 
“Fiduciary Responsibility”6 in 2009. This latter publication built on the Freshfields 
report and comprised three key parts. The first part was a legal commentary on 
fiduciary duty and the integration of environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
issues in investment mandates. The second part was a survey of asset consultants on 
                                                                                                                                            
2
 Eccles et al The State of Responsible Investment in South Africa 42. 
3
 Richardson “Do the Fiduciary Duties of Pension Funds Hinder Socially Responsible Investment?” 
145. 
4
 Freshfields A Legal Framework for the Integration of Environmental, Social and Governance 
Issues into Institutional Investment. 
5
 Idem 6. The objective of this report was to answer the following question: “Is the integration of 
environmental, social and governance issues into investment policy voluntarily permitted, legally 
required or hampered by law and regulation: primarily as regards public and private pension funds, 
secondarily as regards insurance company reserves and mutual funds?” 
6
 UNEP FI Fiduciary Responsibility 13. 
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the integration of ESG issues into the investment process and the third part dealt with 




The work of Richardson8 targeted the same issues and specifically explored the 
question: “Do the fiduciary duties of pension funds hinder socially responsible 
investment?” His focus was on what he called the “main common law jurisdictions”: 
the United Kingdom (UK), the United States and Australia. South Africa was 
therefore not considered in either the Freshfields report or Richardson‟s study.  
This, together with one of the main conclusions in Eccles et al,9 created the perfect 
rationale for the research question at hand:  
[O]ne of the most striking themes to emerge out of this survey was the fiduciary 
responsibility paradox. On the one hand, the majority of principal officers for pension 
funds interviewed indicated that a wide range of ESG issues were at least somewhat 
important in “evaluating the likely performance of investments”. On the other hand, 
most principal officers indicated that their general approach to RI was either to do 
nothing, or to put a limited proportion of assets in RI. In addition, the majority of 
principal officers (63%) indicated that fiduciary responsibility was at least somewhat 
a barrier to participating in RI.  
1.1 THE PENSION FUND INDUSTRY 
Pension funds ease the burden of the State in providing for retired persons and assist 
individuals in saving for retirement.10 A pension fund can be described as an 
“association of persons” or a “business carried on under a scheme” with the purpose 
of “providing annuities or lump sum payments for members or former members of 
such association upon their reaching retirement dates, or for the dependents of such 
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 UNEP FI “Fiduciary Responsibility” 13–15. 
8
 Richardson “Do the Fiduciary Duties of Pension Funds Hinder Socially Responsible Investment?” 
145. 
9
 Eccles at al The State of Responsible Investment in South Africa 49. 
10
 National Treasury “Retirement Fund Reform” 4. 
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members or former members upon the death of such members”.11 Since their creation 
in Europe in the seventeenth century, pension funds have grown to become one of the 
main sources of capital in the world. According to Richardson,12 the assets of the 
eleven largest national pensions markets in the world totalled approximately US$ 23 
trillion in 2006. This massive scale of pension assets on a global level is not 
unexpectedly mirrored in the South African context. In 2011, one pension fund alone 
(the Government Employee Pension Fund) had more than 2.3 million active members 
and held assets of around USD 100 billion.13  
There are many different classifications of pension funds. Two of the more commonly 
described types are defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) funds. DB 
funds are funds where members get a guaranteed lump sum pay-out or series of 
payments at retirement that is independent of market movements. In DC funds, the 
members‟ contributions are defined but pay-outs are subject to a number of factors, 
including market performance.14 Because of the risk involved in providing guaranteed 
lump sum pay-outs DB funds are mostly restricted to government funds. Companies 
are not willing or able to carry the risk inherent in having to pay members fixed 
amounts at resignation, retrenchment or retirement. In the 1990s this started a major 
shift from DB to DC funds. 
Irrespective of the use of intermediaries to effect the actual investment transactions, in 
DC funds the employee (pension fund member) ultimately carries the investment risk. 
Moreover, the cost for the employer is reduced, because the employee indirectly takes 
on the risk of the investment as well as the risk of rising costs.15 Clark16 states that the 
                                                                                                                                            
11
 See s 1 of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956, where definitions are provided for a pension fund and 
a pension fund organisation. 
12
 Richardson Regulating the Unseen Polluters 64. 
13
 GEPF http://www.gepf.gov.za/Pages/Home.aspx Date accessed: 12 August 2011.  
14
 S 1 of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 also defines a defined benefit category of a fund and a 
defined contribution category of a fund. Also see Financial Services Board and Another v De Wet 
NO and Others 2002 (3) SA 525 (C) 541−542. 
15
 National Treasury “Retirement Fund Reform” 6−7. 
16
 Clark “The Functional and Spatial Structure of the Investment Management Industry” 71. 
4 
 
majority of pension funds make use of specialist role players in order to administer 
the fund and invest and manage the fund‟s assets. This is true of both DB and DC 
funds. The role players involved in a pension fund are illustrated in the following 
figure taken from Clark: 17 
 
Figure 1.1: Pension fund investment management: institutions and services (Clark, see fn 17) 
As indicated in Figure 1.1, pension fund money usually comes from two sources – 
contributions by the employer and those by the employee, regardless of whether it is a 
DB or DC fund. These contributions are administered by a pension fund administrator 
(sometimes referred to as an employee benefits consultant). The function of 
administrators is purely clerical:18 they ensure that the right amounts come in and that 
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 Clark “The Functional and Spatial Structure of the Investment Management Industry” 73. 
18
 See s 13B of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 with regard to the duties of a pension fund 
administrator. At first glance it seems as if this section includes role players involved with the 
investment of pension funds. (See s 13B(1) “No person shall administer on behalf of a pension 
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benefits are paid out, but have no involvement in the actual investment of the assets. 
The pension fund trustees then represent the fund, but some of the trustees are 
nominated by employees and others by the employer. The consultants (or asset 
consultants as they are popularly referred to) clearly form the link between the 
trustees and the asset managers (presented in Figure 1.1 as internal and external 
management). Subsequently, the asset managers are responsible for the actual 
investment of the assets and therefore act as agents on behalf of the pension fund.  
The description above serves as an explanation for the focus on pension fund trustees, 
asset managers and asset consultants in this study. They are clearly the three key role 
players in a pension fund investment chain. The responsibilities of the different role 
players vary, however, in terms of the service that they ought to provide. One of the 
key aspects of this dissertation is about determining whether their responsibility or a 
part of this responsibility is indeed a fiduciary responsibility.  
Before attempting to answer the overall research question, it is essential to come to 
some kind of understanding of what the terms fiduciary responsibility and responsible 
investment actually mean. While defining these terms is at best difficult and at worst 
completely arbitrary, history and literature provide some clues to how one should 
think about these concepts in the context of the South African pension fund industry. 
1.2 FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY 
Payette19 claims that there is no definition as such for the term fiduciary responsibility. 
It is nonetheless suggested that there are four bases for fiduciary responsibility: an 
ethical basis, a legal basis, a religious basis and a professional basis. The legal basis 
for fiduciary responsibility, which is the most relevant one for this study, apparently 
has its origins in English common law.20 Several other academic writers,21 however, 
                                                                                                                                            
fund the investments of such a pension fund …”.) However, where the duties of these 
administrators are outlined in s 13B(5), it becomes clear that they only involve administrative 
tasks. 
19
 Payette “Fiduciary Responsibility of Board Trustees and Officers in Universities and Colleges” 12. 
20
 Martin “Socially Responsible Investing: Is your Fiduciary Duty at Risk?” 553. 
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assert that fiduciary responsibility finds its origins in the rules of equity rather than in 
English common law.22 
Ames23 provides the following description of the equitable rules as they relate to 
fiduciaries and this is still a valid description for fiduciary responsibility today:  
The equitable rules which prohibit a fiduciary, while in the performance of his 
fiduciary duty, from competing in any way with the interest of his beneficiary, and 
permit dealings between them only upon clear evidence of the good faith of the 
fiduciary, and of the complete disclosure of all his knowledge as to the matters 
entrusted to him, and in fact the whole law of equity as to fiduciaries, enforce a moral 
standard considerably in advance of the average business man. 
This is, however, the recent history of the concept. In fact the word “fiduciary” can be 
traced back to the Latin words fiducia, which means “confidence”, “trust” or 
“assurance” and fiduciarius which means “entrusted” or “committed”.24  
In its original form, a fiduciarius (as it was known in ancient Rome) was a person who 
was given an asset through a process of succession or inheritance. This arrangement, 
known as a fideicommissum, was no ordinary testamentary disposition. The 
fideicommissum was associated with an explicit understanding that the conferred 
“ownership” involved a custodial responsibility. In other words, the inheritance 
imposed a very strong and concrete obligation on the fiduciarius to transfer his 
                                                                                                                                            
21
 See DeMott “Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation” 880–882; Blackman The 
Fiduciary Doctrine and its Application to Directors of Companies 78; Hammond “The Stolen 
Generation – Finding a Fiduciary Duty” par 2; Gautreau “Fiduciary Principle” 1; Ames “Law and 
Morals” 97–113. 
22
 See Ames “Law and Morals” 97–113, where he explains that these rules of equity actually differed 
substantially from English common law in the sense that someone could for instance be found 
guilty of murder even if it was done in self-defence in terms of the common law, although the rules 
of equity would provide some relief for the person who acted in self-defence. These rules of equity 
were then extended to other areas of the law and started to influence the law of trusts from about 
the 1400s and developed over time to frame the duties of fiduciaries as well. 
23
 Ames “Law and Morals” 108. 
24
 Simpson Cassell’s Latin Dictionary 92. 
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inheritance to a specified third party at a specific point in the future. This was usually 
after his death and to his own son.25  
A number of definitions can be found for the modern fiduciary. “A person holding the 
character of a trustee, being charged to act primarily for another‟s benefit with regard 
to specific property or affairs”;26 “One who owes another the duties of good faith, 
trust, confidence, and candor”;27 “A person who undertakes or assumes responsibility, 
or is required by law to act on or [on] behalf of and in the interests of another 
person”;28 “A fiduciary is a person who undertakes to act in the interests of another 
person”.29 It is also stated that: 
To say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further 
inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In 
what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations? And what are the 
consequences of his deviation from duty?30 
Considering these definitions and the questions that were raised around the word 
fiduciary, two key characteristics of a fiduciary can be highlighted: 
                                                                                                                                            
25
 Long “Fideicommissum”. 
 http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/secondary/SMIGRA*/Fideicommissum.html 
Date accessed: 28 July 2008. Also see Alfaro “The Trust and the Civil Law with Special Reference 
to Panama” 27, where the similarities between the fideicommissum and the English trust have led 
to academic debate as to whether the fideicommissum of Roman Law was indeed the inspiration for 
the English trust and therefore the modern fiduciary.  
26
 Richardson “From Fiduciary Duties to Fiduciary Relationships for Socially Responsible Investing: 
Responding to the Will of Beneficiaries” 5. 
27
 Payette “Fiduciary Responsibility of Board Trustees and Officers in Universities and Colleges” 12. 
28
 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 8–31. 
29
 Havenga Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors with Specific Regard to Corporate Opportunities 
8. 
30
 Both McCormack “Fiduciary Obligations in a Changing Commercial Climate” 33 and Rotman 
“Fiduciary Doctrine: A Concept in Need of Understanding” 824 quote Mr Justice Felix Frankfurter 
in Securities & Exchange Commission v Chenery Corp [1943] 318 US 80 at 85–60. 
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1. The existence of a relationship between the fiduciary and another party. The 
other party can be seen as the vulnerable party – handing over the 
responsibility to the fiduciary, who is bestowed with the responsibility. 
2. The existence of legal duties that rest on the person who takes up the 
responsibility.  
These characteristics also prompt the clarification of the terms that have been used 
under the banner of fiduciary responsibility so far. Fiduciary responsibility refers to 
the overall responsibility that fiduciaries have. This fiduciary responsibility is created 
because of a fiduciary relationship and includes certain fiduciary duties. The two 
characteristics identified above will now be discussed separately. 
1.2.1 THE EXISTENCE OF A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TWO OR MORE PEOPLE 
The fiduciary relationship has been discussed by a number of academic authors. 
Blackman et al31 state that: 
Relationships in which a fiduciary obligation has been imposed are marked by three 
characteristics:  
1. scope for the exercise of some discretion or power; 
2. that power/discretion can be used unilaterally so as to affect the beneficiary‟s legal 
or practical interests; and 
3. a peculiar vulnerability to the exercise of that discretion or power … .  
Another definition, similar to Blackman‟s, is the following:  
Broadly speaking, a fiduciary relationship is one in which a person undertakes to act 
on behalf of or for the benefit of another, often as an intermediary with a discretion or 
power which affects the interests of the other who depends on the fiduciary for 
information and advice.32   
This definition, however, adds the fact that the vulnerable party depends on the 
fiduciary for information. Nevertheless, the authors of both these definitions 
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 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 8–37. 
32
 McCormack “Fiduciary Obligations in a Changing Commercial Climate” 33. 
9 
 
emphasise the fact that, while their definitions might be good working definitions, 
they are not exhaustive. 
Havenga33 asserts that there are only two characteristics that are vital to the existence 
of the fiduciary relationship, not three as stated by Blackman above. Havenga 
describes these characteristics as being discretion or power and states that this 
discretion or power will affect the beneficiary‟s interests. Although her views still 
closely reflect those of Blackman and McCormack,34 she, like Blackman, does not 
mention the specific duties of providing advice and information.  
Another theme that constantly emerges from the literature whenever fiduciary 
relationships are discussed is the possibility that this power or discretion can be 
abused. In this regard, it is said that “the courts should examine fiduciary relations 
separately from the legal contexts in which they arise and design the rules not by 
analogies to prototypical relations but by evaluating the fiduciary power and its 
potential abuse”.35 
It is also evident that fiduciary relationships should not necessarily be bound to the so-
called traditional “fiduciary” categories like those of the trustees of a trust:36  
The fiduciary nature of any relationship arises from circumstances peculiar to that 
relationship and the interaction of its participants and not as a result of belonging to 
traditional categories of fiduciary relations. Secondly, since fiduciary relationships 
                                                                                                                                            
33
 Havenga Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors with Specific Regard to Corporate Opportunities 
9. 
34
 See Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 8–37 and McCormack “Fiduciary 
Obligations in a Changing Commercial Climate” 33. The differences in the way the authors 
describe the fiduciary relationship may be explained by the fact that these authors deal with 
different types of fiduciary. Blackman et al do not specifically mention that the fiduciary has a duty 
to share information or advice. This is probably because they describe directors of companies as 
fiduciaries, specifically. Information and advice are not as important to the company, as companies 
can only be informed and advised through those same directors. This illustrates the notion that 
fiduciary duties are contextual and this is discussed in Section 1.2.2. 
35
 Frankal “Fiduciary Law” 797; 836. 
36
 Sealy “Some Principles of Fiduciary Obligation” 119–140.  
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ought not to be confined to already established categories and should be determined 
by a more functional approach, the categories of relationships that may be described 
as fiduciary should be viewed as open-ended.37 
Weinrib38 states that:  
Awareness of the central importance of the element of discretion and of the law‟s 
attempt to control this discretion may also provide a clue for determining who is and 
who is not a fiduciary.  
He criticises the tendency to think of the typical fiduciaries like trustees, agents and 
directors as an exhaustive list of fiduciaries. In Volvo (Southern Africa) (Pty) Ltd v 
Yssel39 it was said that there is no closed list of fiduciary relationships and that the 
existence of a fiduciary relationship should be determined by the facts of every case. 
These views are important in the context of this dissertation, because they illustrate 
that not only pension fund trustees and agents (asset managers) are fiduciaries, but 
that asset consultants can also be fiduciaries.  
In summary, it is helpful to refer to the universal elements of fiduciary relations as 
described by Rotman:40 
 The beneficiary‟s trust and confidence in the honesty, integrity and fidelity 
of the fiduciary; 
 The beneficiary‟s reliance on the fiduciary‟s care of that trust; 
 The fiduciary‟s power over the interests of the beneficiary as a result of the 
latter‟s reposing of trust; 
 The beneficiary‟s resultant vulnerability as a result of the fiduciary‟s 
power over the beneficiary‟s interests. 
Rotman‟s comments on pension plans are extremely helpful in the context of this 
study. He states that pension plans are hybrids of contracts and trusts and that all 
                                                                                                                                            
37
 Rotman “Fiduciary Doctrine: A Concept in Need of Understanding” 828. 
38
 Weinrib “The Fiduciary Obligation” 5. 
39
 2009 (6) SA 531 (SCA) 536. 
40
 Rotman “Fiduciary Principles and Pensions” 1–3. 
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trusts are forms of fiduciary relationships. He considers the following role players in 
pension plans to be fiduciaries: “pension administrators; other persons with power or 
control over pension plan assets or their distribution and those who have significant 
input into the creation or maintenance of pension plans”.41 The first category, namely 
pension fund administrators, might have different meanings in different countries. 
Rotman does not provide any definition for the term pension administrators and it is 
therefore not clear exactly what kind of role player he is referring to. The second 
category could easily include asset managers, while the third category could clearly 
include role players like asset consultants. Traditionally, all trustees are fiduciaries 
and therefore one might assume that pension fund trustees would also obviously be 
fiduciaries.42 
1.2.2 THE EXISTENCE OF LEGAL DUTIES THAT REST ON THE PERSON WHO TAKES 
UP THE RESPONSIBILITY 
It is also evident that the fiduciary has certain legal duties. A universally accepted and 
finite list of fiduciary duties could not be found in the literature; however, the 
following guidance from Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd & Another43 with 
regard to fiduciary duty, also used by Blackman et al,44 is helpful:  
The existence of such a duty and its nature and extent are questions of fact to be 
adduced from a thorough consideration of the substance of the relationship and any 
relevant circumstances which affect the operation of that relationship.  
                                                                                                                                            
41
 Rotman “Fiduciary Principles and Pensions” 3. 
42
 See Tek Corporation Provident Fund and Others v Lorentz, 1999 (4) SA 884 (SCA) at 894 B–D, 
where Marais JA said the following: “A number of propositions are either axiomatic or not in 
dispute. The pension fund, the powers and duties of its trustees, and the rights and obligations of its 
members and the employer are governed by the Rules of the fund, relevant legislation and the 
common law. The fund is a legal persona and owns its assets in the fullest sense of the word 
„owns‟. (Section 5(1)(a) and (b) of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956.) … The trustees of the fund 
owe a fiduciary duty to the fund and to its members and other beneficiaries …. The employer is not 
similarly burdened but owes at least a duty of good faith to the fund and its members and 
beneficiaries”. 
43
 2004 (3) SA 465 (SCA) 477 G-H. 
44
 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 8–30. 
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This suggests that both the existence of a fiduciary relationship and the fiduciary 
duties are contextual. In Section 1.2.1 it was proposed that there is indeed a fiduciary 
relationship between the key role players in the pension fund investment chain and 
their beneficiaries. In order to come up with a list of generally recognised common 
law fiduciary duties, it is therefore essential to carefully consider the current context: 
fiduciary duties for the key role players in the pension fund investment chain in South 
Africa. 
A good starting point is Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd,45 dating 
back almost a hundred years. In this, Innes CJ stated that:  
Where one man stands to another in a position of confidence involving a duty to 
protect the interests of that other, he is not allowed to make secret profit at the other‟s 
expense or place himself in a position where his interests conflict with his duty.  
Judge Innes therefore suggested that there are three fiduciary duties: 
 A duty to protect the interests of the beneficiary;46 
 A duty to not make any secret profit; and 
 A duty to avoid conflicts of interest 
However, if it is true that fiduciary duties are contextual, then it is essential to look 
specifically at descriptions of fiduciary duties in the pension fund context of South 
Africa. In Tek Corporation Provident Fund and Others v Lorentz,47 the fiduciary 
duties of pension fund trustees were described. Marais JA stated the following:  
They [the trustees] have no inherent and unlimited power as trustees to deal with a 
surplus as they see fit, notwithstanding their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests 
of the members and beneficiaries of the fund. 
                                                                                                                                            
45
 1921 AD 168. 
46
 See also the definitions provided for a fiduciary in Section 1.2 and the descriptions of a fiduciary 
relationship in Section 1.2.1 by Blackman et al, McCormack and Havenga. 
47
 1999 (4) SA 884 (SCA) 898H.  
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In this case the duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries is therefore recognised. 
In Meyer v Iscor Pension Fund48 it was stated that: 
The general proposition that the trustees of the fund are under a fiduciary duty to act 
in the best interests of the members appears to be supported by authority (see, for 
example, Tek Corporation Provident Fund and Others v Lorentz 1999 (4) SA 884 
(SCA) at 898H – I). I accept that the trustees' fiduciary duty towards its members 
includes a duty of impartiality, that is, an obligation not to discriminate between 
members unfairly. It seems to me to be inherent in the proper exercise of any 
discretion that it should be done with impartiality.  
Pension fund trustees thus have an overarching fiduciary duty to act in the best 
interests of the members and this duty includes a duty of impartiality. These cases 
specifically looked at the fiduciary duties of pension fund trustees. In Afrisure CC and 
Another v Watson NO and Another,49 another Supreme Court of Appeal case, the court 
equated the content of a trustee‟s fiduciary duties with that generally accepted for a 
director of a company, as also described by Blackman elsewhere.50 Even though this 
case focused on a trustee of a medical aid scheme, it would surely also be applicable 
to a pension fund trustee. This is because both are trustees of a “financial institution” 
as defined in section 1 of the Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990.  
It is said that section 7C of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 (hereafter the Pension 
Funds Act) and section 2 of the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 
2001 (hereafter the Financial Institutions Act) contain codifications of fiduciary 
duties.51 Section 7C of the Pension Funds Act reads: 
(1) The object of the board shall be to direct, control and oversee the operations of the 
fund in accordance with the applicable laws and the rules of the fund. 
(2) In pursuing its object the board shall – 
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(a) take all reasonable steps to ensure that the interests of members in terms 
of the rules of the fund and the provision of this Act are protected at all 
times, especially in the event of an amalgamation or transfer of any business 
contemplated in section 14, splitting of a fund, termination or reduction of 
contributions to a fund by an employer, increase of contributions of 
members and withdrawal of an employer who participates in a fund; 
(b) act with due care, diligence and good faith; 
(c) avoid conflicts of interest; 
(d) act with impartiality in respect of all members and beneficiaries. 
Section 2 of the Financial Institutions Act states that: 
A director; member; partner; official; employee or agent of a financial institution 
or of a nominee company who invests, holds, keeps in safe custody, controls, 
administers or alienates any funds of the financial institution or any trust property 
(a) Must, with regard to such funds, observe the utmost good faith and 
exercise proper care and diligence; 
(b) Must, with regard to the trust property and the terms of the instrument or 
agreement by which the trust or agency concerned has been created, observe 
the utmost good faith and exercise the care and diligence required of a 
trustee in the performance or discharge of his or her powers and duties; and 
(c) May not alienate, invest, pledge, hypothecate or otherwise encumber or 
make use of the funds or trust property or furnish any guarantee in a manner 
calculated to gain directly or indirectly any improper advantage for himself 
or herself or for any other person at the expense of the financial institution, 
trust, beneficiary or principal concerned. 
The statutory formulation of the fiduciary duties of company directors in section 76(3) 
of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (hereafter the Companies Act) is comparable to the 
codified duties in the Pension Funds Act and the Financial Institutions Act. Section 
76(3) reads: 
A director of a company, when acting in that capacity, must exercise the powers and 
perform the functions of director – 
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(a) in good faith and for a proper purpose 
(b) in the best interests of the company; and 
(c) with the degree of care and skill and diligence that may reasonably be expected of 
a person − 
(i) carrying out the same functions in relation to the company as those 
carried out by that director; and 
(ii) having the general knowledge, skill and experience of that director. 
Owing to the fact that the duty of care, skill and diligence is included in these 
sections, the impression could be created that this duty is seen as a fiduciary duty. 
Some secondary legal sources on the topic of fiduciary duties in the pension fund 
context also create this impression. Sigwadi52 describes the personal liability of 
pension fund trustees for breach of fiduciary duties. He states that the “duties of 
pension fund trustees are determined by the particular pension fund, by statutes and, 
in so far as it may be necessary, by the common law relating to trusts in a broad 
sense”.53 Under the relevant statutes he then specifically mentions section 7C of the 
Pension Funds Act and section 2 of the Financial Institutions Act. It is not, however, 
clear if it is the author‟s intent to create the impression that the duty of care, skill and 
diligence is a fiduciary duty, but the fact that the term fiduciary duties is used loosely, 
as well as the fact that all these duties are grouped together in codifications, leads to 
confusion. 
In section 77(2)(a) and (b) of the Companies Act it is, however, stated that: 
(2) A director of a company may be held liable –  
(a) in accordance with the principles of the common law relating to breach 
of fiduciary duty, for any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company 
as a consequence of any breach by the director of a duty contemplated in 75, 
76(2) or 76(3)(a) or (b); or 
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 Sigwadi “The Personal Liability of Pension Fund Trustees for Breach of Fiduciary Duties” 331–
346. 
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 Sigwadi “The Personal Liability of Pension Fund Trustees for Breach of Fiduciary Duties” 334. 
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(b) in accordance with the principles of the common law relating to delict 
for any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company as a consequence of 
any breach by the director of – 
(i) a duty contemplated in section 76(3)(c); 
The Companies Act therefore makes a clear distinction between the duty to act with 
care, skill and diligence,54 on the one hand, and the duty to act in good faith and for a 
proper purpose and the duty to act in the best interests of the company, on the other.55 
The duty to act with care, skill and diligence is explicitly excluded from the list of 
fiduciary duties and is seen as a separate duty. 
Rotman56 specifically addresses “Fiduciary Principles and Pensions” and uses words 
like “honesty, integrity, fidelity, selflessness and utmost good faith” when he 
describes the standard of conduct of a fiduciary. These words could easily be replaced 
with some of the duties that have already been mentioned. Honesty and integrity 
could refer to the duty to act in good faith or not to make a secret profit; fidelity could 
refer to the duty to act in the best interests of the beneficiary; and selflessness could 
refer to the duty not to make any secret profit or perhaps also the duty to act in the 
best interests of the beneficiary. Rotman‟s views on fiduciary duties could apply to all 
the fiduciaries in the pension fund industry and not just to pension fund trustees, but 
they are not specific to the South African context. 
Although several fiduciary duties for pension fund trustees have been described so far, 
little has been said about the fiduciary duties of asset managers and asset consultants. 
In Sections 1.1 and 1.2.1 it was noted that asset managers act as agents of the pension 
fund. An agent owes his duties to a principal. In the context of this study, asset 
managers are agents who owe their duties to a principal – in this case, the pension 
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 See s 76(3)(a) and (b) of the Companies Act.  
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 Rotman “Fiduciary Principles and Pensions” 1–3. 
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fund. In a decision of the Cape High Court57 the fiduciary duties of an agent were 
described as follows: 
 A duty to act honestly; 
 A duty to act in good faith; 
 A duty to act in the best interests of the principal; 
 A duty to avoid conflicts of interest; and 
 A duty to properly account to the principal (this duty could also refer to a 
duty to disclose). 
It is, however, unclear whether asset consultants would also qualify as agents, because 
technically they do not act on behalf of the trustees or the fund; rather, they provide 
the trustees with advice in order for them to act. If this is true, no fiduciary duties that 
could specifically be attached to asset consultants have been described so far. This 
does not necessarily mean that they do not have fiduciary duties, because it has been 
suggested already that the nature and extent of these duties depend on the context of 
the relationship. It has also been suggested that there is indeed a fiduciary relationship 
between the asset consultants and the pension fund trustees, at least, and indirectly, 
with the pension fund members.  
Still, a generally recognised list of fiduciary duties would assist in moving forward 
with this study. In order to compile such a list, three main issues that can be identified 
from the descriptions above should be addressed first. Firstly, it is evident that, for 
fiduciaries in the pension fund context in South Africa, there are several duties that 
are described as fiduciary duties. Secondly, it is evident that these duties are closely 
related and could be categorised into main duties and sub-duties. Thirdly, there may 
be confusion around whether the duty to act with due care and diligence is indeed a 
fiduciary duty. The three issues are described separately below: 
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There are several duties that are described as fiduciary duties for fiduciaries in the 
pension fund context. 
A number of duties could be identified in the preceding descriptions of fiduciary 
duties. Every single duty that was mentioned is not, however, listed separately, 
because many of them overlap and were therefore reduced to one duty. This was done 
in cases where the wording of the descriptions differed, but the meaning remained the 
same. In the case of the duty to protect the interests of beneficiaries, for instance, only 
the duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries was noted. Nine duties are 
therefore noted: 
 A duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries58 
 A duty to act in good faith59 
 A duty to avoid conflicts of interest60 
 A duty to act with impartiality61 
 A duty to not make any secret profit (or gain any improper advantage)62 
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 A duty to disclose63 
 A duty to act for a proper purpose/not to act for an improper purpose64 
 A duty to not exceed powers65 
 A duty to maintain an unfettered discretion66 
It is evident that these duties are closely related and can be categorised into main 
duties and sub-duties. 
Based on the previous descriptions provided for fiduciary duties and the fact that 
fiduciary duties are contextual, it is suggested that the two main duties for the key role 
players in the pension fund investment chain are the duty to act in the best interests of 
beneficiaries and the duty to act in good faith. It is possible to argue that all the other 
duties noted could form part of these two broader duties. This prompts questions 
around the actual meanings of these duties and how they differ, if they differ at all. It 
would therefore be constructive to provide short descriptions for the meanings of 
these duties. 
A duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries 
In explicating the meaning of the words, the word “interests” can simply be replaced 
with benefit or advantage. This would mean that the fiduciary should act so that the 
beneficiaries are not disadvantaged in any way. This is not only a very difficult task 
but seems to be an extremely wide duty. This is probably why this one duty can 
include so many of the other duties mentioned. It is possible to argue that in order to 
act in another‟s best interests one must a) apply due care and skill; b) not make a 
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secret profit; c) not have interests that conflict with one‟s duty; d) disclose relevant 
information; e) act with impartiality toward all beneficiaries; f) act for a proper 
purpose; g) not exceed one‟s powers; and h) maintain an unfettered discretion. 
In order to narrow down this wide meaning of “best interests”, it is again essential to 
look at the specific context. In Browne v South African Retirement Annuity Fund and 
Others,67 the trustees were found to be in breach of their duty to act in members‟ best 
interests by not allowing a certain transfer. This transfer was between approved 
retirement annuity funds, prior to the retirement age. This case was obviously judged 
on a very specific set of facts and it is therefore difficult to make any generalisations 
from this decision with regard to a possible definition for acting in the best interests of 
beneficiaries. The “bottom line” of this case would, however, be that the member 
would have been in a better financial position if the trustees had allowed the transfer. 
This might also imply that “best interests” means that risk-adjusted financial returns 
should be maximised. 
This idea that best interests might be a reference to maximising risk-adjusted financial 
returns is reinforced by the legislated object of pension funds, provided in the Pension 
Funds Act as part of the definition of the term pension fund organisation. A pension 
fund organisation is defined and it is stated that the object of such an organisation is 
“providing annuities or lump sum payments for members or former members …”.68 
Circular PF 13069 states that “the assets of a retirement fund are administered for the 
main purpose of providing the benefits promised – in terms of the registered rules of 
that fund”. This is further supported in the same Circular which states further on that 
“the purpose of good governance in a fund is to ensure that benefits are optimized and 
the associated investment risks are minimized”. Furthermore, the word “benefit” is 
                                                                                                                                            
67
 2006 (4) BPLR 311 (PFA). 
68
 See s 1, the definitions section in the Pension Funds Act. 
69
 The Financial Services Board (FSB), a statutory body tasked with oversight of the entire financial 
services industry, publishes documents called Circulars. These are published in the Government 
Gazette and are designed to give guidance to the financial services industry on how to interpret 
legislation. Circulars PF Nos. 3 to 131 deal specifically with matters relating to pension funds. 
21 
 
defined in the Pension Funds Act and in the General Pension Act as “any amount 
payable to a member or beneficiary in terms of the rules of that fund” and “an amount 
of money”. Once again, in both instances, the word would seem to have a purely 
financial connotation. Thus, although it is theoretically possible to extend the notion 
of best interests beyond the traditional financial interpretation, this would require 
disconnecting best interests from the object of pension funds. 
Blackman et al discuss the meaning of “the interests of the company” as part of their 
discussion of the fiduciary duties of company directors.70 They also acknowledge that 
the concept is not clearly defined but nonetheless describe what the current legal 
position is in their view. They state that “the general rule is that the interest of the 
company are the interests of the shareholders qua shareholders, as a general body”.71 
They add that directors should also consider the interests of future shareholders. If this 
is applied to the current context it would mean that the interest of the pension fund is 
the interests of the members and the future members of the fund. They also explain 
that this duty entails that the fiduciary must act in what he genuinely believes72 to be 
the best interests of his beneficiaries.73 They say that the word “interest” can mean 
different things, but emphasise that it depends on the context.  
In the context of a pension fund, the meaning of best interests can, then, essentially 
mean either achieving the best possible financial position for the beneficiary, or it can 
include other benefits like a healthy physical environment. 
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 See Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 8−67, 76. They do not, however, discuss 
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 Idem 8–70. 
22 
 
A duty to act in good faith 
Good faith in a legal context would refer to bona fides74 – the opposite of mala fides. 
This can be roughly translated as good intentions. In other words the fiduciary should 
not have bad intentions or hidden agendas. Good faith also refers to the fact that the 
fiduciary must act honestly. This duty of honesty includes a duty to not do anything 
that is illegal or fraudulent and points to the notion of transparency and 
accountability.75 Furthermore, it has been established through case law76 in the pension 
fund context that the duty to act in good faith includes a duty to disclose adequate, 
relevant information.  
It also seems impossible to separate this duty from the duty to act in the best interests 
of beneficiaries.77 In this sense, it can be argued that good faith refers to the “how” it 
should be done while “best interests” refers to what should be achieved. The one 
therefore refers to the attitude of the fiduciary and the other refers to the outcome of 
the fiduciary‟s actions. Blackman et al describe this as a test that is “subjective as to 
means”78 and “objective as to ends”.79 This simply entails that the fiduciary must 
subjectively believe that he is acting in the best interests of the beneficiary, but this is 
qualified in the sense that it only applies if the fiduciary has correctly identified the 
interests of the beneficiary as they stand in law. In the South African pension fund 
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A duty to avoid conflicts of interest 
It is plain to see that this duty forms part of the broader duty to act in the best interests 
of beneficiaries.80 Nonetheless, in the pension fund context this duty would mean that 
the fiduciary “may not place himself in a position in which he has, or can have, a 
personal interest, or a duty to another, conflicting, or which may possibly conflict, 
with his duties”81 to the pension fund. Thus, this duty not only forbids actual conflicts 
but also potential conflicts. 
It has also been said that one should not only acknowledge breach of this duty where 
the fiduciary has an interest conflicting with the interests of the beneficiary, but also 
where the fiduciary has a duty to another that conflicts with his duty to the 
beneficiaries. There can, however, be an exception to this “no-conflict rule”, where 
the fiduciary has informed the beneficiaries about his interest and consent is given that 
he may still proceed with the action − also referred to as informed consent.82  
Blackman et al83 identify six sub-duties under the so called “no-conflict rule” where 
the fiduciary duties of company directors are described. These sub-duties are: the self-
dealing rule; the fair-dealing rule; a duty to account for all profits obtained; a duty not 
to take corporate opportunities; a duty not to compete with the company; and a duty 
not to misuse confidential information. The self-dealing rule refers to situations where 
the fiduciary has an interest that conflicts or may possibly conflict with his duty to act 
in the best interests of the beneficiaries. This rule does not, however, state that the 
fiduciary may not have a personal interest in the situation; it is just that his interest 
may not clash with his duty. 
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The fair-dealing rule in the pension fund context would amount to the following: 
where the fiduciary has an interest that conflicts with the interest of the pension fund, 
the fiduciary must with regard to that specific contract or situation remove himself 
from the decision-making process or may not take part in that action. It is said that the 
primary duty here is that the fiduciary must disclose his interest. 
The duty to account for all profits obtained is discussed separately below under the 
duty not to make any secret profit. A discussion of a duty not to take corporate 
opportunities and a duty not to compete with the pension fund is not included here as 
it is not deemed essential for the purposes of this study. It might, however, be 
technically possible for the role players in the pension fund investment chain to take 
corporate opportunities and to compete with the fund. A duty to not misuse 
confidential information refers to a scenario where the fiduciary might be in 
possession of confidential information because of his position or office and the rule is 
that he may not then use this information for his own benefit. 
A duty to act with impartiality 
This duty is seen as part of the duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries but 
refers to the fact that the fiduciary should not discriminate against any of the 
beneficiaries and should treat all beneficiaries fairly.84 This duty also illustrates how 
fiduciary duties can be contextual. It will not, for instance, be applicable to fiduciaries 
that have to act only in the interest of one beneficiary, but will only be relevant where 
the fiduciaries have to act in the interests of more than one beneficiary, as is the case 
with pension funds. 
A duty to not make a secret profit (or gain any improper advantage) 
As already described, this duty is closely related to the duties to act in the best 
interests of the beneficiaries and the duty to act in good faith. This duty simply entails 
that the fiduciary is not allowed to use his position to make a profit that is not 
disclosed and is also referred to as the “no-profit rule”.85 It is also clearly related to the 
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duty to avoid conflicts of interest and some argue that this duty flows naturally from 
the duty to avoid conflicts of interests.  Furthermore, it is said that the “no-profit rule” 
constitutes two sub-duties: firstly, the fiduciary may not keep a profit that he made by 
use of his position and secondly, a fiduciary may not keep a profit that he made from 
circumstances where there was a conflict of interest and duty.86 
A duty to disclose 
This duty is self-explanatory in the sense that disclosure means to make known or 
reveal. This duty essentially refers to the notion of accountability and would therefore 
include a duty to communicate relevant information. In the pension context 
specifically, it would for instance include the communication of benefit statements. 
As has already been explained, this duty is seen as part of the duty to act in good faith 
which is described in case law.87 This duty could certainly also be part of the duty to 
act in the best interests of beneficiaries. 
A duty to disclose can also be seen as one of the sub-duties of the duty to avoid 
conflicts of interests. It was mentioned that a fiduciary has a duty to disclose the 
interest he has in situations where he has an interest that conflicts with his duty. On 
the question of to whom the disclosure must be made, it has been said that the 
disclosure must be made to the members in a general meeting, but this is in the 
context of companies.88 It is not certain what the position in the context of a pension 
fund is. It has however been said that this duty will depend on the facts of each case,89 
therefore highlighting the fact that these duties are contextual. 
A duty to act for a proper purpose/not to act for an improper purpose 
This duty refers to the fact that the fiduciary has power and he must “exercise it bona 
fide for the end designed”.90 This duty is therefore clearly linked to the two duties (a 
duty to act in good faith and a duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries) that are 
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suggested to be the main fiduciary duties for the key role players in the pension fund 
investment chain. Blackman et al91 discuss this duty and its application to company 
directors at length and assert that this duty also comprises certain sub-duties. They 
discuss these sub-duties under the headings “categories of improper purpose” and 
“unauthorised or collateral purposes”. Under “categories of improper purpose” the 
following duty is mentioned: a duty to act bona fide in the interests of the company. 
This is, therefore, a combination of the two main duties as identified for this 
dissertation. It is argued that the fiduciaries‟ purpose is to act in the interests of their 
beneficiaries and if they don‟t do that, they are acting for an improper purpose.92 Then 
it is said that unauthorised or collateral purposes are purposes not authorised by the 
memorandum of the company, or where it comprises unauthorised business purposes, 
or purposes not authorised by the articles of association of the company. In the 
pension fund context this would translate to purposes not authorised by the rules of 
the fund. 
A duty to not exceed powers 
This duty requires that the fiduciary may not go beyond the scope of his authority. 
The generally recognised term used in this context is that fiduciaries are not allowed 
to act ultra vires. It also means that the fiduciary may not act beyond any limitation 
placed on him by legislation or the common law93 or the rules of the fund in the 
pension fund context. Again, it is clear that this duty and the duty to act for a proper 
purpose are very closely related and could probably fall under the duty to act in the 
best interests of beneficiaries. 
In Tek Corporation Provident Fund and Others v Lorentz94 a recommendation was 
made by the trustees that a surplus should be retained to balance the possible risks of 
future volatility in the investment environment. Although the duty to not exceed one‟s 
powers was not explicitly identified as a fiduciary duty, it was said that the trustees 
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would be acting ultra vires if they are not given the powers to do so in the rules of the 
fund. It is also implied that acting within one‟s powers forms part of the duty to act in 
the best interests of beneficiaries.  
A duty to maintain an unfettered discretion 
This duty was discussed in PPWAWU National Provident Fund v Chemical, Energy, 
Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers' Union (CEPPWAWU),95 where it was said 
that:  
The trustee's obligation to exercise an independent judgment, regardless of the views 
of the trade union (or employer) which appointed him, is analogous to the director's 
obligation to exercise an independent judgment, regardless of the views of any party 
which may have procured his or her appointment as a director. 
This “independent judgment” the court refers to is probably the best way of describing 
this duty. It is also said that this duty requires the fiduciary to not just follow 
instructions without considering them first and that the fiduciary may not be a 
“puppet”.96 In the current context this duty would specifically require that a trustee, 
for instance, is not influenced by the employer to represent only the interest of that 
employer just because he was appointed by them. 
In Mashazi v African Products Retirement Benefit Provident Fund and Another97 it 
was said that the trustees of the pension fund had a duty to “exercise an equitable 
discretion”. In this case the issue under discussion was the interpretation of section 
37C of the Pension Fund Act and the fact that the trustees have the power to decide 
how benefits will be paid to dependents upon a member‟s death. In the context of this 
case this reference to an equitable discretion is therefore a reference to the fact that the 
trustees should not be persuaded only by the will or the nomination form of the 
deceased member but that they should retain their independent judgement.  
Confusion on whether the duty to act with due care and diligence is a fiduciary duty  
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Firstly, it is submitted that this possible confusion over whether the duty to act with 
due care and diligence is a fiduciary duty is created by the loose manner in which the 
term fiduciary duty is often used.98 Secondly, it might be difficult for the lay person to 
differentiate between a fiduciary duty as opposed to a duty owed by a fiduciary. This 
is clearly illustrated in Frankal:  
First the law vests in entrustors the legal right to receive quality fiduciary services. It 
imposes on fiduciaries a duty to exercise care and skill, akin to the tort of negligence. 
Second, the rules vest in entrustors the legal right to rely on the honesty of their 
fiduciaries by imposing on fiduciaries a duty of loyalty, as well as other specific 
duties, in order to deter fiduciaries from misappropriating the entrusted property or 
interests. This part of fiduciary law is akin to the crime of embezzlement and the tort 
of conversion.99  
Thirdly, it is clear that the real difference between a duty of care on the one hand and 
fiduciary duties on the other is in the test for breach of these duties. This notion is also 
implied in the quote by Frankal above and discussed in great detail by Havenga.100 She 
specifically comments on the suggestion made by Du Plessis101 that there is no need 
for a distinction between the duty of care and other fiduciary duties and that the basis 
for breach of both can be delictual. She furthermore explains that if the Aquilian 
action would be accepted as a valid basis for breach of fiduciary duties, fiduciaries 
could potentially be found in breach of a fiduciary duty not only by actively pursuing 
bad intentions, but also by simply being negligent or careless in their actions. She then 
continues, saying “liability without fault is generally recognised in respect of directors 
who have breached their fiduciary obligation”.102 Blackman et al103 also assert that the 
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duty of care is not a fiduciary duty and explain it as follows: “A servant who loyally 
does his incompetent best for his master is not unfaithful and is not guilty of breach of 
his fiduciary duty.”  
Rotman,104 in the international context, also differentiates between the duty of care and 
fiduciary duty and explains that the duty of care is “that of a man of ordinary 
prudence in managing his own affairs”, which is obviously not the case in his 
descriptions of fiduciary conduct. Consequently, Rotman‟s views are the same as 
those of Havenga.  
Nevertheless, on the international front in particular, there are some authors who are 
of the opinion that the duty of care does form part of fiduciary duties. Richardson105 
describes the duty of care or prudence as one of “the principal elements of the 
fiduciary relationship”. He further explains that “[t]hese standards coalesce to form 
the twin key duties of loyalty and prudence, the latter known as the prudent investor 
rule”. Martin106 also creates the impression that the duty of care forms part of fiduciary 
duties because the notion of prudence and the fact that the fiduciaries have a duty of 
care is discussed under the heading of “Nature of fiduciary liability”. He states that a 
fiduciary in a financial advisory role will be in breach of his fiduciary duty if he fails 
to document his process of decision making. 
The dichotomy around whether the duty of care is indeed a fiduciary duty is 
acknowledged in the literature.107 It is said that some commentators differentiate 
between specific fiduciary duties and trust law. On this matter it is argued that there 
are different grounds for liability and different consequences for breach of fiduciary 
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duties as opposed to breach of the duty to act with care (prudence) and that the duty of 
care should therefore be seen as a separate duty.108  
The fact that the duty of due care and diligence is a separate duty would recently seem 
to have been settled, at least within the South African context,109 but there still seems 
to be no clarity on this matter on the international front. It is not, however, the purpose 
of this dissertation to determine whether the duty of care is an “original” fiduciary 
duty or not, although it is important to acknowledge this dichotomy in the literature. 
Consequently, the focus of this dissertation is rather to describe the fiduciary duties of 
the key role players in the pension fund investment chain, if indeed they are 
fiduciaries. 
1.2.3 SUMMARY 
In summary, as the literature indicates, many authors have discussed the notion of 
fiduciary responsibility at great length, but few seem to agree on an exact definition or 
description of fiduciary responsibility. There are nonetheless a few universal elements 
that can be pinned down. 
Firstly, there is agreement about the fact that a relationship needs to exist between two 
or more people – the fiduciary and the beneficiary/beneficiaries. It is also frequently 
mentioned that the fiduciary has to act on behalf of the beneficiary and that the 
fiduciary therefore has some power and discretion and, consequently, has certain 
fiduciary duties. 
Secondly, it was emphasised that a list of generally recognised common law fiduciary 
duties could not be found, but that it would aid the rest of this study if such a list 
could be compiled. It was then suggested that the two main duties are the duty to act 
in the best interests of beneficiaries and the duty to act in good faith. Furthermore, it 
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was established that the duty of care and diligence is a separate duty and should not 
form part of the list of generally recognised fiduciary duties. Consequently, the 
following list is proposed as presenting the generally recognised common law 
fiduciary duties: 
 A duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries 
 A duty to act in good faith 
 A duty to avoid conflicts of interest 
 A duty to act with impartiality 
 A duty not to make any secret profit (or gain any improper advantage) 
 A duty to disclose 
 A duty to act for a proper purpose/ not to act for an improper purpose 
 A duty to not exceed powers 
 A duty to maintain an unfettered discretion 
Thirdly, an interesting notion presented in the literature is that the duty to act in the 
best interests of beneficiaries could include the majority of the other fiduciary duties. 
Richardson110 describes this as follows: “As such the fiduciary‟s foremost duty is one 
of loyalty to the beneficiary – to act in their sole or best interests.” These authors and 
case law111 provide different perspectives on the same issue – fiduciary duty entails, 
first and foremost, acting in the best interests of the beneficiary. 
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Nonetheless, in order to describe the universe of interpretations of fiduciary 
responsibility of the key role players in the pension fund investment chain, three 
crucial questions remain:112  
1. Who assumes fiduciary responsibility in the pension fund investment chain? 
2. Who are the beneficiaries of this responsibility? 
3. What are the duties involved in this responsibility?113 
These questions form part of the methodology in this dissertation and are used in 
Phase I and Phase II of the study as instruments to address the overall research 
question. 
1.3 RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT 
As with fiduciary responsibility, the concept of responsible investment appears to be 
associated with a multitude of interpretations.114 Responsible investment is actually a 
relatively new and still developing term and therefore the concept may be even more 
                                                                                                                                            
112
 After the completion of this study an important piece of legislation with regard to the pension fund 
industry in South Africa was published. On 4 March 2011, the Amendment of Regulation 28 of the 
Regulations made under s 36 of The Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 was published in the 
Government Gazette 34070. For the first time, the actual words “fiduciary duty” and “fiduciary 
responsibility” appear in the preamble to this regulation. Consequently, the revised Regulation 28 
raised more questions about practitioners‟ fiduciary responsibility in the pension fund industry. 
Although the revised Regulation 28 was not used during this study to inform the research question, 
the influence it might have had on the research question at hand and the possibilities for future 
research in this space are considered in an epilogue to this dissertation. This epilogue follows after 
the concluding chapter and is entitled: Fiduciary Responsibility: New Developments in Pension 
Fund Legislation. 
113
 Rotman “Fiduciary Doctrine: A Concept in Need of Understanding” 824. Rotman uses a quote 
from Mr Justice Felix Frankfurter in a case Securities and Exchange Commission v Chenery Corp. 
This quote confirms the three questions triggered by Blackman‟s definition of a fiduciary: “To say 
that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis: it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a 
fiduciary? What obligation does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge 
these obligations? And what are the consequences of his deviation from duty?” 
114
 Eccles et al “The Origins and Meanings of Names Describing Investment Practices that Integrate a 
Consideration of ESG Issues in the Academic Literature” 389–402. 
33 
 
undefined than fiduciary responsibility. Sparkes and Cowton115 state that “[t]he field 
of socially responsible investment (SRI) has been characterized by debate or lack of 
consensus about definitions” and that “the terminology is not settled”.  
The following piece from Thornton116 clearly illustrates this confusion around names 
and terminology for responsible investment: 
Quite naturally, many are concerned to try to make responsible investment choices; 
the ethical investment industry has itself become a multi-million pound business. 
Since 1984, when Friends Provident Fund launched its Stewardship Fund, the first 
specifically “ethical” unit trust, the sector of the investment market targeted at 
investors seeking to ensure socially responsible uses for their money has grown 
exponentially. [researcher‟s emphasis] 
Furthermore, Thornton117 uses the terms ethical investment and socially responsible 
investment interchangeably throughout her article, which adds to the confusion.118 
Sparkes and Cowton119 also seem to cloud the terms ethical investment and socially 
responsible investment when they used the same definition to describe these two 
terms a few years apart. They also state that the two most prominent terms used in this 
genre are socially responsible investment (SRI) and ethical investment, and mention 
that ethical investment is the older of the two. In the above quotation, three terms are 
mentioned, ethical investment, socially responsible investment and responsible 
investment. According to Eccles et al,120 these are also the three most popularly used 
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terms to describe investment practices that consider environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) issues.121  
Although it is constructive to first discuss the history and development of the concept 
of responsible investment, this is challenging owing to the fact that it is difficult to 
separate the issues of the history and development of responsible investment and the 
use of terminology in this genre. In this case, genre refers to 
… a combination of investment strategies that integrate ethical as well as 
environmental, social and corporate governance considerations into investment 
analysis and decision making processes.122  
It therefore makes sense to look at the three most prominent terms separately, starting 
with ethical investment, as this is generally conceived to be the oldest of the terms.123 
1.3.1 ETHICAL INVESTMENT 
The notion of ethical investment dates back to the 1700s, when churches and other 
religious groups like the Quakers sought to avoid investing in things that they 
perceived to be immoral or wrong.124 This trend later developed into an interest in 
investing with the goal of achieving specific social return or for the relief of specific 
social dilemmas. However, there are differing opinions on the origin of this kind of 
investment.  
In his historical analysis of ethical investment, Sparkes125 distinguishes between the 
“public awareness” and the actual “activity” of ethical investment. He explains that 
church investors have for many years used ethical considerations to run their 
portfolios; in other words they have been involved in the activity of ethical 
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investment, but they did not specifically attach a name to it (public awareness). 
Consequently, the literature seems to present differing views on the exact details of 
the first instance of ethical investment.126 Nevertheless, academic writers generally 
agree that, historically, ethical investment typically involved a negative screening 
process whereby manufacturers of certain products (usually those that were closely 
linked to alcohol, tobacco and firearms) were excluded from investment portfolios. 
They also agree that religious beliefs played an important role in the development of 
ethical investment. 
Sparkes also mentions that during the 1970s, ethical investment became more 
widespread with the growing resistance to apartheid, with not only churches but also 
individuals wanting to take a stand against the apartheid regime by divesting from 
South Africa.
127
 Sparkes also recognises the role that the anti-Vietnam war movement 
played in the increase in ethical investment and this was even before the anti-
apartheid movement. In the late 1970s and 1980s, ethical investment was still 
primarily a niche investing stream but more and more individual ethical investment 
tools were introduced to the market. Nonetheless, confusion around names and terms 
about the subject continued into the nineties. 
Sparkes, for instance, presents two specific definitions of ethical investment – one by 
Button and one by Cowton.128 Button‟s definition is as follows:  
… putting your money into investments which will yield a financial return for you, 
but which do not support areas of business interest that you disapprove of, such as 
arms, tobacco, alcohol, apartheid, violation of human rights.  
Cowton‟s definition is the following:  
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… the exercise of ethical and social criteria in the selection and management of 
investment portfolios, generally consisting of company shares (stocks).  
Sparkes, however, goes on to say:  
Ethical investment is straightforward, and simply means an investment philosophy 
that combines ethical or environmental goals with financial ones.129 
Mackenzie and Lewis‟s130 definition of ethical investment is similar to Sparkes‟s 
definition, but it does not seem so straightforward:  
Ethical investment can be used to refer to all kinds of investments that mix ethical 
with ordinary financial motivations or objectives. It includes green, social, and 
socially responsible investment. 
Considering all of the above, what has been said about the confusion around 
definitions and terminology is highlighted rather than clarified. It is, however, 
suggested that, during the nineties, it became evident that people no longer wanted to 
use the term ethical investment, because it had become too loaded; thus, more and 
more people started to use the term socially responsible investment (SRI).131 This was 
perhaps because people were attracted to the notion of doing “good” with their 
money, but not everyone was comfortable with the idea that it was attached to 
religious views in some way.132 
1.3.2 SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT (SRI) 
By the mid 1990s, the dominant name applied to investment activities in this genre, in 
the academic literature at least, was socially responsible investment (SRI).133 
Nonetheless, the confusion around names and terminology continued. In 2001 
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Sparkes134 primarily described ethical investment as a synonym for the term socially 
responsible investment, although ethical investment is described as an older term than 
socially responsible investment. It then makes sense that Sparkes and Cowton135 
defined SRI in 2004 as “the exercise of ethical and social criteria in the selection and 
management of investment portfolios, generally consisting of company shares 
(stocks)” – the same definition used earlier136 by Cowton to define ethical investment. 
From the late 1990s onwards, considerable efforts were made to take this genre of 
investment from a small niche approach into the mainstream of investment. In 
describing the growth in SRI, Richardson137 states that “[w]hile this movement is 
gaining more adherents, it has increasingly justified responsible financing as a path to 
be prosperous, rather than virtuous”. Richardson also says that “[e]thical investment, 
or socially responsible investment as this financing movement is more commonly 
known today, increasingly downplays ethics”.138 
Eccles139 also comments on the downplaying of ethics and a move towards a more 
“egoist” approach to SRI. Once again, the idea of mainstreaming SRI and building a 
business case for SRI arose. The business case for SRI refers to the suggestion that 
even more money can be made if investment is done in a socially responsible manner.  
1.3.3 RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT  
Responsible investment is thought to “imply the choice of financial products or 
adhesion to a set of criteria bearing a certain label”.140 However, this is not a 
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universally accepted definition of responsible investment, since other authors use 
other definitions to describe similar investment activity.141 
According to Sparkes, writing in 2001,142 SRI is often used as a synonym for 
responsible investment. If this is true it would imply that the social “aspect” of 
responsible investment is not only important but possibly dominates in the minds of 
those who are responsible for investment decisions. In other words, these “responsible 
investors” most likely want to achieve social goals with their investment strategy. 
Thus, even though the terminology has changed from ethical investment to SRI and, 
more recently, just plain responsible investment, two issues remain: the absence of a 
universally accepted definition for what constitutes responsible investment and issues 
around ethics.  
This requires asking some practical questions concerning responsible investment. 
Eccles and Viviers143 found that the term responsible investment is associated with 
three specific investment strategies, namely, positive screening, best-in-class and 
cause-based investing. This speaks about the practice of responsible investment.  
Viviers et al144 (2008) also explore the issue of whether responsible investing is indeed 
ethical. The aim of their article was to place responsible investment within an ethical 
framework. They therefore explored the definition of ethics and the different 
approaches to investment ethics. In their article, these authors describe “seven 
approaches to ethical reasoning”. Dembinski et al145 (2003) express a similar view to 
Viviers et al and state that responsible investment can be expressed by way of “four 
types of ethical concern”.146 These ethical concerns are  
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… value-based ethics resulting in the exclusion of so-called vicious companies from 
the investment portfolio; fructification-oriented ethics with a view to long-term 
investment; consequence-based ethics aimed at initiating a behavioral change in the 
investment target; and ethics envisaged as a discriminating criterion in the search of 
the best financial performance. 
In spite of the abovementioned authors‟ attempt to place responsible investment 
within an ethical framework, academic writers147 contend that there is a move away 
from the focus on ethics as a consequence of the mainstreaming of responsible 
investment. It is not entirely clear whether this is because the PRI148 is supposedly 
removing the focus from ethics to advancing risk-adjusted financial returns, or 
because academic writers have fuelled the idea that ESG issues are financially 
material.149  
So, whereas earlier forms (ethical investment and SRI) of this investment genre were 
explicitly about constraining investment activities on the basis of some notion of what 
was ethically right and wrong, more recent versions attached to the use of the term 
responsible investment have focused on the financial materiality of ESG issues. While 
some authors150 have suggested that this egoist “ethical” position might be a defining 
characteristic of responsible investment compared with other forms of the genre, this 
is far from a consensus position. 
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Eccles151 states that there is “a growing disquiet amongst academics surrounding the 
ascendancy of „responsible‟ investment that is egoist or self-interested in character”. 
He then goes on to describe the different names that have been given to this egoistic 
type of responsible investment by various academics. Richardson152 calls it “business-
case” responsible investment; Van Braeckel and Bontemps call it the “materiality 
approach”; while Viviers et al call it “a weak form of ethical investment”.  
Although it is acknowledged that a number of interpretations exist for responsible 
investment, it is the aim of this section to reduce these different definitions and 
interpretations of responsible investment in order to determine whether fiduciary 
responsibility can be seen as a barrier to its implementation. Considering the 
description above of the history and development of responsible investment, as well 
as the confusion surrounding relevant names and terms, it is suggested that 
responsible investment could be used as an overarching term to include nuances of 
ethical investment and socially responsible investment. Furthermore, at least two 
basic forms of responsible investment can be identified: a “business case” form, 
where ESG issues are only considered in so far as they are considered to be 
financially material, and a “social” form that implies the distinct possibility (although 
not absolute certainty) that financial return may be sacrificed in pursuit of some sort 
of social or other returns. 
1.4 FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY AND RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT 
As mentioned right at the beginning of this dissertation, it is not surprising that 
uncertainty exists at the interface of two ambiguous concepts. In 2001, Payette153 
touched on the subject of the link between fiduciary responsibility and responsible 
investment. He commented on the focus of the maximising of financial returns by 
investors and quotes Nicklin (1997), who claims that it is the fiduciary responsibility 
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of investment managers to maximise returns. Payette thereafter states that “... the term 
fiduciary responsibility is being used as a justification for achieving a high level of 
financial performance even though stakeholders may object to the principle of the 
location and social conditions surrounding investments”.154 In 2005, the Freshfields 
report155confirmed the sentiment expressed by Payette that investment fiduciaries can 
act in an ethical way with regard to ESG issues if acting in such a way either improves 
or at least has no negative impact on financial returns.  
In 2007, Richardson156 addressed a very similar question to the one in this study 
(whether fiduciary responsibility creates barriers to the implementation of responsible 
investment for pension funds), but he focused on what he called the main common 
law jurisdictions, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Australia, 
using a literature review to address the question. Richardson starts out by saying that 
some lawyers and investors believe that their legal duties, including their fiduciary 
duties, restrict them from considering “non-financial criteria”.157 He also 
acknowledges the fact that there is some confusion among investment practitioners as 
to the question of how far reaching their fiduciary duties really are and if they are 
allowed to sacrifice financial returns in order to gain social or environmental returns. 
He then proposes that SRI can actually be enhanced through the legal reform of 
fiduciary responsibility and suggests four possible ways of achieving this reform. 
Nevertheless, he ultimately concludes: 
This article seeks to clarify the impact of fiduciaries‟ investment duties in the pension 
fund sector on SRI. Traditionally, those fiduciary duties are seen as antithetical to 
SRI, primarily because ethically-motivated investing is stereotyped as sacrificing 
financial returns. This article disputes this dichotomy, arguing that SRI is often 
financially advantageous and can be implemented by various methods that comply 
                                                                                                                                            
154
 Payette “Fiduciary Responsibility of Board Trustees and Officers in Universities and Colleges” 15. 
155
 Freshfields A Legal Framework for the Integration of Environmental, Social and Governance 
Issues into Institutional Investment 1–153. 
156
 Richardson “Do the Fiduciary Duties of Pension Funds Hinder Socially Responsible Investment?” 
146–201. 
157
 Idem 147. 
42 
 
with duties of prudence and loyalty. Depending on how the “best interests” of 
beneficiaries are defined, SRI may even allow for some diminution of financial 
returns in order to achieve specific ethical or social benefits mandated by governing 
trust instruments.  
In 2009, Richardson158 wrote on “Keeping ethical investment ethical” and he again 
suggested the reformation of fiduciary duties in order to achieve this. He concludes 
that “the traditional concept of benefit to investors can be ethically redefined, and 
thereby financiers steered towards sustainability”.  
Also in 2009, Martin159 commented on the relationship between SRI and fiduciary 
duties. Accordingly, he echoes the view presented in the Freshfields report that 
fiduciary duty and SRI are not inherently incompatible. He does, however, comment 
that profit maximisation is being challenged on a global scale and provides specific 
qualifications for his conclusions.  
More recently, Richardson160 described the ongoing debate about the legality of 
responsible investment. He states that the focus of responsible investment has been on 
the financial materiality of this investment approach and that this was a legal 
justification for it in terms of fiduciary duties – again affirming the views presented in 
the Freshfields report. However, in this article Richardson explores the issue of the 
will of beneficiaries and how legal reform could give effect to “a more participatory 
fiduciary relationship”.161 In other words whether the “social form” of responsible 
investment would be permissible if it were what the beneficiaries want. 
Although these authors have addressed similar questions to the one being investigated 
in this dissertation, none of them have addressed them in the context of the pension 
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fund industry of South Africa. Consequently, it is appropriate to answer the research 
question at hand with reference to the pension fund industry of South Africa. 
1.5 DISSERTATION STRUCTURE 
In order to address the overall research question of this dissertation, the research was 
conducted in three distinct qualitative phases. Phases I and II were dedicated to 
describing fiduciary responsibility for the key role players in the pension fund 
investment chain in South Africa. Phase III consisted of drawing and verifying 
conclusions.162 In order to draw these conclusions, a systematic data reduction was 
performed, particularly through comparisons between Phases I and II and, finally, 
using special interpretation matrices.163 
The investigation into the universe of interpretations for fiduciary responsibility for 
the key role players in the South African pension fund investment chain is structured 
around three sub-questions, derived in Section 1.2:  
1. Are the key role players in the pension fund investment chain actually 
fiduciaries?  
2. Assuming they are fiduciaries, who are the beneficiaries of their duties? 
3. What are the key role players‟ fiduciary duties in the specific context of this 
study? 
In Phase I these questions were put to South African legal sources,164 while in Phase II 
the key role players themselves were asked to answer these questions in open-ended 
qualitative interviews.165 These descriptions of fiduciary responsibility from South 
African legal sources, as well as the views of the key role players in the pension fund 
investment chain derived from Phases I and II, are presented in Chapter 3 of the 
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dissertation, together with the systematic reduction of these descriptions.166 This 
process of data reduction is essential to prepare the data for Phase III. 
In Phase III, the two key concepts of the study, fiduciary responsibility and 
responsible investment, are brought together to address the overall research question. 
Chapter 4 is dedicated to Phase III.  
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
2.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 
It has been said that qualitative descriptive studies should be chosen when “straight 
descriptions of phenomena are desired”.167 It is for this reason that a qualitative 
research approach was chosen for this study. The typical purpose of any qualitative 
research study is to “describe and understand rather than explain human behavior”.168 
In this study, one of the aims was to describe and understand two key concepts, 
fiduciary responsibility and responsible investment. Descriptions of responsible 
investment are found in Section 1.3 of this dissertation. The descriptions of fiduciary 
responsibility were gathered from “interviews” with legal sources and human 
participants. The different descriptions of fiduciary responsibility and responsible 
investment were then used to achieve the main objective of the study, which was to 
answer the following core research question: 
Does fiduciary responsibility create barriers to the implementation of responsible 
investment in the South African pension fund investment chain? 
The research was conducted in three distinct phases. In Phase I the research 
considered South African legal sources169 as they apply to the fiduciary responsibility 
of the key role players in the pension fund investment chain. Phase II involved an 
exploration of the different key role players‟ understanding(s) of fiduciary 
responsibility, through in-depth qualitative interviews. After Phases I and II, the data 
from these two sets of results was compared with each other in order to identify 
correspondences and discrepancies. This was done as part of a data reduction process 
to organise the data for Phase III. Phase III entailed the use of interpretation matrices, 
portraying the different descriptions of the key concepts in the study in order to 
provide or describe the range of valid answers to the core research question. 
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Sandelowski170 claims that no method is just good or bad, but rather that any method 
must suit the specific research objectives. Although qualitative description was by far 
the most appropriate method to achieve the objectives of this study, certain limitations 
remain. These limitations and the measures taken to ensure trustworthiness form part 
of the discussion of the methodology in this chapter. 
2.2 OPERATIONALISATION 
Mouton describes operationalisation or operational definition as the process of 
“linking the key concepts in the problem statement to the actual phenomena to be 
studied”.171 The key concepts in this study, as noted before, are fiduciary 
responsibility and responsible investment. Proper descriptions, definitions and 
interpretations of the concept of fiduciary responsibility in the context of South 
African pension funds, and the bringing together of these with the descriptions of 
responsible investment were required before the overall research question could be 
answered. 
In order to link Phases I and II of the research to fiduciary responsibility, a measuring 
instrument that suited the qualitative nature of this study was developed. This 
instrument structured the interrogation of the research phenomena around the 
following three questions:172 
1. Are pension fund trustees, asset managers and asset consultants (the key role 
players) fiduciaries in the pension fund investment chain? 
2. If the answer to the first question is yes, to whom do they respectively owe 
their fiduciary responsibility? 
3. What are their fiduciary duties? 
In keeping with the qualitative tradition, which allows for adjustments of the 
instrument, these three core questions were extended during Phase II of the research 
with two additional questions for the role players. The interviewees were asked to 
                                                                                                                                            
170
 Sandelowski “Whatever Happened to Qualitative Description?” 335. 
171
 Mouton Understanding Social Research 125. 
172
 See Section 1.5. 
47 
 
describe in their own words, a) the duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries, 
and b) the duty to act in good faith. This was because these two duties had already 
been suggested in the background literature as the main fiduciary duties. The legal 
sources then also provided lists of fiduciary duties, and again these two duties were 
mentioned most frequently.173 It was therefore justified to ask the key role players for 
their views on these duties specifically. 
2.3 SELECTION DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION 
The focus of Phases I and II of the study was to construct an “extensive description”174 
of fiduciary responsibility for the three key role players in the South African pension 
fund context. Mouton175 states that a contextual strategy should be used when “the 
primary aim of the investigators is to produce an extensive description of the 
phenomenon in the specific context”. Mouton continues, saying that contextual 
strategies are appropriate where the aim is “to investigate a single case in an in-depth 
manner”.176 The “single case” in this dissertation refers to fiduciary responsibility in 
the very specific context of the South African pension fund industry.  
One requirement for executing a contextual strategy is to go through a selection 
process and to identify the universe or population for the study. The universes for 
Phases I and II are described separately below.  
2.3.1 PHASE I 
In this phase of the research the “target population”177 comprised specific South 
African legal sources. These sources include the legislation relevant to the South 
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African pension fund industry,178 contextual case law and FSB Circulars. The 
applicable cases were identified by doing key word searches on the LexisNexis 
Butterworths (hereafter LexisNexis) database and the key words searched for were 
“fiduciary responsibility” and “fiduciary duty”. A total of 2613 results were found for 
“fiduciary duty” and only 430 for “fiduciary responsibility”. These results were 
interrogated for case law relevant to the pension fund industry. General mercantile 
law that could otherwise apply indirectly was not considered. This is justified because 
as stated earlier the aim was to describe a specific phenomenon comprehensively.179 
The legal sources that were interrogated are listed in Appendix A. 
2.3.2 PHASE II 
As already noted, the aim of Phase II of the study was to describe the universe of 
interpretations of the term fiduciary responsibility held by the key role players in the 
pension fund investment chain. In this phase of the research the target population 
comprised the key role players in the pension fund investment chain, which, as stated 
above, were identified as pension fund trustees, asset managers and asset consultants. 
The descriptions of the administrative details concerning contact with the human 
participants that follow are included to demonstrate that the researcher adhered to 
generally accepted research ethics practices as outlined in the “Policy on Research 
Ethics”180 of the institution where this study was conducted. Accordingly, before 
embarking on any interviews, all documentation used in the research process was 
submitted to the UNISA Ethics Review Committee and approval obtained. 
As a starting point, the list of asset consultant and asset management companies 
contained in “The State of Responsible Investment in South Africa”181 report was 
used. The findings of this report were instrumental in prompting the research question 
                                                                                                                                            
178
 See Appendix A. 
179
 Mouton Understanding Social Research 133. 
180
 UNISA “Policy on Research Ethics” 3–16. 
181
 Eccles et al The State of Responsible Investment in South Africa 55–57. 
49 
 
of this study, as explained in the introduction in Chapter 1.182 All the companies on the 
list were contacted and the researcher engaged with the pension department or 
principal officers of some of the pension funds of top companies, as well as pension 
funds in the public sector in South Africa. 
All the participants were provided with a brief description of the researcher‟s 
affiliation and background. The researcher then explained the purpose of the study 
and what exactly would be expected of the participants on the day of the interview. 
However, she gave very little detail about the questions that would be asked. This was 
done in order to prevent the participants from preparing for the interviews and thus 
giving “textbook” responses. After the participants had consented to participate in the 
study, a confirmation letter (Appendix B) with the date and time of the interview and 
an assurance of anonymity was sent to the participants.  
On the day of the interview, the following were explained to the respondents: the 
purpose of the study; the envisaged use of the results; how the results were to be 
disseminated; assurance of confidentiality and the structure and process of the 
interview.  
Extensive records of the telephonic process were kept on a database. All the 
interviews were recorded and then transcribed. These transcriptions were then sent to 
the participants in order to give them an opportunity to make changes to their 
responses. After the transcripts had been finalised, a release form was sent to every 
participant. This form183 was used to gain formal participant consent for the use of the 
information obtained from the interviews in one way or another.  
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Prior to the study proper, a pilot interview was held with one asset manager, the 
purpose of which was to determine whether the instrument could be applied in a 
manner that was conducive to the more open-ended conversational style required for a 
qualitative study. The findings of the pilot interview suggested that using the three 
questions together with the added descriptions of the duty to act in the interests of 
beneficiaries and the duty to act in good faith, listed in Section 2.2 above, did indeed 
yield a long, almost casual, conversation as is required by a qualitative research 
approach. It was therefore decided to continue with the interviewing process without 
making any changes to the planned structure of the interviews. 
The data collection process for both the phases of research continued until a point of 
saturation was reached. Data saturation is “when gathering fresh data no longer sparks 
new theoretical insights, nor reveals new properties of your core theoretical 
categories”.184 The reason for this is to ensure the validity and reliability of the study.  
2.4 DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION  
In analysing the data in this study I used the analytical framework described in Miles 
and Huberman,185 consisting of “three concurrent flows of activity: data reduction, 
data display, and conclusion-drawing/verification”. These “flows of activity” can be 
illustrated graphically using a simple flow chart (Figure 2.1). This process of 
analysing qualitative data was used for this study because it contributes to its 
trustworthiness. All three activities and the way in which they were applied in this 
study are described separately below. 
2.4.1 DATA REDUCTION 
Miles and Huberman describe the term data reduction as “the process of selecting, 
focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming the raw data …”.186  
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Figure 2.1: Components of data analysis: flow model (Miles & Huberman, 1984: 23). 
PHASE I 
In Phase I of the research the selection process included the choice of specific legal 
sources, while the focus was on the key term fiduciary responsibility. The data was 
simplified a priori in the sense that the three key questions187 were used. The 
categorisation of the data according to these a priori questions, as well as by the key 
role players, represented an a priori or initial coding. Answers to the key questions 
were then abstracted from the raw data, which, in this phase, consisted of a number of 
the legal sources found by means of the desktop review. Because of the 
unconventional approach taken, which involved “interviewing” the legal sources, a 
limited number of very specific sources were chosen for the interviews. As for 
interviews with human participants, sources that would be most likely to provide 
answers to the questions were chosen. Firstly, legislation and case law applicable to 
the pension fund industry and which are primary legal sources were “interviewed”. 
All the cases that were “interviewed” are reported in the Pensions Law Reports, 
published by Butterworths. Secondly, specific Financial Services Board (FSB) 
Circulars188 were interrogated. In order to stay close to the qualitative nature of this 
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study, the legal sources were “asked” the interview questions. This meant that all the 
sources were read and re-read in order to see if they provided answers to the key 
questions. As a result of this process, the “answers” to these interview questions 
represent that which a lay person would find if they were to review the legal 
sources.189 All the answers and their sources were noted and transformed into “field 
notes”,190 and these field notes were then coded using a method referred to as “open-
coding”.191  
Pandit192 describes “open-coding” as  
… that part of analysis that deals with the labeling and categorizing of phenomena as 
indicated by the data. The product of labeling and categorizing is concepts – the basic 
building blocks of grounded theory construction.  
Practically, this process involved reading and re-reading the field notes and 
identifying themes or codes in them. This can be done by writing one‟s own 
“headings” in the margins of the raw data or, alternatively, using different colours to 
highlight the text in the field notes to indicate repetitive themes.193 During this phase 
the researcher used both methods on the raw data. 
The limitations of Phase I were brought about by the unconventional approach taken 
in “interviewing” the sources. These limitations arose as a result of the fact that legal 
sources can never be equated to human participants. An example of a conventional 
qualitative study with human participants would be Phase II of this study, where one 
requirement for the interviewees in each group of role players was that they actually 
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had to be a member of that profession in order to represent that specific group. In 
other words, only pension fund trustees, asset managers and asset consultants were 
interviewed. On the other hand, the requirements for Phase I were that the sources 
should actually address the specific questions. This was not, however, the case, 
because legal sources are not that specific. This created the impression that the legal 
sources are silent on a number of the issues. Consequently, the following limitations 
are specifically acknowledged: 
 Not all possible sources were exhausted and the scope of the study was 
therefore limited.  
 The sources could not be probed for further information or better 
explanations, which, in turn, gave the impression that the sources were 
silent on several issues. This differs from conventional qualitative studies 
where human participants are interviewed, open conversations are used to 
“interview” the participants, and researchers use specialised probing skills 
to get in-depth descriptions of a specific experience.   
 The saturation in this phase could be questioned, because the universe of 
legal sources could inevitably keep on providing new information. The 
saturation is obviously limited to those sources that were interviewed, but 
this may not necessarily present a consensus view of all legal sources.  
PHASE II 
In Phase II of the research, the selection process simply involved extracting the lists of 
asset management and consulting companies identified from “The State of 
Responsible Investment”,194 as well as the pension funds of some of the top companies 
in the country that were approached. As already described in the section above on 
Phase I, the focus in this phase was also on the key term, fiduciary responsibility and 
the data was simplified by using the key questions listed in Section 1.2.3. The field 
notes for this phase were made by the researcher in a research journal throughout the 
interview process. These notes comprised any repetitive themes, interesting ideas and 
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additional questions that emerged from the interviews. All the interviews were 
recorded and then transcribed.  
In order to further reduce the data, all the transcripts were coded. The process of 
coding in Phase II differed slightly from the open-coding process conducted in Phase 
I, although open-coding formed part of the various steps of coding in this phase. 
Burnard describes fourteen “stages” of coding. Accordingly, the coding that was done 
for this phase is almost identical to the first six stages of coding. 195 Burnard describes 
these steps as follows: 
1. Write down the topics discussed in each interview; 
2. Read transcripts and write down the general themes as notes; 
3. Read transcripts again and develop as many categories of discussion as 
possible; 
4. Group categories; 
5. Make a last list of categories by looking at the groups again to see if there is 
still any overlap; 
6. Co-coders are invited to go through the same process. Afterwards the coding 
of the independent co-coders is compared with that of the first researcher.196 
Furthermore, to ensure the dependability of the coding, verification is needed. 
Verification simply entails that other researchers should come to the same conclusions 
when presented with the same set of data.197 As described in the sixth step above, all 
interviews were independently coded by two other independent researchers, both of 
whom are experts in the field of qualitative data analysis. A consensus discussion was 
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held to reach agreement on an interpretation and conclusions. Burnard also describes a 
consensus discussion as part of his stage six, but in less detail.198  
The consensus discussion also provided an opportunity for giving the primary 
researcher critical feedback regarding the interview process itself. In this regard, the 
following possible weaknesses were identified: 
 Role confusion. During the interviews, the primary researcher was 
sometimes introduced as a researcher and other times as a lawyer.  
 Leading questions. There were instances where the participants were led 
into answers due to “rescuing behaviour” by the researcher, such as when 
the researcher helped the participants by providing them with explanations 
for questions asked. These instances were actually an indication of their 
lack of knowledge or occasions when they struggled to express 
themselves.  
 The use of a structured questionnaire as opposed to completely open-
ended conversations.  
These limitations to the research were mitigated in the following ways: 
 Role confusion. The occurrences were infrequent and therefore not deemed 
to have any material influence on the overall results. 
 Leading questions. The occurrences were also infrequent and again not 
deemed to be of substantial concern.  
 Semi-structured questionnaire. Although open-ended conversations could 
have provided more substantive qualitative descriptions, the semi-
structured interviews were chosen for the purpose of addressing a specific 
question directly. As mentioned previously, Burnard also acknowledges 
this method in qualitative research when he states that semi-structured 
interviews may be used as a “principle methodology”.199 The purpose of 
                                                                                                                                            
198
 Burnard “A Method of Analysing Interview Transcripts in Qualitative Research” 463. 
199
 Idem 461. 
56 
 
the interviews was to find descriptions of fiduciary responsibility. These 
descriptions were, in turn, essential for pulling them into the interpretation 
matrices in order to address the overarching research question. Waiving 
the qualitative “ideals” of open-ended conversations and prolonged 
engagement therefore seemed reasonable in the context of this study. 
At the end of Phases I and II, the data was reduced further in order to make it possible 
to insert the descriptions of fiduciary responsibility into the interpretation matrices of 
Phase III. As part of this data reduction process, the two sets of data (Phase I and 
Phase II) were compared. Not only was Phase I compared with Phase II, but the 
answers from the different legal sources and the different groups of practitioners were 
also compared internally.200 This was done in order to identify discrepancies between 
what the legal sources state and what the practitioners said. Inconsistencies within 
each phase were also identified during this process.  
These comparisons were conducted using the basic concepts of set theory. 
Accordingly, the union would be an inclusive view of all the answers; the intersection 
would represent a consensus view; and the set differences would then represent the 
union minus the intersection.201 
2.4.2 DATA DISPLAY 
Miles and Huberman202 state that data display can be defined as “an organized 
assembly of information that permits conclusion-drawing and action-taking”. In this 
study, a combination of descriptive matrices203 and narrative descriptions were used to 
display the data. Descriptive matrices were used because they are able to contain a 
wide variety of data.204 Consequently, in this dissertation the descriptive matrices 
contain the different sources and their paraphrased answers to the key questions. 
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Together, the effect of the descriptive matrices and the narrative descriptions was to 
provide a rich description of the results from Phases I and II of the research.  
Nine descriptive matrices were produced205 in Chapter 3 for Phase I of the research: 
one descriptive matrix for every question (three questions) asked of each role player 
(three role players). In Chapter 3 for Phase II of the research, fifteen descriptive 
matrices were produced.206 Once again, there is a matrix for every question (five 
questions) asked of each role player (three role players). A further 13 tables207 were 
produced to illustrate the comparisons within and between Phase I and Phase II of the 
data. 
2.4.3 CONCLUSION-DRAWING AND VERIFICATION 
Phase III of the research was a phase of conclusion-drawing and verification. As 
mentioned earlier, the purpose of Phase III was to find answers to the overall research 
question:  
Does fiduciary responsibility create barriers to the implementation of responsible 
investment in the South African pension fund investment chain? 
A special class of descriptive matrices, which I refer to as interpretation matrices, 
were used to facilitate the process of conclusion-drawing. Descriptions of the two key 
concepts from the research question; fiduciary responsibility and responsible 
investment, are pulled together to create these interpretation matrices, with 
responsible investment descriptions in the columns and fiduciary responsibility 
descriptions in the rows.208  
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 See Tables 3.10−3.24. 
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 See Tables 3.25−3.38. 
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 See all the tables presented in Chapter 4 that illustrate the way these interpretation matrices allow 




A qualitative research approach was chosen for this study, the aim of which was to 
describe and understand the two key concepts, fiduciary responsibility and responsible 
investment. Hence, descriptions of the two key concepts were needed to address the 
overall research question: 
Does fiduciary responsibility create barriers to the implementation of responsible 
investment in the South African pension fund investment chain? 
Two specific interpretations of responsible investment were already identified at the 
outset of this dissertation in Chapter 1: a “business-case”209 form and a social form of 
responsible investment. The research was further divided into three distinct phases. In 
Phase I, South African law as it applies to the fiduciary responsibility of the key role 
players was considered; Phase II involved an exploration of the different key role 
players‟ understanding(s) of fiduciary responsibility; while Phase III primarily 
entailed the use of interpretation matrices to describe the range of valid answers to the 
core research question. 
Chapter 3 essentially displays the data for Phase I and II of this research. The aim of 
both of these phases was to provide extensive descriptions of the key term, fiduciary 
responsibility, within a very specific context – the pension fund investment chain in 
South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 3: FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY – SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
AND PRACTITIONER VIEWS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Phases I and II of the research provided extensive 
descriptions and interpretations of the fiduciary responsibilities of the key role players 
in the pension fund investment chain. Phase I of the research encompassed an 
“interview” process with South African legal sources,210 whereby the research 
considered the law as it applies to the fiduciary responsibility of pension fund trustees, 
asset managers and asset consultants. Aspects of fiduciary responsibility were 
interrogated using the following three questions: 
1. Are pension fund trustees, asset managers and asset consultants fiduciaries in 
the pension fund investment chain? 
2. If the answer to the first question is yes, to whom do they owe their fiduciary 
responsibility respectively? 
3. What are their fiduciary duties? 
In this chapter, I present these descriptions and interpretations. This presentation is 
structured as follows. In Section 3.2, I describe the range of interpretations emerging 
from the engagement or “interviews” with the South African legal sources. These 
interviews were limited to a specific “population”, which comprised statutes relevant 
to the pension fund industry and case law (primary legal sources), and Financial 
Services Board (FSB) Circulars, specifically Circulars PF Nos. 3–130, which contain 
information about pension funds. 
The two sections (3.2 and 3.3) that contain the responses obtained in Phases I and II 
are structured, firstly, according to the key role players and, secondly, according to the 
three interview questions. The answers obtained to every question in Phase I were 
categorised according to the source, that is, legislation, case law or the FSB Circulars. 
Therefore, each subsection of Section 3.2 typically starts with a description of the 
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 See Chapter 2 Section 2.3.1 where the selection design and data collection methods of this 
unconventional process are described in more detail.  
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answers obtained from legislation and case law, and then moves on to the FSB 
Circulars. 
This is then followed in Section 3.3 by descriptions of practitioner views or 
interpretations. Finally, by way of consolidation and discussion in Section 3.4, the two 
sets of descriptions are compared and contrasted. This comparing and contrasting is 
done with a view to achieving data reduction. Thus, the outcome of this chapter is a 
range of interpretations of fiduciary responsibility, which are subsequently used in 
Chapter 4 to directly address the overarching research question. 
3.2 PHASE I: “INTERVIEWS” WITH SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL 
SOURCES 
3.2.1 PENSION FUND TRUSTEES 
 Question 1: Are pension fund trustees fiduciaries? 
At first glance, South African legislation appears to be silent on the question of 
whether pension fund trustees are fiduciaries. However, it is only silent in the sense 
that it does not explicitly state “trustees are fiduciaries” or “trustees have fiduciary 
duties”.211 Nevertheless, the statutory duties ascribed to pension fund trustees include 
those that are generally recognised as fiduciary duties.212 
                                                                                                                                            
211
 The list of generally recognised common law fiduciary duties was deduced from the literature 
review in Chapter 1. See Sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 specifically. Furthermore, there are only two 
places in the legislation that was reviewed where the actual word “fiduciary” appears. The first is 
the term fiduciary capacity, which appears in s 4(3)(b) of the Financial Institutions (Protection of 
Funds) Act and refers to shares or debentures being held in a fiduciary capacity in cases where the 
financial institution cannot be registered as the owner of the shares or debentures and a manager 
holds them as nominee. Also see s 4(3)(a). The second instance is in the revised Regulation 28 
published in terms of s 36 of the Pension Funds Act. An extensive discussion on the revised 
Regulation 28 can be found at the end of this dissertation in the form of an epilogue. This was done 
because the revised Regulation 28 was only published after the completion of the actual research 
contained in this dissertation. 
212
 See s 7C of the Pension Funds Act as well as s 2 of the Financial Institutions Act. 
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The answer from case law is fairly easy to trace: from the list of 32 recent cases (from 
2004 onwards) that were specifically interrogated for this phase of the research 
(Appendix A), the first 13 cases213 unambiguously acknowledged a fiduciary duty for 
pension fund trustees. In Dollman v The Irvin and Johnson Retirement Fund & 
Others214 it is stated that:  
In light of the fiduciary duties of the board, it does not have an unfettered discretion 
in dealing with pension fund assets. Instead it is bound to exercise its control over the 
property in such a way that it is to the general benefit of fund members.   
In Milton v Bidcorp Group Pension Fund215 it is stated that: 
… the trustees of a fund owe a fiduciary duty to the fund and to its members and 
other beneficiaries. These duties are clearly established in terms of common law, case 
law, and statute, the most important legislative sources being the Pension Funds Act 
and the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 2001. 
In Moeng v John Abbot Garage Services & Others216 it is emphasised that:  
In terms of fiduciary duties owed by trustees of a fund to its members, trustees are 
required to direct, control and oversee operations of a fund with applicable laws and 
rules of the fund; to take all reasonable steps to ensure that interests of members in 
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 Wentworth v GG Umbrella Provident Fund and Others [2009] 1 BPLR 87 (PFA); Dollman v The 
Irvin and Johnson Retirement Fund and Others [2008] BPLR 137 (PFA); Milton v Bidcorp Group 
Pension Fund [2008] 2 BPLR 156 (PFA); Moeng v John Abbot Garage Services and Others [2008] 
JOL 22810 (PFA); Mthimkhulu v NBC Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Another [2008] 2 BPLR 184 (PFA); 
Mtshixa v Mine Employees Pension Fund [2008] 2 BPLR 189 (PFA); H v Bidcorp Provident Fund 
and Another [2008] 1 BPLR (PFA); Wilson v Bidcorp Group Pension Fund and Others [2008] 1 
BPLR 89 (PFA); Machoga v Soweto City Council Pension Fund and Others [2007] 3 BPLR 342 
(PFA); Chairman of the Board of the Sanlam Pensioenfonds (Kantoorpersoneel) v Registrar of 
Pension Funds [2007] 1 BPLR 57 (T); Browne v South African Retirement Annuity Fund and 
Others [2006] 4 BPLR 311 (PFA); Central Retirement Annuity Fund v Adjudicator of Pension 
Fund and Others [2006] 4 All SA 251 (C); Du Plessis v Lifestyle Retirement Annuity Fund and 
Another [2005] 5 BPLR 383 (PFA). 
214
 [2008] 2 BPLR 137 (PFA) 2. 
215
 [2008] JOL 22728 (PFA) 5. 
216
 [2008] JOL 22810 (PFA) 1. 
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terms of rules of the fund and provisions of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 are 
protected at all times; and to act with due care, diligence, in good faith and to avoid 
conflicts of interest.  
The consensus view presented in the 32 cases was unambiguous: trustees are indeed 
fiduciaries.217 In none of the population explored was dissent detected. 
Circular PF 130218 states that:  
… as fiduciaries, the boards, its alternates and other persons duly appointed by the 
board to act on its behalf, have to deal with assets or affairs of the fund in terms of 
pensions law, common law, customary law, regulations, the (registered) rules of the 
fund, codes of conduct and policies that apply to the fund. 
Furthermore, Circular PF 98219 states that “the board acts in a fiduciary capacity …”. 
Pension fund trustees make up the “boards” referred to in these circulars as well as in 
the Pension Funds Act. The FSB consequently regards the trustees as fiduciaries.  
Thus, the law, as suggested in legislation through the codification of duties that are 
generally recognised as fiduciary duties, confirmed in case law, and as discussed in 
FSB Circulars, is strongly suggestive of the fact that pension fund trustees are 
fiduciaries. The results for pension fund trustees are now summarised in Table 3.1 
below. 
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 The following examples also illustrate the unambiguity of case law on this subject: See Dollman v 
The Irvin and Johnson Retirement Fund and Others [2008] 2 BPLR 137 (PFA): “In light of the 
fiduciary duties of the board…”; Milton v Bidcorp Group Pension Fund [2008] 2 BPLR 156 
(PFA): “The Respondent concedes that the trustees owe a fiduciary duty to the fund and to its 
members and other beneficiaries.” Central Retirement Annuity Fund v Adjudicator of Pension 
Funds and Others [2005] 8 BPLR 655 (C): “… the Court highlighted the fiduciary duties of the 
fund‟s board of management to members”; Skinner v De Beers Pension Fund and Another [2005] 5 
BPLR 453 (PFA): “The trustees of the De Beers fund owed a fiduciary duty to the Complainant to 
act in good faith.” 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive matrix displaying the answers to Question 1, “Are pension fund trustees 
fiduciaries?” obtained from South African legal sources 
Publication Interpretation 
Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 (PFA) 
Explicitly silent although the duties specified in 
s 7C resemble what are generally recognised as 
fiduciary duties 
General Pensions Act 29 of 1979 Silent 
Government Employees Pension Law, 1996 Silent 
Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990 Silent 
Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 
28 of 2001 
Explicitly silent although some of the duties 
specified in s 2 resemble what are generally 
recognised as fiduciary duties 
Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services 
Act 37 of 2002 (FAIS Act) 
Explicitly silent although some of the duties 
specified in s 16 resemble what are generally 
recognised as fiduciary duties 
Case law Yes 
Circular PF 98 Silent 
Circular PF 130 Yes 
 
 Question 2: Who are the beneficiaries of trustees‟ fiduciary responsibility? 
The legal sources are more ambiguous with regard to the question of who are the 
beneficiaries of the fiduciary responsibility of pension fund trustees. However, 
because the legislation presents duties that are generally recognised as fiduciary 
duties, it was interpreted as being evidence for the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship. The Pension Funds Act does not explicitly mention the beneficiaries of 
the duties outlined for the boards of trustees; it merely states in section 7C(2)(a) that 
“the interests of members in terms of the rules of the fund and the provisions of the 
Act” must be protected at all times. On the other hand, in section 2 of the Financial 
Institutions Act it is implied that the duties ascribed to “a director, member, partner, 
official, employee or agent of a financial institution” are owed to the financial 
institution itself and indirectly to the owners of the assets, meaning the members of 
the fund. In section 2(a) and (b) of the Financial Institutions Act it is stated that the 
persons/institutions responsible must act with the utmost good faith with regard to 
“such funds” and the “trust property”. This would mean that the persons responsible 
have a fiduciary duty with regard to the assets they manage, which would mean the 
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fiduciary duty is owed to the owner of the assets, namely, the pension fund. Also see 
section 2(c):  
… may not alienate, invest, pledge, hypothecate or otherwise encumber or make use 
of funds or trust property or furnish any guarantee in a manner calculated to gain 
directly or indirectly any improper advantage for himself or herself or for any other 
person to the prejudice of the financial institution or principal concerned.  
The “principal concerned” in this case is a reference to the person who entrusted the 
financial institution with funds to keep in trust on his/her behalf. This Act applies to a 
variety of financial institutions in addition to pension funds. The members of a 
pension fund would not, however, be regarded as “principals”. 
Case law offered a range of opinions on the question of who the beneficiaries are in 
terms of the fiduciary responsibility placed on pension fund trustees. The list of 32 
recent cases220 provided four possible answers to this question. In 14 cases221 it was 
said that the trustees owe a fiduciary duty to the members of the fund. In Burke v 
Mitchell Cotts Pension Fund and Another,222 the term the members as a whole is used, 
as opposed to only members. However, it is not clear from the rest of this case what 
exactly is meant by this term. In four cases223 it was concluded that the trustees owe a 
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 See Appendix A. 
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 Wentworth v GG Umbrella Provident Fund and Others [2009] 1 BPLR 87 (PFA); Dollman v The 
Irvin and Johnson Retirement Fund and Others [2008] BPLR 137 (PFA); Moeng v John Abbot 
Garage Services and Others [2008] 2 BPLR 169 (PFA); Mtshixa v Mine Employees Pension Fund; 
Machoga v Soweto City Council Pension Fund and Others [2008] 2 BPLR 189 (PFA); Browne v 
South African Retirement Annuity Fund and Others [2006] 4 BPLR 311 (PFA); Central Retirement 
Annuity Fund v Adjudicator of Pension Fund and Others [2006] 4 All SA 251 (C); Louw v Central 
Retirement Annuity Fund and Another [2005] 7 BPLR 622 (PFA); Seipobi v Momentum 
Retirement Annuity Fund and Another [2005] 6 BPLR 534 (PFA); Du Plessis v Lifestyle 
Retirement Annuity Fund and Another [2005] 5 BPLR 383 (PFA); Burke v Mitchell Cotts Pension 
Fund and Another [2005] 4 BPLR 292 (PFA); Pankhurst and Another v Solomon Nicolson Rein 
and Verster Provident Fund and Another [2005] 1 BPLR 56 (PFA); Van der Linde v Telkom 
Retirement Fund [2004] 8 BPLR 6257 (PFA). 
222
 [2005] 4 BPLR 292 (PFA). 
223
 Milton v Bidcorp Group Pension Fund [2008] 2 BPLR 156 (PFA); Chairman of the Board of the 
Sanlam Pensioenfonds (Kantoorpersoneel) v Registrar of Pension Funds [2007] 1 BPLR 57 (T); 
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fiduciary responsibility to the fund and to its members and other beneficiaries. In 
Hossack v Chep South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another224 it was said that the fiduciary 
duty is owed to the fund, but the remaining cases225 did not provide an answer to this 
question. 
FSB Circular PF 98226 states that “the board should not only have the interest of active 
members at heart but also those of pensioners, deferred pensioners and beneficiaries”. 
Circular PF 130227 states that the board stands “in a position of trust or fiduciary 
relationship to funds …” and “the board of management therefore holds fund assets in 
trust for those persons who will ultimately benefit from them” and later on it is 
mentioned that “the board shall at all times act with the utmost good faith towards the 
fund and in the best interest of all the members”. Circular PF 130 therefore implies 
that the trustees owe their fiduciary duties to the fund itself, but also to all the 
members and the members‟ beneficiaries. 
  
                                                                                                                                            
Odayan v Orion Money Purchase Pension Fund and Another [2005] 6 BPLR 523 (PFA); Zwane v 
Wiseman and Others [2005] 1 BPLR 92 (PFA). 
224
 [2005] 11 BPLR 944 (PFA). 
225
 Mthimkhulu v NBC Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Another [2008] 2 BPLR 184 (PFA); H v Bidcorp 
Provident Fund and Another [2008] 1 BPLR 19 (PFA); Wilson v Bidcorp Group Pension Fund 
and Others 1 BPLR 89 (PFA); Msunduzi Municipality v Natal Joint Municipal Pension/Provident 
Fund and Others [2006] 3 BPLR 210 (N); Central Retirement Annuity Fund v Adjudicator of 
Pension Fund and Others [2006] 4 All SA 251 (C); Schwartz v Central Retirement Annuity Fund 
and Another [2005] 5 BPLR 435 (PFA); Holmes v Morris Crane Aid Pension Fund [2005] 4 
BPLR 309 (PFA); De Beer v Central Retirement Annuity Fund and Another [2005] 3 BPLR 257 
(PFA); Mine Employees Pension Fund v Murphy NO and Others [2004] 11 BPLR 6204 (W); 
Kamaldien v Telkom Retirement fund and Another [2004] 9 BPLR 6072 (PFA); Wood v ABSA 
Group Pension Fund [2004] 8 BPLR 6003 (PFA). 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive matrix displaying the answers to Question 2, “To whom do pension fund 
trustees owe their fiduciary responsibility?” obtained from South African legal sources 
Publication Interpretation 
Pension Funds Act Members and other beneficiaries 
General Pensions Act Silent 
Government Employees Pension Law Silent 
Financial Services Board Act Silent  
Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 
Explicitly silent although it is stated that they 
owe a duty to act with the utmost good faith 
with regard to funds and trust property and it is 
implied that they should not have conflicting 
interests with the fund itself  
Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services 
Act 
Explicitly silent although it is stated that they 
owe a duty to act in the interests of their clients 













Circular PF  98 
Explicitly silent although it is stated that the 
board should not only have the interest of active 
members at heart, but also pensioners, deferred 
pensioners and beneficiaries‟ 
Circular PF  130 
The fund itself; all members; “persons who will 
ultimately benefit” 
 
In summary,232 the law provides a range of interpretations with regard to the question 
of who the beneficiaries of the fiduciary duties of pension fund trustees are. 
Suggestions by the legal sources as to whom fiduciary duties are owed include the 
following: 
 The members of the fund/members as a whole 
 The members and other beneficiaries 
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 Moeng v John Abbot Garage Services and Others [2008] 2 BPLR 169 (PFA). 
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 Milton v Bidcorp Group Pension Fund [2008] 2 BPLR 156 (PFA); Chairman of the Board of the 
Sanlam Pensioenfonds (Kantoorpersoneel) v Registrar of Pension Funds [2007] 1 BPLR 57 (T); 
Odayan v Orion Money Purchase Pension Fund and Another [2005] 6 BPLR 523 (PFA); Zwane v 
Wiseman and Others [2005] 1 BPLR 92 (PFA). 
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 Hossack v Chep South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another [2005] 11 BPLR 944 (PFA). 
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 Burke v Mitchell Cotts Pension Fund and Another [2005] 4 BPLR 292 (PFA). 
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 See Table 3.2. 
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 The fund itself 
These views differ from legislation to case law and FSB Circulars. There were also 
discrepancies within case law and within the Circulars.  
 Question 3: What are trustees‟ fiduciary duties? 
The third question asked about what South African law states with regard to the 
specific fiduciary duties of pension fund trustees. As already noted, the words 
“fiduciary duties for pension fund trustees” do not appear explicitly in legislation. In 
six233 of the 32 recent cases listed234 the sentiment was expressed that section 7C of the 
Pension Funds Act codifies the common-law fiduciary duties owed by the trustees of 
a fund to its members.235 In Milton v Bidcorp Group Pension Fund,236 it is simply 
stated that the most important legislative sources for establishing the fiduciary duties 
owed to the members by the trustees are the Pension Funds Act and the Financial 
Institutions Act. 
Circular PF 98 clearly states that this circular “should not be regarded as either an 
exhaustive or a definitive account of the fiduciary duties of boards of management”. It 
does, however, refer to section 7C of the Pension Funds Act and states that boards are 
bound by the rules of the fund. Furthermore, that boards 
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 Dollman v The Irvin and Johnson Retirement Fund and Others [2008] BPLR 137 (PFA); Moeng v 
John Abbot Garage Services and Others [2008] 2 BPLR 169 (PFA) ; Milton v Bidcorp Group 
Pension Fund and Others [2008] 1 BPLR 89 (PFA); Machoga v Soweto City Council Pension 
Fund and Others [2007] 3 BPLR 342 (PFA); Browne v South African Retirement Annuity Fund 
and Others [2006] 4 BPLR 311 (PFA); Seipobi v Momentum Retirement Annuity Fund and 
Another [2005] 6 BPLR 534 (PFA). 
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 See Appendix A. 
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 The fact that it is said that s 7C of the Pension Funds Act is a statutory formulation of the fiduciary 
duties does not necessarily mean that the entire section is devoted to a codification of the fiduciary 
duties without any additional duties or aspects being contained in the section. A codification can 
only relate to something that was an uncodified common-law principle. 
236
 [2008] 2 BPLR 156 (PFA). 
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… may vary them only in accordance with the amendment provisions set out in the 
Act [Pension Funds Act] and rules. In making amendments, the board must have 
regard to the other fiduciary duties governing its conduct.  
These so called “other fiduciary duties” are not described in any detail.  
Circular PF 130 states that the trustees are in a “fiduciary relationship to funds and 
therefore must act with integrity”. It then continues, saying that the board “should deal 
with all matters relating to the fund and its members in accordance with their 
fiduciary duties, fairly and with respect”, but it also does not describe these fiduciary 
duties. 
South African legal sources thus provide us with two possible answers to the question 
of what the particular fiduciary duties are (Table 3.3). Accordingly, the fiduciary 
duties of trustees are the following: 
1. Either the statutory formulation of the common law fiduciary duties mentioned 
in section 7C of the Pension Funds Act or the statutory formulation of the 
common law fiduciary duties mentioned in section 2 of the Financial 
Institutions Act or both;  
2. “Other fiduciary duties” as mentioned in the Circulars, which presumably also 
refer to the generally recognised common law fiduciary duties.237  
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 A duty to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries; a duty to act in good faith; a duty of 
impartiality; a duty to avoid conflicting interests; a duty not to make any secret profits; a duty to 




Table 3.3: Descriptive matrix displaying the answers to Question 3, “What are the fiduciary duties of 
pension fund trustees?” obtained from South African legal sources 
Publication Interpretation 
Pension Funds Act 
Statutory duties listed in s 7C that resemble what 
are generally recognised to be fiduciary duties: 
“best interests” 
“good faith” 
“conflicts of interests” 
“impartiality” 
“disclose” 
General Pensions Act Silent 
Government Employees Pension Law 
Statutory duties listed in Schedule 1, rule 4.1.19 
that resemble what are generally recognised to 
be fiduciary duties: 
“best interests” 
“good faith” 
“conflicts of interest” 
“impartiality” 
Financial Services Board Act Silent 
Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 
Statutory duties listed in s 2 that resemble what 
are generally recognised to be fiduciary duties: 
“good faith” 
“no secret profit” 
“conflicts of interest” 
Case law 
Refers to s 7C of the Pension Funds Act and 
common law fiduciary duties 
Circular PF  98 
“PF 98 should not be regarded as an exhaustive 
or definitive account of the fiduciary duties of 
boards of management.” 
3.2.2 ASSET MANAGERS 
 Question 1: Are asset managers fiduciaries? 
As already mentioned in the section above on trustees, at first glance the legislation 
appears to be silent on this question. A number of legal duties are, however, conferred 
on asset managers by legislation. Accordingly, when these statutes are reviewed 
carefully it becomes evident that the legislation can be seen as a statutory formulation 
of what has been identified in Section 1.2.2 in Chapter 1, as generally recognised 
common law fiduciary duties.238 Most of these generally recognised common law 
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 In order to answer the question of whether asset managers are fiduciaries, a slight deviation from 
the normal inductive reasoning in qualitative studies was used. Instead of providing in-depth 
descriptions from a number of sources and then reaching conclusions; the argument is built on the 
suggestion that there is a fiduciary relationship between asset managers and the pension fund as 
presented in Chapter 1. The norm in qualitative studies is to do “literature control”, meaning that 
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fiduciary duties are represented in the lists of statutory duties attached to asset 
managers in section 2 of the Financial Institutions Act239 and section 16(1) of the 
Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002 (hereafter referred to as 
the FAIS Act).240 The following generally recognised common law fiduciary duties are 
mentioned in these sections: a duty to act in good faith (s 2(a) and (b) of the Financial 
Institutions Act); a duty to avoid conflicts of interests (s 2(c) of the Financial 
Institutions Act and s 16(a) of FAIS Act); a duty to not make any secret profit (s 2(c) 
of the Financial Institutions Act) and a duty to act in the interests of clients (s 16(a) of 
FAIS Act). 
Case law is silent on the question of whether asset managers are fiduciaries.241 One 
might be inclined to infer from this silence that asset managers are not viewed as 
                                                                                                                                            
the literature is used to “validate” or support what is found in the interviews. This deviation is also 
used for the same questions with regard to asset consultants. 
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 Section 2 of the Financial Institutions Act reads: “A director, member, partner, official, employee 
or agent of a financial institution or of a nominee company who invests, holds, keeps in safe 
custody, controls, administers or alienates any funds of the financial institution or any trust 
property – (a) must, with regard to such funds, observe the utmost good faith and exercise proper 
care and diligence; (b) must, with regard to the trust property and the terms of the instrument or 
agreement by which the trust or agency in question has been created, observe the utmost good faith 
and exercise the care and diligence required of a trustee in the exercise or discharge of his or her 
powers and duties; and (c) may not alienate, invest, pledge, hypothecate or otherwise encumber or 
make use of funds or trust property or furnish any guarantee in a manner calculated to gain directly 
or indirectly any improper advantage for himself or herself or for any other person to the prejudice 
of the financial institution or principal concerned.” In terms of this Act asset managers would be 
agents of a pension fund and the fund is, in turn, a financial institution. 
240
 Section 16(1)(a) of the FAIS Act, which regulates role players such as asset managers and asset 
consultants, however, states that “financial services providers, and their representatives, are obliged 
by the provisions of such code – (a) to act honestly, fairly, and with due skill, care and diligence, in 
the interests of clients and the integrity of the financial services industry”. 
241
 It is of the utmost importance to note at this point that asset managers and asset consultants are not 
administrators. In Dollman v The Irvin and Johnson Retirement Fund and Others [2008] BPLR 
137 (PFA) as well as Milton v Bidcorp Group Pension Fund and Others [2008] 1 BPLR 89 (PFA) 
it was implied that administrators have a fiduciary duty to not make any secret profit by bulking the 
fund‟s bank accounts. It should be pointed out again that administrators fulfil a purely clerical role. 
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fiduciaries; however, there are logical problems with making such an inference. The 
alternative is simply that, to date, no action has been brought against an asset manager 
for breach of their fiduciary duties in the South African pension fund context 
specifically.242  
Circular PF 130243 states that: 
… as fiduciaries, the board, its alternates and other persons duly appointed by the 
board to act on its behalf, have to deal with assets or affairs of the fund in terms of 
pensions law, common law, customary law, regulations, the (registered) rules of the 
fund, codes of conduct and policies that apply to the fund.   
Since it is reasonable to assume that asset managers fall into the category of “other 
persons duly appointed by the board to act on its behalf”, this is a reasonably strong 
indication that asset managers are indeed considered to be fiduciaries. 
In summary then (Table 3.4), asset managers have statutory duties that reflect the 
generally recognised common law fiduciary duties. This might be an indication that 
they are fiduciaries. Case law is silent on the question of whether asset managers are 
indeed fiduciaries. PF Circular 130 points to the notion that they are fiduciaries. 
Therefore the possible answers to the question of whether asset managers are 
fiduciaries obtained from the legislation, case law and the Circulars respectively are: 
a) yes; and b) ambivalent.  
  
                                                                                                                                            
They do however administer all incoming and outgoing payments and therefore operate the fund‟s 
bank accounts. They are however not responsible for the actual investment of assets. The fact that 
there is confusion around the term administrator should nonetheless be acknowledged. This 
confusion is worsened by the fact that there are companies that provide administrating, asset 
managing as well as asset consulting services. Furthermore, the legislation only refers to 
administrators. Asset managers and asset consultants are not mentioned in the Pension Funds Act. 
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 As discussed in Section 2.4, unlike with the practitioners the sources could not be prompted or 
encouraged to provide answers to this question and this is acknowledged as a limitation. 
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 ftp://ftp.fsb.co.za/public/pension/circular/PF1302.pdf Date accessed: 2011-02-24. 
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Table 3.4: Descriptive matrix displaying the answers to Question 1, “Are asset managers 
fiduciaries?” obtained from South African legal sources 
Publication Interpretation 
Pension Funds Act  Silent 
General Pensions Act Silent 
Government Employees Pension Law 
 
Silent 
Financial Services Board Act Silent 
Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds)Act  
Explicitly silent although some of the duties 
specified in s 2 (in relation to agents) resemble 
what are generally recognised as common law 
fiduciary duties 
“good faith” 
 “no secret profit” 
“conflicts of interest” 
Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services 
(FAIS) Act 
Explicitly silent although some of the duties  (in 
relation to representatives) specified in s 16 
resemble what are generally recognised to be 
common law fiduciary duties 
“interests of clients” 
 “conflicts of interests” 
“good faith” 
“impartiality” 
Case law Silent 
Circular PF 98 Silent 
Circular PF 130 Yes 
 
 Question 2: Who are the beneficiaries of asset managers‟ fiduciary responsibility? 
The South African legal sources are silent on the question of who are the beneficiaries 
of asset managers‟ fiduciary responsibility, in the sense that no direct, literal answer 
could be found in any of the sources. Some of the generally recognised common law 
fiduciary duties are, however, described in section 2(a), (b) and (c) of the Financial 
Institutions Act and section 16(1)(a) of the FAIS Act. These statutes are relevant 
because, as explained in Section 1.2.2, asset managers technically act as agents of the 
pension fund. Section 2(a), (b) and (c) of the Financial Institutions Act mentions the 
generally recognised common law fiduciary duties of “good faith” and “no conflicts 
of interest”, but is silent in the sense that it does not state that the duties mentioned are 
owed to a specific party or institution. Instead, it attaches the duties to “such funds” 
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and “the trust property” in section 2(a) and (b).244 This means that the fiduciary duty is 
owed to the owner of the assets which is the pension fund. In section 2(c) it is implied 
that the fiduciary duty is owed to the fund itself.245  
Section 16(1)(a) the FAIS Act,246 which regulates role players such as asset managers 
and asset consultants, mentions a duty to act honestly that could refer to the duty of 
good faith; a duty to act fairly that could refer to a duty of impartiality; a duty of due 
care, skill and diligence; and a duty to act in the interests of clients and the integrity of 
the industry. 
                                                                                                                                            
244
 Trust property is defined in the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act as “any corporeal 
or incorporeal, movable or immovable asset invested, held, kept in safe custody, controlled, 
administered or alienated by any person, partnership, company or trust for, or on behalf of, another 
person, partnership, company or trust, and such other person, partnership, company or trust is 
hereinafter referred to as the principal”. 
245
 S 2 of the Financial Institutions Act reads: “A director, member, partner, official, employee or 
agent of a financial institution or of a nominee company who invests, holds, keeps in safe custody, 
controls, administers or alienates any funds of the financial institution or any trust property – (a) 
must, with regard to such funds, observe the utmost good faith and exercise proper care and 
diligence; (b) must, with regard to the trust property and the terms of the instrument or agreement 
by which the trust or agency in question has been created, observe the utmost good faith and 
exercise the care and diligence required of a trustee in the exercise or discharge of his or her 
powers and duties; and (c) may not alienate, invest, pledge, hypothecate or otherwise encumber or 
make use of funds or trust property or furnish any guarantee in a manner calculated to gain directly 
or indirectly any improper advantage for himself or herself or for any other person to the prejudice 
of the financial institution or principal concerned.” In terms of this Act, asset managers would be 
agents of a pension fund and the fund is, in turn, a financial institution.  
246
 S 16(1)(a) of the FAIS Act reads: “financial services providers, and their representatives, are 
obliged by the provisions of such code – to act honestly, fairly, and with due skill, care and 
diligence, in the interests of clients and the integrity of the financial services industry.”  
 “Such code” refers to the publication of codes of conduct that is prescribed to financial 
intermediaries and advisors in terms of s 15 of the FAIS Act. These codes are published in the 




Table 3.5: Descriptive matrix displaying the answers to Question 2, “To whom do asset managers 
owe their fiduciary responsibility?” obtained from South African legal sources 
Publication Interpretation 
Pension Funds Act Silent 
General Pensions Act Silent 
Government Employees Pension Law Silent 
Financial Services Board Act Silent  
Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds)Act 
Silent, even though some of the generally 
recognised common law fiduciary duties are 
described in s 2(a), (b) and (c) in relation to 
agents and it is stated that “with regard to such 
funds, observe the utmost good faith …” and 
“with regard to the trust property and the terms 
of the instrument or agreement by which the 
trust or agency in question has been created, 
observe the utmost good faith …”. 
FAIS Act 
Explicitly silent although some of the generally 
recognised common law fiduciary duties are 
described in s 16(1)(a) in relation to 
representatives of financial services providers 
and it is stated that that they owe a duty to “act 
in the interests of clients and the integrity of the 
industry”. 
Circular PF 130 Silent 
Case law Silent 
 
Again, referring back to the discussion in Section 1.2.2 of the generally recognised 
common law fiduciary duties, it is possible to conclude that the Act is saying that 
financial advisors and intermediaries owe all their duties (including presumably any 
fiduciary duties they might have) to their clients and to the integrity of the industry. 
Assuming that the contracting client of asset managers, in the context of the pension 
fund industry, is the fund itself, this suggests that whatever responsibility exists 
(fiduciary or otherwise) is toward the fund. With regard to “the integrity of the 
industry” it is not obvious how the integrity of the industry could be determined. 
Interpretations of this in case law would be helpful but as mentioned previously, such 
could not be found in the legal sources that were interrogated. Therefore, the possible 
answer to this question found in the sources is that asset managers owe their fiduciary 
duties to the pension fund itself (Table 3.5).  
 Question 3: What are asset managers‟ fiduciary duties? 
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The legal sources do not provide a clear-cut answer to the third question for asset 
managers. As already noted,247 nowhere in the South African legal sources reviewed is 
a list of fiduciary duties for any of the role players explicitly presented. Some of the 
generally recognised common law fiduciary duties are, however, found in the lists of 
statutory duties attached to asset managers in section 2 of the Financial Institutions 
Act and section 16(1) of the FAIS Act. This could be an indication that these are 
statutory formulations of the fiduciary duties of asset managers. It is also stated in 
section 16(1)(e) of the FAIS Act that  
… authorized financial services providers, and their representatives, are obliged by 
the provisions of such code to comply with all applicable statutory or common law 
requirements applicable to the conduct of business.248  
One can assume that this “conduct of business” refers to the General Code of Conduct 
that is published in terms of section 15 of the FAIS Act, but the code itself merely 
states the following: 
A provider must at all times render financial services honestly, fairly, with due skill, 
care and diligence, and in the interests of clients and the integrity of the financial 
services industry.249 
Again, it is necessary to deviate slightly from the standard qualitative paradigm in 
order to interpret the legislation. As it is stated that common law requirements would 
apply, the common law fiduciary duties would be applicable if one could prove the 
existence of a fiduciary relationship between asset managers and beneficiaries in the 
pension fund investment chain. Accordingly, it has already been suggested in Section 
1.2.1 that asset managers are agents and stand in a fiduciary relationship toward the 
trustees and the beneficiaries of the fund.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
247
 See section above on “What are trustees‟ fiduciary duties?” 
248
 Again, the “integrity of the financial services industry” is not defined, nor is it explained how it 
may be determined.  
249
 http://www.fsb.co.za/ Date accessed: 2012-02-12. 
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Table 3.6: Descriptive matrix displaying the answers to Question 3, “What are the fiduciary duties of 
asset managers?” obtained from South African legal sources 
Publication Interpretation 
Pension Funds Act Silent 
General Pensions Act Silent 
Government Employees Pension Law Silent 
Financial Services Board Act Silent 
Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 
Statutory duties listed in s 2 that resemble what 
are generally recognised to be common law 
fiduciary duties: 
“good faith” 
“no secret profit” 
“conflicts of interest” 
FAIS Act 
Statutory duties listed in s 16(1) that resemble 
what are generally recognised to be common 
law fiduciary duties: 
“interests of clients” 
 “conflicts of interests” 
The other generally recognised common law 
fiduciary duties that 16(1) might be referring to 
are: 
“no secret profit” 
“a duty to disclose” 
“a duty of impartiality” 
“a duty to act in good faith” 
Circular PF 98 Silent 
Circular PF 130 Silent 
Case law Silent 
In summary, it is proposed that the fiduciary duties of asset managers are at least 
those generally recognised common law fiduciary duties listed in section 2 of the 
Financial Institutions Act and section 16(1) of the FAIS Act, and most likely also all 
the other generally recognised common law fiduciary duties.250 
3.2.3 ASSET CONSULTANTS 
The answers to the three questions asked of asset consultants closely match those 
presented above for asset managers. 
                                                                                                                                            
250
 A duty to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries; a duty to act in good faith; a duty of 
impartiality; a duty to avoid conflicting interests; a duty not to make any secret profits; a duty to 




 Question 1: Are asset consultants fiduciaries? 
Nowhere in the legislation reviewed does it explicitly state that asset consultants are 
fiduciaries in the pension fund context. Case law is also silent on the question of 
whether asset consultants are fiduciaries. However, as with asset managers, this does 
not necessarily mean that they are not fiduciaries. At best it is possible to conclude 
that this has, to date, not been tested in court.  
It is, however, possible to argue that asset consultants, like asset managers, fall into 
the category of “other persons duly appointed by the board to act on its behalf”.251 
Asset consultants are technically only contracted to advise the trustees, but frequently 
the trustees who represent the employees lack confidence in making such decisions 
and therefore rely to a large extent on the advice of their asset consultants when 
making investment decisions.252 Consequently, asset consultants directly influence 
decisions made by pension fund trustees. This is a reasonably strong indication that 
asset consultants are fiduciaries in the pension fund investment chain (especially 
considering the notion of the existence of a trust relationship, as discussed in Section 
1.2.1). 
In summary then (Table 3.7), the answers obtained from the legislation, case law and 
the Circulars respectively for asset consultants are the same as for asset managers in 
terms of whether this group is a fiduciary or not and include: a) yes; and b) 
ambivalent.  
                                                                                                                                            
251
 Circular PF 130 p 1 par 1 ftp://ftp.fsb.co.za/public/pension/circular/PF1302.pdf Date accessed: 
2011-02-24. 
252
 The following quote was taken from an interview with a trustee. It is included here to support the 
notion that trustees are not necessarily highly educated individuals and are influenced by the asset 
consultants. This particular trustee, who preferred to stay anonymous, said: “It is because a lot of 
these trustees, come from very poor backgrounds, very very poor, especially the Union funds. 
Very, very poor backgrounds. Say, workers in factories, and they come here to Johannesburg, and 
they are wined and dined, and they‟re given woman and they‟re being – without them knowing – 
corrupted.” Later in the interview the trustee continued, saying: “The consultants to the funds are 
almost like gatekeepers. They are the ones that – who try to influence the trustees to accept their 
decisions, to that consultant‟s benefit.” 
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Table 3.7: Descriptive matrix displaying the answers to Question 1, “Are asset consultants 
fiduciaries?” obtained from South African legal sources 
Publication Interpretation 
Pension Funds Act  Silent 
The General Pensions Act Silent 
Government Employees Pension Law Silent 
The Financial Services Board Act Silent 
The Financial Institutions Act  Not applicable 
FAIS Act 
Explicitly silent although some of the duties 
specified in s 16 resemble what are generally 
recognised as common law fiduciary duties: 
“interests of clients” 
 “conflicts of interests” 
Case law Silent 
Circular PF 98 Silent 
Circular PF 130 Yes 
 
 Question 2: Who are the beneficiaries of asset consultants‟ fiduciary 
responsibility? 
The South African legal sources are even more silent on this question of the 
beneficiaries of asset consultants‟ fiduciary responsibility than on the question of 
whether asset consultants are fiduciaries. Nonetheless, the possible answers to this 
question are generally exactly the same as it were for asset managers. In so far as it 
seems likely that asset consultants are in fact fiduciaries, as argued in Section 1.2.1, it 
follows from the South African legal sources that such responsibility would be owed 
to the fund (Table 3.8 below).  
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Table 3.8: Descriptive matrix displaying the answers to Question 2, “To whom do asset consultants 
owe their fiduciary responsibility?” obtained from South African legal sources 
Publication Interpretation 
PFA Silent 
General Pensions Act Silent 
Government Employees Pension Law Silent 
Financial Services Board Act Silent  
Financial Institutions Act Silent 
FAIS Act 
Explicitly silent although it is stated that they 
owe a duty “to act in the interests of their clients 
and the integrity of the industry”. 
Case law Silent 
Circular PF 98 Silent 
Circular PF  130 Silent 
 
 Question 3: What are asset consultants‟ fiduciary duties? 
Again, answers to the third question are similar for asset consultants and asset 
managers. One possible answer is based on the suggestion contained in the Circular 
PF 130 that asset consultants are indeed fiduciaries. A logical inference is, therefore, 
that asset consultants‟ fiduciary duties are the generally recognised common-law 
fiduciary duties, because of the fact that some of these are also presented in the 
statutory duties attached to asset consultants (Table 3.9 below).253 The possible 
answers to the question of what asset consultants fiduciary duties are, obtained from 
the legislation, case law and the Circulars respectively, include a) the full list of 
generally recognised common law fiduciary duties; or b) the generally recognised 
fiduciary duties captured in section 16(1) of the FAIS Act; or c) ambivalence. 
  
                                                                                                                                            
253
 S 16(1) of FAIS Act. 
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Table 3.9: Descriptive matrix displaying the answers to Question 3, “What are the fiduciary duties of 
asset consultants?” from South African legal sources 
Publication Interpretation 
PFA Silent 
General Pensions Act Silent 
Government Employees Pension Law Silent 
Financial Services Board Act Silent 
Financial Institutions Act Not applicable 
FAIS Act 
Statutory duties listed in s 16(1) that resemble 
what are generally recognised to be common 
law fiduciary duties: 
“interests of clients” 
 “conflicts of interests” 
The other generally recognised common law 
fiduciary duties that 16(1) might be referring to 
are: 
“no secret profit” 
“a duty to disclose” 
“a duty of impartiality” 
“a duty to act in good faith” 
Circular PF 98 Silent 
Circular PF 130 Silent 
Case law Silent 
 
3.3 PHASE II: INTERVIEWS WITH THE KEY ROLE PLAYERS IN THE 
PENSION FUND INVESTMENT CHAIN 
3.3.1 PENSION FUND TRUSTEES 
 Question 1: Are pension fund trustees fiduciaries? 
In terms of the first question, the majority of pension fund trustees confirmed that they 
saw themselves as fiduciaries. Only one trustee was ambivalent in answering this 
question and stated:  
Look it depends on what you want to say, if I think they should be or if I see them as 
is … I think there are a lot of them that are. But unfortunately a lot of them are not, 
either. 
This answer suggests that the interviewee thought that some trustees act as fiduciaries 
and others do not, but perhaps failed to answer the question of whether the participant 
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indeed sees trustees as fiduciaries in the current legal context. Nonetheless, 
interpreting the answer to this question literally implies that the range of 
interpretations expressed by pension fund trustees themselves in terms of the first 
question included (Table 3.10): a) yes; b) possibly   
Table 3.10: Descriptive matrix displaying the answers to Question 1, “Do you see yourself as a 
fiduciary in the pension fund investment chain?” – opinions expressed by actual pension 
fund trustees 
Respondent Opinion  Respondent Opinion 
1 Yes  6 Yes 
2 Yes  7 Yes 
3 Yes  8 Yes 
4 Yes  9 Yes 
5 Ambivalent  10 Yes 
 
 Question 2: To whom do pension fund trustees owe their fiduciary responsibility? 
All trustees interviewed, including the outlier in terms of Question 1, were of the 
opinion that their fiduciary responsibility is owed to the members of the fund. Four of 
the trustees added other parties to the list of beneficiaries, of which two trustees said 
that their fiduciary responsibility is owed to the employer as well. One trustee 
mentioned the pension fund itself and another mentioned “other pensioners”. It is not 
clear what exactly this latter trustee meant by “other pensioners” and it is not fair to 
assume that the trustee was referring to a broader social responsibility. This might, 
however, prompt an interesting question to put to trustees in future research: Do 
pension fund trustees believe that they have a broader social responsibility to other 
pensioners beyond the ones in their own fund? 
These answers suggest that the range of interpretations on the second question is 
(Table 3.11) a) the members of the fund; b) the members and the employer; c) the 




Table 3.11: Descriptive matrix displaying the answers to Question 2, “To whom do you owe your 
fiduciary responsibility?” – opinions expressed by actual pension fund trustees 
Respondent Opinion 
1 Members as a collective entity 
2 Members and the employer 
3 The members of the fund 
4 The members of the fund 
5 The members of the fund, the fund and dependents 
6 The members of the fund 
7 The members and “other pensioners” 
8 The members of the fund 
9 Members and the employer 
10 The members of the fund 
 
 Question 3: Describe trustees‟ fiduciary duties? 
It is evident from the trustees‟ answers to the third question that some were unfamiliar 
with the generally recognised common law fiduciary duties (Table 3.12).254 Three out 
of ten did not mention any of these duties in their answers, although the other seven 
mentioned at least one of the generally recognised common law duties; however, none 
of them mentioned more than two of the nine. 
To act in the best interests of members was the generally recognised common law 
duty that was mentioned most (three out of the ten trustees). This duty was also the 
one mentioned by the most authors, as mentioned in the discussion on fiduciary 
responsibility in Section 1.2.2. The duty to act with good faith was mentioned twice 
and the duty to act with care and diligence was mentioned once. The fact that the duty 
to act with care was also mentioned by trustees when asked to describe fiduciary 
duties supports the notion that there is confusion around this duty and whether it is a 
fiduciary duty or not.255  
                                                                                                                                            
254
 Also see Section 1.2. 
255
 See also Section 1.2.2. 
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Table 3.12: Descriptive matrix displaying the answers to Question 3, “What are your fiduciary 
duties?” – opinions expressed by actual pension fund trustees 
Respondent Opinion 
1 
Generally recognised common law fiduciary duties noted: 
A duty to act with good faith 
A duty to disclose (accountability) 
Other duties: 
Measure against correct benchmarks 
2 
Generally recognised common law fiduciary duties noted: 
None 
Other duties: 
Submission of regulatory requirements 
Review of service providers 
Ensure that benefits are paid 
3 
Generally recognised common law fiduciary duties noted: 
None 
Other duties: 
Investing in a responsible manner 
4 
Generally recognised common law fiduciary duties noted: 
None 
Other duties: 
Making sure the investment returns are adequate to cover liabilities of fund 
Benefits are paid 
5 
Generally recognised common law fiduciary duties noted: 
A duty to disclose (benefit statements communicated) 
Other duties: 
A number of administrative tasks mentioned 
Mitigate risks 
6 
Generally recognised common law fiduciary duties noted: 
A duty to act in the interests of members 
Other duties: 
A duty of care and diligence 
7 
Generally recognised common law fiduciary duties noted: 
A duty to not exceed one‟s powers (stay within the investment mandate 
and remaining within the law) 
 
8 
Generally recognised common law duties noted: 




Generally recognised common law fiduciary duties noted: 




Generally recognised common law fiduciary duties noted: 
A duty to act in the interests of members 
Other duties: 
Balance risk and return 
 
 Question 4: Describe the duty to act in good faith in your own words. 
When the trustees were asked to describe the duty of good faith it was evident that 
most of them could not separate this duty from the duty to act in the best interests of 
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members. Five out of the ten trustees used words like “to act in the interests of” or 
“for the benefit of members” to describe this duty. Two other ideas that were 
highlighted in their answers (Table 3.13) were that there should not be any conflicting 
interests and that the members should be supplied with information on a regular basis. 
Table 3.13: Descriptive matrix displaying the answers to Question 4, “Describe the duty to act with 
good faith.” – opinions expressed by actual pension fund trustees 
Respondent Opinion 
1 Knowledge and skills and in the best interests of the members 
2 No self-interest 
3 The outcome must benefit the role player 
4 Making an investment with the best information available 
5 Act in such a way that the interests of members are paramount 
6 Act trustworthy, reliable, faithful and responsible 
7 Believe in what the person is doing 
8 Have as much information as possible before making decisions 
9 Act in such a way as to preserve the interests of the role players 
10 Do everything honestly; not thinking of yourself; think of others 
 
 Question 5: Describe the duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries in your 
own words. 
It was evident from the trustees‟ answers that they struggled to put “the duty to act in 
the best interests” into words. For example: 
… well best interest is ensuring that they are getting um, but administration at um a 
cost, at a cost effect, from a cost effective supplier and that um people um get ripped 
off and that there is too much cross subsidization … .  
This quote was a particularly striking example of the general confusion on the subject 
that clearly emerged in the interviews.256 The idea that this duty is closely related to or 
                                                                                                                                            
256
 It is also obvious that we cannot take what the interviewee said literally, because this would mean 
that he/she is saying “to act in the best interests” means to get ripped off, which is likely not what 
the interviewee intended to say.  
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inseparable from the duty of good faith again came out strongly (Table 3.14). Two 
trustees explained that best interests are  
… to act as you would as though it was acting for yourself. 
Table 3.14: Descriptive matrix displaying the answers to Question 5, “Describe the duty to act in the 
best interests of beneficiaries” – opinions expressed by actual pension fund trustees 
Respondent Opinion 
1 Interwoven concepts – acting in the best interests is also acting in good faith 
2 
Does not want to take decisions that have the effect of disadvantaging members 
and beneficiaries in any way 
3 You put their interests ahead of everything else 
4 Invest in a way that protects the financial investment 
5 Deliver on fund rules 
6 Though you are acting for yourself 
7 No front running and good management 
8 Cost-effective administration;  no cross subsidies; communication; best returns 
9 Same as good faith; decisions must not be in conflict with the rules/law 
10 Same as good faith; no difference 
  
It was not clear from these answers whether the trustees thought best interests 
automatically imply financial benefit, or if they could include other benefits like a 
healthy physical environment. Two trustees, however, highlighted the importance of 
financial benefit:  
Now you‟ve got to try and see that you invest their money in the – to get them the 
best pension possible, but also invest their money in a safe way. So there‟s risk 
attached to it, and you‟ve got to try and balance the two, and help the pensioners to 
get the best they can.  
… to provide the best uh, financial um, investment portfolio at – at the time of 
retirement so that the member can retire with a decent pension.  
In the first of these quotes, it is clear that the interviewee emphasises maximisation of 
financial return at an appropriate level of risk by his/her use of the word “best”. The 
second quotation, however, illustrates two possible interpretations. In the same 
sentence the word “best” and then later “decent” is used. “Best” in this case points to 
86 
 
maximising financial return, but a “decent” pension does not necessarily mean 
maximising financial return. Another, however, said:  
… one doesn‟t want to make decisions which have the effect of disadvantaging 
members and beneficiaries in any way.  
It is possible to deduce from this statement that, if the words “in any way” are 
recognised, beneficiaries‟ interests can include a wider range of benefits than just 
financial benefits. However, it might not have been the intention of the interviewee to 
have these words loaded with so much meaning. Considering the context of the 
abovementioned quote, it would seem that the interviewee placed a lot of emphasis on 
the fact that trustees have a duty to avoid conflicting interests and none of the parties 
should ever be favoured at the expense of another. 
3.3.2 ASSET MANAGERS 
 Question 1: Are asset managers fiduciaries? 
As is indicated in Table 3.15, without exception asset managers saw themselves as 
fiduciaries in the pension fund investment chain. 
Table 3.15: Descriptive matrix displaying the answers to Question 1, “Do you see yourself as a 









 Question 2: Who are the beneficiaries of asset managers‟ fiduciary responsibility? 
Two of the five asset managers said their fiduciary responsibility is owed to the 
members of the fund (Table 3.16). A third also mentioned the members of the fund, 
but said that the primary responsibility is to the primary client – the fund itself. 
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Another also mentioned the pension fund itself and one asset manager mentioned the 
broader society and the environment. 
Table 3.16: Descriptive matrix displaying the answers to Question 2, “To whom do you owe your 
fiduciary responsibility?” – opinions expressed by actual asset managers 
Respondent Opinion 
1 The client, the pension fund 
2 
Primarily the investor, primary intermediary and financial advisor; secondarily, the 
pension fund shareholders, employees of the company, society and environment 
3 The members of the pension fund 
4 
Primarily party clients – the trustees, the members of the fund, government and 
beneficiaries 
5 The members of the fund 
 
The responses of asset managers to the second question therefore suggest that the 
range of interpretations expressed included a) the members of the fund; b) the fund 
itself and the members of the fund; c) the fund itself; d) broader society and the 
environment.  
 Question 3: Describe the fiduciary duties of asset managers 
Answers to this question are summarised in Table 3.17. When asked to describe their 
fiduciary duties, asset managers most frequently mentioned the duty to act in the best 
interests of beneficiaries (four out of the five mentioned this duty). This reinforces the 
emerging trend that the duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries is seen as a 
primary, or perhaps overarching, fiduciary duty by a range of stakeholders in the 
pension fund investment chain. In the previous section it was also mentioned that this 
was the duty mentioned by most trustees. This was also identified as an overarching 




Table 3.17: Descriptive matrix displaying the answers to Question 3, “What are your fiduciary 
duties?” – opinions expressed by actual asset managers 
Respondent Opinion 
1 
Generally recognised common law duties noted: 
A duty to act in the interests of the client 
A duty to avoid conflicts of interest 
No secret profit 
Other duties: 
A duty to act with care and diligence 
2 
Generally recognised common law duties noted: 
A duty to act in the interests of the client 




Generally recognised common law duties noted: 
A duty to act in the interests of members 
Other duties: 
Act within the law 
Behave in trust 
4 
Generally recognised common law duties noted: 
A duty to act in the interests of the client 
A duty to disclose (fair disclosure) 
Other duties: 
Deal fairly in capital markets 
Provide value-for-money service 
Ethical responsibility 
Educate, advocate and train about ethics 
Gatekeepers 
5 
Generally recognised common law duties noted: 
A duty to not exceed one‟s powers (to act within the mandate)  
Other duties: 
Look after the assets in a diligent and responsible way 
 
One of the interviewees mentioned three out of the nine generally recognised common 
law duties, while two asset managers mentioned two out of the nine. A duty to stay 
within the mandate was mentioned by at least two asset managers, which could be a 
reference to the generally recognised common law fiduciary duty to not exceed one‟s 
powers. 
Asset managers, like trustees, also mentioned several other (not generally recognised) 
duties which they believed to be fiduciary duties: 
 “moral and ethical responsibility”  
 “to trade fairly within capital markets” 
 “to stay within the law” 
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 “to provide value for money service” 
 “to disclose fairly and to educate, advocate and train about ethics”  
The last duty on this list could include a reference to the generally recognised 
common law fiduciary duty to disclose, but this was not said explicitly. As the 
interviewee did not separate these ideas, it would not be accurate to present them in 
such a manner. Instead, the possibility that the interviewee could have referred to this 
duty is recognised. 
 Question 4: Describe the duty to act in good faith 
As is indicated in Table 3.18, asset managers gave a wide variety of descriptions for 
the duty to act in good faith. The word “integrity” was mentioned by two asset 
managers, while the word “skill” was also mentioned twice.  
Table 3.18: Descriptive matrix displaying the answers to Question 4, “Describe the duty to act with 
good faith.” – paraphrased opinions expressed by actual asset managers 
Respondent Opinion 
1 Acting in the best interests of the client 
2 Act of integrity 
3 Being transparent; skill 
4 Skill 
5 Absolute integrity 
 
One of the asset managers who mentioned the word “skill” explained it as follows: 
Uhm, I think the essence of good faith is, is things like uhm, skill, I don‟t sell a 
product so you cannot manage, don‟t sell an investment idea you cannot do, its uhm 
… . 
This particular interviewee was then interrupted by a colleague, but later continued, 
saying: 
So I think uh, that‟s right and that summarizes neatly into the clients‟ interest to 
always come first and define the clients broadly as I said that the consultants, the 
trustees, the beneficiaries, even the nation, even the capital markets come first. And 
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that is the essence of good faith because what it defines is: I won‟t sell a product; we 
won‟t sell a product we cannot manage. 
A sentence or two further on the interviewee said: 
Uhm, you‟ll act with uhm, competence, uh diligence, are the key words that come to 
mind. 
Another asset manager mentioned that they could describe the duty of “good faith” as 
“being transparent”, and then went on to explain: 
So tell your client what you are going to do, put processes in place that makes sure 
that you can do that and make sure that you have the skills to make sure that you can 
do what you have told them and then go out and actually do it and finally report back 
to your client. 
These quotations illustrate that these interviewees, like many other role players, 
struggled to put these concepts into their own words, although they are clearly 
referring to the duty of care and skill. Again, it is interesting to note that the duty of 
care is viewed as part of another fiduciary duty. A possible explanation for this is the 
fact that the duty of care is always listed in the same sections of legislation as other 
generally recognised fiduciary duties. Furthermore, it is implied that the duty to act in 
good faith is to act in the best interests of beneficiaries. This echoes what trustees 
said257 in describing this duty. By and large, they too could not seem to separate these 
two duties.   
Another asset manager described the duty to act in good faith as follows:  
Ooh, that‟s quite difficult, I mean I, you know (silence) good faith is, you know you 
either act in the best interest of the client or you‟re not. Uhm, you know I think there 
is some sort of binary outcome. Uhm, you can‟t be acting partly in good faith or uhm, 
or in a degree in good faith uhm so I think if you are acting in the best interest of the 
client, trying to, to balance the, the objective that you are trying to achieve uhm 
within acceptable, acceptable risk parameters as set out in the mandate then I think 
you are acting in the best interest of the client. 
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 See Section 3.3.1. 
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Although this quotation illustrates that the interviewee had a lot of difficulty 
explaining what he/she thought the duty to act in good faith means, the one thing that 
comes across quite plainly is the fact that the interviewee could not separate this duty 
from the duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries. As previously mentioned, 
such views were also expressed by a noteworthy number of trustees and again 
reinforces the recurring theme that “the duty to act in the best interests of” is viewed 
as an all-encompassing fiduciary duty.  
 Question 5: Describe the duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries. 
Three out of the five asset managers referred to skill, diligence, competence, and/or 
prudence (Table 3.19). One possible conclusion that could be made here is that asset 
managers do not view the duty of care and skill as a separate fiduciary duty. Another 
possibility might be that asset managers definitely see the duty of care as part of their 
fiduciary duties because it is mentioned several times when they were asked to 
describe other fiduciary duties – as if they see the duty of care as part of an inherent 
set of duties. The fact that confusion exists around the duty of care was already 
identified at the outset of this study258 and is a recurring theme in the empirical phase 
of the research. This reinforces the submission made earlier that when the layman 
reads the legislation he/she may become confused, as the duty of care is always 
mentioned in the same paragraph as the other fiduciary duties. 
One asset manager mentioned putting the client in a “better off condition” when asked 
about acting in the best interests of beneficiaries: 
It could simply mean that they are in a better off condition when the end of your 
product is reached than where, where they were when they started with you. And – 
and for me that would not only include financial condition, but a psychological 
condition as well. 
This is an interesting comment considering the discussion around the issue of whether 
best interests means profit maximisation or whether it could include other 
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 The dichotomy in the literature about whether the duty of care is indeed a fiduciary duty or a 
separate duty is described in detail in Section 1.2. 
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“benefits”.259 This interviewee clearly suggests that best interests can include other 
benefits, like a better “psychological condition”.  
Table 3.19: Descriptive matrix displaying the answers to Question 5, “Describe the duty to act in the 
best interests of your client.” – opinions expressed by actual asset managers 
Respondent Opinion 
1 
“It is using due care skill and diligence to achieve the objective that is given to you 
by the client …” 
2 
“It could simply be that they are in a better off condition when the end of your 
product is reached then where they were when they started with you …” 
3 “… what you do is well considered prudent and responsible …” 
4 
Putting their interests above your own; beyond words it comes down to actions; 
manage investments the way we would manage your own investments; act with 
competence and diligence 
5 
“The execution of your mandate in such a way that it provides a reasonable chance 
for meeting the members‟ objectives …” 
 
Furthermore, the achievement of the client‟s or the member‟s objectives was 
mentioned twice. It is not clear what the member‟s objectives are and one interviewee 
actually explained that: 
Now we are on pretty vague territory because most of the time we don‟t know 
anything about the actual end-member – we only make generic assumptions about the 
end-member but we assume that they want to grow their savings in a reasonable and 
responsible way. How that is interpreted will differ from person to person. 
This quote reveals at least three things: uncertainty regarding members‟ objectives; 
variation in the objectives of different members of the same fund; and uncertainty as 
to the meaning and implications of growing savings in a “reasonable and responsible” 
way. This possibly indicates that there is a need for future research to determine what 
members‟ objectives or interests are. 
3.3.3 ASSET CONSULTANTS 
 Question 1: Are asset consultants fiduciaries? 
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In answer to the first question of whether asset consultants see themselves as 
fiduciaries, the majority of asset consultants interviewed (five out of seven) believed 
that they were indeed fiduciaries (Table 3.20). However, one stated that 
… so while you might not be directly responsible for something I think it‟s important 
for everybody to see their role as part of the bigger plan.  
It is not completely clear what this interviewee meant by the “bigger plan”, but one 
can speculate that it is a reference to the fact that every role player in the pension fund 
chain has a specific responsibility. It is suggested that this is a fiduciary responsibility 
which could be expressed through a single collective fiduciary duty: to act in the best 
interests of the beneficiaries.  
Table 3.20: Descriptive matrix displaying the answers to Question 1, “Do you see yourself as a 











Another respondent stated the following: 
I think technically they are not direct fiduciaries but having said that they do bear 
responsibilities for the investments of the underlying managers so there is 
responsibility and whether it is a direct legal route in terms of fiduciary duty is 
probably less clear and less direct but there probably is um a sense of responsibility 
there.  
Both of these quotes suggest a certain degree of ambivalence, indicating that the range 
of interpretations of the first question expressed by asset consultants themselves 
includes: a) yes; b) ambivalent; and c) no or at least not directly.  
 Question 2: To whom do asset consultants owe their fiduciary responsibility? 
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As illustrated in Table 3.21, three distinct interpretations emerged from question 2. 
The most common view was that the beneficiaries of asset consultants‟ fiduciary 
responsibility were the members of the fund, with six out of the seven asset 
consultants mentioning members as beneficiaries. This view closely mirrors the views 
expressed by trustees on this question, as they were also of the opinion that they owe 
their fiduciary responsibility to the members. As two of the five asset managers said 
they owe their fiduciary responsibility to the members of the fund, this is clearly a 
recurring theme in the role players‟ views.  
Table 3.21: Descriptive matrix displaying the answers to Question 2, “To whom do you owe your 
fiduciary responsibility?” – opinions expressed by actual asset consultants 
Respondent Opinion 
1 The client, the pension fund 
2 The members of the fund 
3 First members, then trustees 
4 First the trustees and through them the members 
5 The members of the fund 
6 First the trustees, then the members of the fund 
7 The members of the fund 
 
Two of the asset consultants did, however, indicate that their first responsibility is 
toward the trustees. This is perhaps not surprising, as asset consultants have a close 
trust relationship with trustees. As was explained earlier, the trustees rely heavily on 
the advice asset consultants provide them with, because they often lack the confidence 
to make important investment decisions themselves.  
The final interpretation expressed was that the fund is the beneficiary. This view 
corresponds with the answers to this question obtained from the South African legal 
sources.260  
 Question 3: Describe the fiduciary duties of asset consultants. 
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The range of asset consultant responses to this question is illustrated in Table 3.22. 
The duty most frequently mentioned by the asset consultants themselves (three out of 
seven) was the duty to act in the best interests of members. This was the same for the 
pension fund trustees and asset managers. Moreover, this was also the duty mentioned 
by the most authors in Chapter 1, and again highlights the recurring theme that this 
duty might be viewed as an overarching fiduciary duty. The two other generally 
recognised common law fiduciary duties noted by asset consultants were the duty to 
avoid conflicts of interests and the duty to disclose. 
One asset consultant responded to this question as follows: 
Well, uh, I would say, uh we‟re obviously a service provider to the board of trustees 
for example and um, that means that we are contracted to give them advice on um, 
on… everything concerning investments of the retirement funds and the pension 
funds as such a role player, uh our duty would entail, uh, that uhm we‟ve got to be 
very aware of the correctness of the advice, um soundness of the advice and also 
make sure that there‟s a risk and return profile that‟s properly communicated to the 
board of trustees, basically to ensure that the mission and vision of the funds what 
um, what members expect in the end is fulfilled and is basically um carried out. 
This quotation again261 illustrates that the interviewees really struggled to express 
themselves. In this specific instance it may also point to the fact that the interviewee 
had little knowledge of the generally recognised common law fiduciary duties as none 
of them was mentioned explicitly. Of the five asset consultants who did mention some 
of the generally recognised common law fiduciary duties, four cited the duty to act in 
the best interests of the beneficiary, as discussed above.  
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Table 3.22: Descriptive matrix displaying the answers to Question 3, “What are your fiduciary 
duties?” – opinions expressed by actual asset consultants 
Respondent Opinion 
1 
Generally recognised common law duties noted: 
None 
Other duties: 
A duty to give advice on investment strategy 
2 
Generally recognised common law duties noted: 
A duty to act in the interests of members 
3 
Generally recognised common law duties noted: 
A duty to disclose (communicate risk and return profile properly) 
Other duties: 
A duty to give advice 
4 
Generally recognised common law duties noted: 
None 
Other duties: 
 A duty to help the trustees to do a good job 
5 
Generally recognised common law duties noted: 




Generally recognised common law duties noted: 
A duty to act in the interests of members 
Other duties: 
A duty to compile the investment strategy 
A duty to educate the trustees 
7 
Generally recognised common law duties noted: 
A duty to act in the interests of members 




Notwithstanding the debate262 on whether the duty of care, skill and diligence is a 
fiduciary duty or not, no asset consultant mentioned it. This result is interesting, 
considering that this is probably the duty that consultants run the highest risk of 
breaching, owing to the fact that their entire industry is built on the foundation of 
having superior knowledge and skills. It is therefore essential for asset consultants to 
always prove that they have applied care, skill and diligence in the execution of their 
tasks. The fact that asset consultants did not mention the duty to act with care could 
point to the fact that asset consultants generally, like the majority of academic writers 
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and the South African legislation,263 do not consider the duty of care to be part of the 
list of fiduciary duties; or it could be that this duty is just so integral to their roles that 
they did not feel the need to mention it. 
The asset consultant quoted above does seem to imply that his/her fiduciary 
responsibility entails fulfilling pension fund members‟ expectations; a view that was 
also expressed by asset managers. This could simply be interpreted to mean that the 
asset consultant was trying to say that they should act in the best interests of the 
members, but simply did not know the correct term or just struggled to find the right 
words. It is not, however, clear what exactly the consultant meant and therefore the 
consultant was also asked how it could be known what members expect. This was the 
response: 
Well that is uh … that is uh, that I think, we base that on uh (silence) what we say 
would be the average member or the reasonable expectation of a member or uh, 
industry norms. 
Clearly, the interviewee seems to be very unsure of the answer and seems to say that 
members expect industry norms. This would mean that as long as the fund performs 
within industry norms, the members would be happy. This is obviously a huge 
assumption to make and the need for future research on the question of what 
members‟ interests are is once more raised.  
The other duties mentioned by asset consultants do not correspond explicitly with the 
generally recognised common law fiduciary duties, but indicate that asset consultants, 
like asset managers, struggle to differentiate between their contractual obligations and 
their fiduciary duties, or they seem to think they are the same thing. This is not 
necessarily wrong, because the generally recognised fiduciary duty to not exceed 
one‟s powers would include in this context to “stay within the mandate”, as was also 
mentioned by asset managers, and therefore would include some of the contractual 
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obligations.264 Duties like giving advice on investment strategy; helping trustees to do 
a good job; compiling an investment strategy and educating trustees (see Table 3.22) 
are typically part of their contractual obligations.  
 Question 4:Describe the duty to act in good faith. 
As was the case with trustees265 and asset managers,266 most of the asset consultants 
found it difficult to describe the duty of good faith.  
Good faith is also rather about ethics isn‟t it? It‟s about ethics and when it comes to 
ethics it is quite hard to define that sort of thing, it is the sort of thing that you know, 
you know if you are given a specific example you will know whether it is right or 
wrong. 
In addition to illustrating the difficulty that asset consultants had in describing good 
faith, this quote is interesting in that it introduced the word “ethics” for the first time. 
Other role players mentioned words like integrity, while another asset consultant 
described good faith as a “moral code”, which is closely related to this idea of ethics. 
I think um, you know, good faith speaks to behaviour, and intentions, um as well as 
honesty so it‟s pretty much a moral code where you basically say, um, the advice is 
required to be made with the best intention. Now, um, there yes, you know um I‟m 
not great with language, I‟m not a linguist but to my mind the way to achieve that 
with clients is to have, um, a code of transparency and honesty, and to make sure that 
your advice is independent, um, and also to put all conflicts of interest on the table. 
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 See also Volvo (Southern Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Yssel 2009 (6) SA 531 (SCA) 537: “Contractual duties 
owed by one party to another will no doubt often go a long way towards defining whether the 
relationship is one of trust but contractual privity is not indispensable to such relationships, as 
correctly observed by the court below. Having said that, the court below went on to find that Yssel 
indeed owed fiduciary duties to Volvo, but only in relation to the exercise of the specific functions 
that were assigned to him in the various agreements between Volvo and Highveld (the functions I 
have listed in para [2] above). Because his functions did not extend to the recruitment, employment 
or acquisition of staff, so the court reasoned, he was under no duty to act in the interests of Volvo 
when he engaged in the activities with which we are now concerned. That seems to me to view the 
matter too narrowly.” 
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 See Question 4 in Section 3.3.1. 
266
 See Question 4 in Section 3.3.2. 
99 
 
This quote illustrates that the interviewee thinks that good faith includes several 
things, but emphasises the intentions with which it is carried out and uses words like 
“a code of transparency and honesty”. The word “transparency” was used by another 
asset consultant as well (Table 3.23). This other interviewee then continued to say that 
the advice one gives should be independent. This seems to be a reference to the 
generally recognised common law fiduciary duty to maintain an unfettered 
discretion.267 The interviewee also seems to refer to that of avoiding conflicts of 
interests. This is confirmed with the suggestion that one “should put all conflicts of 
interest on the table”. 
Table 3.23: Descriptive matrix displaying the answers to Question 4, “Describe the duty to act in good 
faith” – opinions expressed by actual asset consultants 
Respondent Opinion 
1 Unclear – the same as best interests 
2 It‟s about ethics – knowing right from wrong 
3 Must be able to fulfil promises 
4 About trust and transparency 
5 Having the interests of members uppermost in your mind 
6 The best decisions given the information that they have; accountability 
7 
It is about behaviour and intentions. It is a moral code where the advice given is 
with the best intentions. Transparency 
 
On this note, it was also suggested that the pension fund industry as a whole struggles 
with conflicting interests because so many of the service providers are what was 
called “one-stop-shop” companies. This refers to the fact that many companies in this 
industry provide asset management, asset consulting and pension fund administration 
services. 268 In a situation where the same company provides all three of these services 
to a specific pension fund, there can be conflicting interests. This is particularly 
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 Also see the description of the meaning of this duty in Section 1.2.2, where it is also stated that it 
means independent judgement. 
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 Pension fund administrators were not included in this study because they are not responsible in any 
way for the actual investment of the assets. 
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prevalent where asset consultants advise trustees to contract asset managers to manage 
their assets from what is in fact the same company.   
Another asset consultant mentioned that acting in good faith is the same as the duty to 
act in the interest of beneficiaries. This view was also expressed by some of the 
trustees and the asset managers.  
 Question 5: Describe the duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries. 
Once again, when the asset consultants were asked to describe this duty, most found it 
challenging to articulate the concept (Table 3.24). This is clearly indicated by 
attempts to answer the question being prefixed with: 
It‟s tricky to define.  
or  
I mean I know what it means but it is quite difficult to explain, I mean to give a 
definition um … .  
Acting in the best interests of the beneficiary was also described differently by all the 
participants. One participant described it as “ethical standards”, while another used 
the words “honourable intentions”. What should be immediately apparent is that much 
the same words were used to describe the duty to act in good faith. This points to the 
fact that asset consultants, like the other role players, struggled to separate these two 
duties from each other.  
Two participants also described the best interests of beneficiaries as trying to achieve 
the “best possible outcome” for the member.  
Whatever decision you make it from a point of view where you want to maximise 
benefit for the beneficiary. 
The interviewer then probed further, asking whether this meant to maximise risk-
adjusted financial returns; the interviewee responded as follows: 
Well, let me put it this way. I think what you have got to do is you have got to 
maximise the probability of the beneficiary achieving their objectives and the reason 
why I say that is not about maximising growing assets. 
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Although the interviewee explicitly states that “it is not about maximising growing 
assets”, it is actually not clear what maximising benefit for the beneficiary is all about. 
Another recurring theme that is mentioned in this quote is that the beneficiaries‟ 
objectives should be achieved. This idea was also mentioned when the asset 
consultants were asked to describe their fiduciary duties and it was mentioned twice 
by asset managers when they were asked to describe the duty to act in the best 
interests of beneficiaries.269 The idea of members‟ objectives could be a reference to 
the different profiles of the members, for example those members who are close to 
retirement and those who are far from it. Some members of defined contribution funds 
also get to choose between options like a high-risk maximum growth and a lower-risk 
stability option. Nonetheless, these possibilities were not discussed by the specific 
interviewee in this context and the uncertainty therefore remains. 
Table 3.24: Descriptive matrix displaying the answers to Question 5, “Describe the duty to act in the 
best interests of your client” – opinions expressed by actual asset consultants 
Respondent Opinion 
1 The member should be able to maintain standard of living 
2 Ethical standards 
3 
To give the best advice with the available information and to render a high 
standard of service 
4 
To maximise the probability of the beneficiaries achieving their objectives, but this 
is not necessarily about maximising growing assets 
5 To meet the liabilities determined by the actuary 
6 Doing what is best for the members as opposed to what is best for the trustees 
7 Honourable intentions, like good faith; no conflicts of interests 
 
3.4 DATA REDUCTION: COMPARING THE SETS  
3.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The two preceding sections displayed many recurring themes, as well as some 
discrepancies, in the results of the interviews with the legal sources and those with 
practitioners. The purpose of this section is to provide the reader with comparisons, 
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mostly in the form of tables, in order to present an overall view of the results that have 
been displayed. It also aims to reduce the data in order to transfer it to the 
interpretation matrices in Chapter 4. In this section, basic set theory concepts of the 
union, the intersection, and set differences are used to do these comparisons.270  
This section is presented in two main parts. The first part contains the comparisons 
between the answers obtained from the key role players to each of the five questions 
posed. In other words, the answers trustees gave are compared with those provided by 
the asset managers and with those by the asset consultants. Consequently, the three 
sets of answers are compared with one another. 
The second part of this section contains comparisons between the legal sources (Phase 
I of the research as displayed in Section 3.2) and the opinions of the practitioners 
(Phase II of the research as displayed in Section 3.3) for each of the three questions. 
These comparisons are presented in the same sequence as the other results for Phases 
I and II given earlier in this chapter – with subsections for each role player. The 
section concludes with a description of the reduced data and the gaps that were 
identified for future research, as deduced from these results. 
3.4.2 COMPARISON OF THE PRACTITIONERS’ ANSWERS 
 Question 1: Do you see yourself as a fiduciary? 
The sets compared here emerged from the answers to the question: “Do you see 
yourself as a fiduciary?” given by trustees, asset managers and asset consultants, 
which were presented in Tables 3.10, 3.15 and 3.20 respectively. This detail has been 
reduced271 and this reduction is presented as the three sets in the columns labelled 
“Trustees”, “Asset Managers” and “Asset Consultants” in Table 3.25.  
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Table 3.25: Question 1, “Do you see yourself as fiduciaries?” – comparison of practitioners‟ answers 
Q 1 – Do you see yourself as a 
fiduciary? 
Trustees Asset Managers Asset Consultants 
Yes    
Ambivalent    
No, not directly    
 
The first column in this table represents the union, in that it contains all the answers 
that were received from practitioners. This applies to all the tables throughout this 
section. An intersection is illustrated by the row where all the cells are ticked. This is 
where the answer to the first question was yes. This represents a consensus position. 
The set difference is then illustrated in the “Ambivalent” and the “No, not directly” 
rows, which indicate that some of the trustees and asset consultants did not 
necessarily think that they are fiduciaries. However, in this case, all the asset 
managers were of the opinion that they are indeed fiduciaries.  
 Question 2: To whom do you owe your fiduciary responsibility? 
The answer that the responsibility is owed to members of the fund is the intersection. 
In other words, the members of the fund are the one beneficiary that all three role 
players acknowledged as beneficiaries of their fiduciary responsibility. The set 
differences are indicated in the rows where just one or two cells were ticked (Table 
3.26). 
Three interesting ideas that emerged from the set differences are: firstly, asset 
managers and asset consultants do not seem to distinguish between members, 
dependents and pensioners, but rather seem to view this as one group that falls under 
“members”, although trustees do seem to make a distinction between these groups. 
Secondly, trustees are, not surprisingly, the only role player that did not mention “the 
client”, which points to a clear distinction between the trustees on the one hand and 
the “service providing” role players on the other (asset managers and asset 
consultants). This was also hinted at in Section 3.3, where it emerged that asset 
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managers and asset consultants struggled to differentiate between their contractual 
obligations and their fiduciary duties.  
Table 3.26: Question 2, “To whom do you owe your fiduciary responsibility?” – comparison of 
practitioners‟ answers 
Q 2 – To whom do you owe 
your fiduciary responsibility? 
Trustees Asset Managers Asset Consultants 
The members of the fund    
The members, the fund and 
dependents 
   
The members and pensioners    
The members and the employer    
The client – the pension fund    
The client (the pension fund), the 
members, the government and 
beneficiaries 
   
The investor, pension fund 
shareholders, employees, society 
   
First the members, then the 
trustees 
   
First the trustees, then the 
members 
   
 
Thirdly, asset managers were the only group in which the view emerged that “the 
society” is a beneficiary. They also seemed to be the only group that really described 
the beneficiaries in “financial” terms, such as shareholders and investors. One 
possible explanation for this might be that because of the nature of their work, asset 
managers are used to using many financial terms and this just came out more strongly 
in the interviews than with the other role players. With regard to the mention of 
“society” – this was a specific asset manager who seemed to support the social form 
of responsible investment, as described in this dissertation, throughout the interview. 
 Question 3: Describe your fiduciary duties. 
Table 3.27 presents all the duties that were mentioned as fiduciary duties by the 
practitioners. Except for the generally recognised common law fiduciary duties 
(which are greyed out in Table 3.27), there was very little overlap between what the 





Table 3.27: Question 3, “Describe your fiduciary duties?” – comparisons of practitioners‟ answers 
Q 3 – Describe your fiduciary 
duties. 
Trustees Asset Managers Asset Consultants 
Duty to act in the best interests 
of beneficiaries 
   
Duty to act in good faith    
Duty to avoid conflicts of 
interest 
   
Duty to not make any secret 
profit 
   
Duty to disclose (benefit 
statements communicated; 
accountability; fair disclosure; 
communication of risk and 
return profile) 
   
Duty to not exceed powers (fund 
managed within mandate; stay 
within the mandate; Stay within 
the law) 
   
Duty to act with care, skill and 
diligence 
   
Measure against correct 
benchmark 
   
Review of service providers    
Investing in a responsible 
manner 
   
Make sure investment returns are 
adequate to cover liabilities 
   
To educate and help trustees    
Providence of advice    
Look after assets in a diligent 
and responsible way 
   
Ethical responsibility    
Provide value for money service    
Deal fairly in capital markets    
To educate, advocate and train in 
ethics 
   
Balance risk and return    
Moral background    
No hidden agendas    
Benefits must be paid    
Administrative tasks    
Mitigate risks    
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Note: The dark grey section of this table represents the generally recognised common law fiduciary 
duties, while the medium grey section represents all the other duties and the white section represents 
administrative duties. 
Two very similar duties were mentioned by trustees and asset managers. Trustees 
mentioned a “submission to regulatory requirements” and asset managers said 
fiduciaries should “act within the law”. These were merged under the generally 
recognised fiduciary duty to not exceed one‟s powers.272  
Table 3.27 furthermore shows that practitioners collectively mentioned six out of the 
nine generally recognised common law fiduciary duties. The three that were not 
mentioned explicitly were a duty to disclose; a duty of impartiality and a duty to act 
for a proper purpose. Technically, it can be deduced from the practitioners‟ comments 
that their mention of terms such as fair disclosure and accountability may be 
references to a duty to disclose. The duty of impartiality as well as the duty to act for a 
proper purpose are closely related to the duty to act in the best interests of 
beneficiaries and the duty to avoid conflicts of interest, and this may be why they 
were not mentioned as separate duties.273 
The intersection is clearly at a duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries and a 
duty to disclose. This means that these two duties are the generally recognised 
common law fiduciary duties that were mentioned by all the groups. The duty to 
disclose was not, however, mentioned explicitly; it was merely implied by the 
practitioners‟ words.  
 Question 4: Describe the duty to act in good faith. 
Table 3.28 presents reductions of the practitioners‟ descriptions of the duty to act in 
good faith. It is obvious from this presentation that there was only one intersection in 
terms of how the groups of practitioners described this duty. The different role players 
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common law fiduciary duties could fall under the duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries 
was also discussed Section 1.2.2. 
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provided a list of 14 different descriptions for this duty, some of which resemble the 
same themes, such as ethics and a moral code.274  
Table 3.28: Question 4, “Describe the duty to act in good faith” – comparisons of practitioners‟ 
answers 
Q 4 – Describe the duty to act 
in good faith 
Trustees Asset Managers Asset Consultants 
Knowledge and skills    
No self-interest    
Outcome must benefit the role 
players 
   
Making an investment with the 
best information available 
   
To act in the best interests of 
beneficiaries 
   
Trustworthy, reliable, faithful 
and responsible 
   
Have as much information as 
possible before making decisions 
   
Integrity    
Transparency    
Ethics – knowing right from 
wrong 
   
Accountability    
Fulfil promises    
Moral code    
Behaviour and intentions    
 
The intersection illustrates that the key role players struggled to separate the duty to 
act in good faith from the duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries, or that they 
think that acting in the best interests of beneficiaries includes acting in good faith. It is 
likely that they argued that it would be impossible to act in bad faith and still in the 
best interests of the beneficiaries, but this is not clear. It would, however, be possible 
to act in the beneficiaries‟ financial interests and in bad faith. For instance, if a trustee 
has some “inside information” on a company and suggests to the board that the fund 
should buy shares in that company but does not reveal the source of his “superior 
knowledge”, he is acting in bad faith but still in the best financial interests of the 
beneficiaries. 
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According to the law it can never be in the best interests of the beneficiaries to do 
something illegal. The law therefore settles this matter quite easily. Accordingly, it is 
proposed that the practitioners are not wrong in their thinking that these two duties 
cannot be separated.275 
 Question 5: Describe the duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries. 
Table 3.29 presents the descriptions that were provided by the three key role players 
for the duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries. The table illustrates that the 
groups gave 15 different descriptions for this duty. Some of the ideas were grouped 
together for the purpose of this Table, where it was obvious that the data could be 
reduced to a single item. This was for instance done for the description of meeting 
members‟ objectives. Some asset managers and some asset consultants described it a 
little differently but it was clear that this was what they meant.  
Most interestingly, there is no intersection for these set comparisons, which means 
that none of the descriptions provided was representative of a description from all 
three groups. As a result it can be suggested that practitioners have no clarity on what 
this duty entails and that it might mean something different for every individual.  
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Table 3.29: Question 5, “Describe the duty in the best interests of beneficiaries” – comparisons of the 
practitioners‟ answers 
Q 5 – Describe the duty to act 
in the best interests of 
beneficiaries. 
Trustees Asset Managers Asset Consultants 
To act with good faith    
Decisions must not disadvantage 
members in any way 
   
Put their interests ahead of 
everything else 
   
Invest in a way that protects 
financial investment 
   
Deliver on fund rules    
Act as if you are acting for 
yourself 
   
No front running and good 
management 
   
Cost-effective administration, no 
cross subsidies, good 
communication and best returns 
   
Care and skill    
Members must be in a better-off 
condition (this includes a 
psychological condition) 
   
Meeting the members‟ objectives    
To give the best advice, given 
available information 
   
Doing what is best for the 
members (putting their interests 
above your own and above the 
trustees‟ interests) 
   
Maximise benefit but not 
necessarily “maximising 
growing assets” 
   
No conflicts of interest    
 
3.4.3 COMPARISON OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL SOURCES’ AND THE 
PRACTITIONERS’ ANSWERS 
3.4.3.1 Pension fund trustees 
 Question 1: Are pension fund trustees fiduciaries? 
The majority of pension fund trustees saw themselves as fiduciaries and this notion 
was also reflected in the legal sources. As can be seen from Table 3.30, none of the 
legal sources or practitioners‟ opinions reflected the view that pension fund trustees 
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are not fiduciaries in the absolute sense. In fact, nine out of the ten actual pension 
fund trustees responded that they do consider themselves to be fiduciaries.276 The 
intersection illustrates that some of the legal sources and the majority of the trustees 
agree that pension fund trustees are fiduciaries. 
Table 3.30: Question 1, “Are pension fund trustees fiduciaries?” – comparison of South African legal 
sources‟ and trustees‟ answers. 
Q 1 – Are pension fund 
trustees fiduciaries? 
Legal sources Trustees 
Yes   
Silence  NA 
Ambivalent   
 
 Question 2: To whom do pension fund trustees owe their fiduciary responsibility? 
The answers from the legal sources and the trustees were very similar for this question 
(Table 3.31). The intersection for this question includes a range of interpretations, 
including the members, the fund itself, the members as a whole (or collective entity) 
and members, pensioners and other beneficiaries.  
Table 3.31: Question 2, “To whom do pension fund trustees owe their fiduciary duty?” – comparison 
of answers South African legal sources‟ and trustees‟ answers 
Q 2 – To whom do pension 
fund trustees owe their 
fiduciary duty? 
Legal sources Trustees 
The members of the fund   
The fund itself   
The members and the employer   
The members as a collective 
entity 
  




The table illustrates that the set difference is “the employer”. This is an interesting 
result and prompts the question: why do some trustees perceive the employer to also 
be a beneficiary of their fiduciary responsibility? There are a number of possible 
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answers to this. One could simply be the fact that both trustees that listed this 
beneficiary were employer representative trustees. A far more interesting avenue of 
consideration might relate to the nature of the pension fund on which these trustees 
served. As discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.1, two basic fund types exist: defined 
benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC). Intuitively speaking one might expect 
trustees serving on a DB fund to be more likely to claim a loyalty to the employer. 
After all, in DB funds it is the sponsoring employer that carries all of the investment 
risk and not the members, pensioners or other beneficiaries. In DC funds, the 
investment risk lies with the members themselves. Because of the qualitative nature of 
the study and the room for probing in qualitative interviews, both the participants who 
mentioned the employer as being one of the beneficiaries were asked their reason for 
doing so. It should be noted that they both represented hybrid funds, which have DB 
and DC components. The one did not really answer the question but the other 
response is given below: 
I think the interests of members are paramount, whether they‟re DB or DC, and one 
wants to always make sure that whatever decisions you take, you don‟t harm the 
sponsoring company‟s financial interests in any way, you want to keep the good will 
of the sponsoring company, and its interest in your Fund and its members. 
This quote provides some support for the idea that trustees of DB funds might tend to 
be more loyal towards the sponsoring company and as a result they view the employer 
(the sponsoring company) as one of the beneficiaries of their fiduciary responsibility.  
 Question 3: Describe the fiduciary duties of pension fund trustees. 
Table 3.32 presents all the duties that were mentioned in the legal sources and by the 
trustees as being fiduciary duties. The duties listed in the legal sources are mainly 
those duties listed in section 7C of the Pension Funds Act and section 2 of the 
Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act. The duties mentioned by the trustees 
themselves included some of the generally recognised common law fiduciary duties, 
but also a variety of other technical and administrative duties. 
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Table 3.32: Question 3, “What are the fiduciary duties of pension fund trustees?” – comparison of 
South African legal sources‟ and trustees‟ answers.  
Q 3 – Describe the fiduciary 
duties of pension fund trustees 
Legal sources Trustees 
A duty to act in the best interests 
of beneficiaries 
  
A duty to act in good faith   
A duty to not make any secret 
profit 
  
A duty to avoid conflicts of 
interests 
  
A duty to act with impartiality 
with regard to all members and 
beneficiaries 
  
A duty to disclose   
A duty to not exceed powers   
A duty to maintain an unfettered 
discretion 
  
A duty to act for a proper 
purpose 
  
Duty to act with due care and 
diligence 
  
Measure against correct 
benchmarks 
  
Investing in a responsible 
manner 
  
Make sure investment returns are 
adequate to cover liabilities 
  
Mitigate risks   
No hidden agendas   
Balance risk and return   
Ensure that benefits are paid   
Administrative tasks   
Note: The dark grey section of this table represents the generally recognised common law fiduciary 
duties, the medium grey section represents the other duties and the white section represents 
administrative duties. 
The intersections in Table 3.32 illustrate that the legal sources and the trustees are in 
agreement about five “fiduciary duties”. The first four are generally recognised 
common law fiduciary duties; that is, a duty to act in the best interests of 
beneficiaries; a duty to act in good faith; a duty to disclose; and a duty to not exceed 
one‟s powers. The first one is hardly surprising in the sense that it has been suggested 
throughout this dissertation that this duty is an overarching fiduciary duty. It has also 
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been proposed that a duty to act in good faith cannot be separated from the duty to act 
in the best interests of beneficiaries.  
Interestingly, the third one, a duty to disclose, was specifically recognised as part of a 
duty to act in good faith in case law,277 which leads back again to the duty to act in the 
best interest of beneficiaries. It was also suggested in Section 3.4.2 that it can never be 
in the best interests of beneficiaries to do anything illegal. Although the duty to not 
exceed one‟s powers does not only refer to illegal actions this is also an indication that 
the duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries can include this duty also. 
The fifth duty, the duty to act with care and diligence, is controversial. The debate as 
to whether this duty is indeed a fiduciary duty has already been acknowledged at the 
outset of this study in Section 1.2.2. This intersection reinforces the idea that laymen 
might not recognise the distinction between the duty to act with care, skill and 
diligence and the generally recognised common law fiduciary duties.278  
3.4.3.2 Asset managers 
 Question 1: Are asset managers fiduciaries? 
All the asset managers see themselves as fiduciaries, as indicated by Table 3.33. 
Although this view could also be traced in the legal sources, they were generally silent 
on the matter. However, none of the legal sources‟ or respondents‟ opinions reflected 
the view that asset managers are not fiduciaries. 
Table 3.33: Question 1, “Are asset managers‟ fiduciaries?” – comparison of South African legal 
sources‟ and asset managers‟ answers 
Q 1 – Are asset managers 
fiduciaries? 
Legal sources Asset managers 
Yes   
Silence   
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Considering the position that asset managers hold in the pension fund investment 
chain279 (Chapter 1, Section 1.1), this is an interesting result, as asset managers are 
actually quite far removed from the actual beneficiaries in the pension fund compared 
to the trustees and even the asset consultants. So, even though they definitely have an 
influence on what the member gets at the end of the day, their main purpose is to 
execute an investment strategy. It is therefore interesting to note that none of the 
sources indicated that they are not fiduciaries and that the asset managers all thought 
of themselves as fiduciaries. 
 Question 2: To whom do asset managers owe their fiduciary responsibility? 
Table 3.34 illustrates that the answer suggested by the legal sources was that the 
responsibility is owed to the members (the owners of the assets), the fund itself and 
the industry. Two of the asset managers mentioned the fund itself, whilst three out of 
five mentioned the members of the fund. 
Table 3.34: Question 2, “To whom do asset managers‟ owe their fiduciary responsibility?” – 
comparison of South African legal sources‟ and trustees‟ answers 
Q 2 – To whom do pension 
fund trustees owe their 
fiduciary responsibility? 
Legal sources Asset managers 
The members of the fund   
The fund itself (the client)   
The industry   
The fund, the members, 
government and beneficiaries 
  
The investor, pension fund 
shareholders, employees, society 
and the environment 
  
 
The intersections in Table 3.34 are the “members of the fund” and the “fund itself”. 
The fact that the members of the fund are identified as a beneficiary of fiduciary 
duties by both the asset managers themselves and the legal sources can be seen as a 
surprising result, considering the position of asset managers in the pension fund 
investment chain, as also discussed in the preceding section. The fact that the other 
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intersection is the “fund itself” is a more obvious result in the sense that asset 
managers are mainly a service-providing role player and are essentially contracted by 
a pension fund to manage the fund‟s assets. 
 Question 3: Describe the fiduciary duties of asset managers. 
Table 3.35: Question 3, “Describe the fiduciary duties of asset managers?” – comparison of South 
African legal sources‟ and asset managers‟ answers  
Q 3 – Describe the fiduciary 
duties of asset managers 
Legal sources Asset managers 
A duty to act in the best interests 
of beneficiaries 
  
A duty to act with good faith   
A duty to not make any secret 
profit 
  
A duty to avoid conflicts of 
interests 
  
A duty to disclose   
A duty to not exceed powers   
A duty to maintain an unfettered 
discretion 
  
A duty to act with impartiality 
with regard to all members and 
beneficiaries 
  
A duty to act for a proper 
purpose 
  
The duty to act with due care and 
diligence 
  
Ethical responsibility   
Educate, advocate and train 
about ethics 
  
Gatekeepers   
Moral background   
Act within the law   
Behave in trust   
Deal fairly in capital markets   
Provide value-for-money service   
Look after assets in diligent and 
responsible way 
  
Note: The dark grey section of this table represents the generally recognised common law fiduciary 




The essential answer suggested from legal sources on this question was the list of 
generally recognised common law fiduciary duties.280 As illustrated by the 
intersections in Table 3.35, the asset managers also mentioned a number (six out of 
the nine) of the generally recognised common law fiduciary duties. 
The intersections in Table 3.35 are mostly for the generally recognised common law 
fiduciary duties (see the dark grey section at the top of the table). The only 
intersection that is not a generally recognised common law fiduciary duty is the duty 
to act with due care and diligence; yet again confirming the confusion surrounding 
this duty and its status as a fiduciary duty.281  
The set differences are basically all the administrative and other duties mentioned by 
the asset managers. This illustrates firstly that the asset managers mentioned a whole 
array of duties that are not found in the legal sources and, secondly, this may indicate 
that asset managers are not really sure what their fiduciary duties per se are, and 
therefore just mentioned most of the duties they know they have. 
3.4.3.3 Asset consultants 
 Question 1: Are asset consultants fiduciaries? 
The union (or range of interpretations) between Phases I and II is: a) yes; b) silence; 
and c) ambivalence, as illustrated in Table 3.36. The intersection is “yes”; the set 
difference relative to Phase I is silence and relative to Phase II is ambivalence and 
“yes”. The intersection could point to the fact that asset consultants are indeed 
fiduciaries. As can be seen from Table 3.36, none of the legal sources‟ or respondents‟ 
opinions reflected the view that asset consultants are not fiduciaries. There also 
appears to be no legal basis282 for the interpretation that they do not have a fiduciary 
responsibility other than the complete absence of case law.  
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Table 3.36: Question 1, “Are asset consultants‟ fiduciaries?” – comparison of South African legal 
sources‟ and asset consultants‟ answers 
Q 1 – Are asset managers 
fiduciaries? 
Legal sources Asset consultants 
Yes   
Ambivalence   
Silence   
 
Question 2: To whom do asset consultants owe their fiduciary responsibility? 
As presented in Table 3.37, the asset consultants‟ answers portrayed a wider spectrum 
of beneficiaries of their fiduciary duties than was evident in the legal sources. This 
possibly points to uncertainty around this question in the minds of asset consultants. 
The silence in the legal sources may also contribute to this uncertainty and possibly 
points to gaps in the legislation. 
Table 3.37: Question 2, “To whom do asset consultants‟ owe their fiduciary responsibility?” 
Comparison of South African legal sources‟ and asset consultants‟ answers. 
Q 2 – To whom do asset 
consultants owe their fiduciary 
responsibility? 
Legal sources Asset consultants 
Silence   
The fund itself (the client)   
The industry   
The members of the fund   
First the members and then the 
trustees 
  




If the intersection were to be a representative answer, the fund itself would be the 
beneficiary of asset consultants‟ fiduciary duties. This makes sense because asset 
consultants are contracted by the fund and their responsibilities are suggested by the 
contractual relationship. If asset consultants then act in the interests of the fund, they 
automatically act in the interests of members, because the trustees are representatives 
of the fund and thus have to act in members‟ interests. However, once again the 
question of what type of fund it is creeps in, as there one may be confronted with the 
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question of whether there should be differences between DB and DC funds.283 For a 
DB fund one could argue that the contracting client is not only the fund but also, 
indirectly, the sponsoring company. If this is so, then the asset consultants‟ duty to act 
in the interests of the client might become increasingly difficult, because the members 
of the fund and the sponsoring company will most likely have conflicting interests. To 
some extent this observation suggests a certain inadequacy in the present legal 
framework to deal with DB and DC fund types, as the legislation does not make 
distinctions between the two types of fund in terms of responsibilities and 
beneficiaries, which might create confusion. 
 Question 3: Describe the fiduciary duties of asset consultants. 
The set differences, in Table 3.38, essentially indicate that the asset consultants‟ views 
differed markedly from those of the legal sources in the sense that the consultants 
mentioned a number of “other” duties that are not contained in the legal sources. 
Furthermore, the intersections show that the legal sources and the consultants were 
only in agreement on three duties (all of which were generally recognised common 
law fiduciary duties).284 Firstly, the duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries was 
listed in both sets, which yet again supports the notion that this might be an 
overarching fiduciary duty. Secondly, it was mentioned in both sets that the duty to 
avoid conflicts of interest is a fiduciary duty; this may point to the fact that asset 
consultants might be specifically conscious of this duty. Thirdly, it was evident that 
the duty to disclose appeared in both sets, although the asset consultants did not 
mention this duty explicitly.  
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Table 3.38: Question 3, “Describe the fiduciary duties of consultants?” – comparison of South African 
legal sources‟ and asset consultants‟ answers  
Q 3 – Describe the fiduciary 
duties of asset consultants 
Legal sources Asset consultants 
Silence  NA 
A duty to act in the best interests 
of beneficiaries 
  
A duty to act with good faith   
A duty to not make any secret 
profit 
  
A duty to avoid conflicts of 
interest 
  
A duty to disclose   
A duty to not exceed one‟s 
powers 
  
A duty to maintain an unfettered 
discretion 
  
A duty to act with impartiality 
with regard to all members and 
beneficiaries 
  
A duty to act for a proper 
purpose 
  
The duty to act with care and 
diligence 
  
To seek information   
Honestly and fairly   
To give advice   
To educate trustees   
To help trustees do a good job   
To compile the investment 
strategy 
  
To give advice on investment 
strategy 
  
Note: The dark grey section of this table represents the generally recognised common law fiduciary 
duties and the medium grey section represents all the other duties that were mentioned by asset 
consultants. 
3.5 CONCLUSION  
The main purpose of this chapter was to describe the interpretations of fiduciary 
responsibility given by the key role players in the pension fund investment chain, with 
a view to using the descriptions in the interpretation matrices in Chapter 4 to address 
the overarching research question. The chapter therefore presented the descriptions 
and interpretations for fiduciary responsibility provided by the South African legal 
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sources (Phase I) and the key role players in the pension fund investment chain (Phase 
II). Furthermore, a comparison of the results obtained from the practitioners and those 
obtained from the legal sources was provided with a view to reducing the data so as to 
transfer it to the interpretation matrices in Chapter 4. 
A number of recurring themes were identified in this chapter. The most important one 
of these with regard to progressing with the study is probably the idea that the duty to 
act in the best interests of beneficiaries is viewed as an overarching fiduciary duty. 
This was confirmed by the intersections in the preceding section (3.4) which 
illustrated that the duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries was the one duty 
that was mentioned in both sets among all three groups of role players.285 
The details of the content of this duty are, however, unclear and no generally accepted 
definition was presented in the legal sources or by the practitioners. In fact, it would 
seem that practitioners struggled to put this duty in words and could not necessarily 
separate the duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries from the duty to act in 
good faith. Moreover, the legal sources simply seem to be silent on this matter. This 
points to gaps in terms of the statutory formulation of these duties and suggests that it 
would be useful if this duty and other duties were to be described or defined in legal 
sources. 
These possible gaps in legislation and the lack of definitions for this duty point to the 
need for future research on the meaning of “best interests”, specifically in the context 
of the members of pension funds. 
Another repetitive theme was the confusion surrounding the fiduciary status of the 
duty to act with care, skill and diligence. It was suggested that people generally regard 
this duty as a fiduciary duty, because it is always mentioned in the same sections of 
legislation as other generally recognised common law fiduciary duties. 
Finally, it was established that there might also be gaps in the legislation with regard 
to the different types of pension funds (DB and DC) and how the type of fund might 
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influence the roles and responsibilities of the investment chain, primarily because the 










CHAPTER 4: FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY AND RESPONSIBLE 
INVESTMENT – INTERPRETATION MATRICES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is devoted to the process of conclusion-drawing286 – Phase III of the 
research. The aim is to pull together the two key concepts in the dissertation, fiduciary 
responsibility and responsible investment, in order to answer the core research 
question: 
Does fiduciary responsibility create barriers to the implementation of responsible 
investment in the South African pension fund investment chain? 
As described in Chapter 2, the process of conclusion-drawing has been achieved with 
the use of interpretation matrices. Interpretation matrices are a special form of 
descriptive matrices287 that assisted in exploring the abovementioned research question 
in this study. It was already suggested at the outset of this study288 that responsible 
investment has at least two forms: a) a “business case form”289 in which ESG issues 
are considered only in so far as they are financially material; and b) a social form in 
which ESG issues are considered before financial return maximisation is considered. 
The responsible investment side of the interpretation matrices is therefore restricted to 
these two forms throughout this chapter. In contrast, the fiduciary responsibility side 
of the matrices is populated on the basis of a range of interpretations of fiduciary 
responsibility uncovered during Phase I (interviews with the legal sources) and Phase 
II (interviews with practitioners) of the research, as presented in Chapter 3.  
This chapter is structured according to the three questions used in Phases I and II to 
inform interpretations and definitions for fiduciary responsibility. The logic behind 
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this structure is to represent all the interpretations for fiduciary responsibility found in 
this study for both the legal sources and the key role players themselves.  
4.2 QUESTION 1: ARE THE KEY ROLE PLAYERS FIDUCIARIES IN 
THE PENSION FUND INVESTMENT CHAIN? 
Tables 4.1 to 4.3 consider the implications of interpretations from the legal sources 
and the key role players on the question of whether they are indeed fiduciaries. In the 
column on the left-hand side of the tables under the heading “Question 1 scenarios”, 
actual paraphrased answers from the legal sources and the key role players are 
presented. In terms of set theory, as used in Chapter 3, Section 3.4, these columns 
represent the union of the sets. Under every answer, the source of the answer is 
indicated in brackets.   
Table 4.1: Interpretation matrix representing the fiduciary responsibility scenarios emerging from the 
question of whether pension fund trustees are fiduciaries vs forms of responsible 
investment  
 Forms of responsible investment 
Question 1 scenarios Business case form Social form 
Yes 
(LS and PFTs – Tables 3.1 and 
3.10) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on specific duties 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
specific duties 
Ambivalent 
(Only one PFTs – Table 3.10) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on how the ambivalence is 
interpreted 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
how the ambivalence is 
interpreted 
Note: LS = legal sources; PFT = pension fund trustees 
Logically speaking, fiduciary responsibility can only be a possible barrier to the 
implementation of responsible investment if the key role players are indeed 
fiduciaries. While a limited number of the pension fund trustees290 and asset 
consultants291 expressed some ambivalence with regard to this question, the general 
consensus seemed to be that they are indeed fiduciaries. Consequently, if they are 
indeed fiduciaries, they will be subject to certain legal obligations or duties292 and if 
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the content of these duties clash with the implementation of responsible investment, 
there may be a fiduciary barrier. However, this will clearly depend on the details of 
the fiduciary duties.  
All the asset managers293 saw themselves as fiduciaries. Under this interpretation it is 
again entirely possible that fiduciary responsibility could be a barrier to either form of 
responsible investment, depending on the specific duties.  
Table 4.2: Interpretation matrix representing the fiduciary responsibility scenarios emerging from the 
question of whether asset managers are fiduciaries vs forms of responsible investment  
 Forms of responsible investment 
Question 1 scenarios Business case form Social form 
Yes 
(LS and AMs – Tables 3.4 and 
3.15) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on specific duties 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
specific duties 
Note: LS = legal sources; AMs = asset managers 
Table 4.3: Interpretation matrix representing the fiduciary responsibility scenarios emerging from the 
question of whether asset consultants are fiduciaries vs forms of responsible investment  
 Forms of responsible investment 
Question 1 scenarios Business case form Social form 
Yes 
(LS and ACs – Tables 3.7 and 
3.20) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on specific duties 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
specific duties 
Ambivalent 
(Minority of ACs only – Table 
3.20) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on how the ambivalence is 
interpreted 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
how the ambivalence is 
interpreted 
Note: LS = legal sources; ACs = asset consultants 
4.3 QUESTION 2: TO WHOM DO THE KEY ROLE PLAYERS OWE 
THEIR FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY? 
Irrespective of the answer to this question, it is again entirely possible that fiduciary 
responsibility could be a barrier to both forms of responsible investment, depending 
on the specific duties. This applies to all three of the key role players in the pension 
fund investment chain (pension fund trustees – Table 4.4; asset managers – Table 4.5; 
asset consultants – Table 4.6). Whether or not there are barriers depends not so much 
on who the beneficiaries are but rather on what the specific duties are. This should 
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however be qualified. If the broader society and the environment could be seen as 
beneficiaries, then the answers to this question would be directly relevant. 
Table 4.4: Interpretation matrix representing fiduciary responsibility scenarios emerging from the 
question of to whom pension fund trustees owe their fiduciary responsibility vs forms of 
responsible investment.  
 Forms of responsible investment 
Question 2 scenarios (Table 
3.31) 
Business case form Social form 
The members 
(LS and PFTs) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on specific duties 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
specific duties 
The fund itself 
(LS and PFTs) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on specific duties 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
specific duties 
The members and the employer 
(PFTs only) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on specific duties 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
specific duties 
The members as a collective 
entity 
(LS and PFTs) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on specific duties 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
specific duties 
The members, pensioners 
(present & future) and 
beneficiaries 
(LS and PFTs) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on specific duties 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
specific duties 
Note: LS = legal sources; PFTs = pension fund trustees 
Table 4.5: Interpretation matrix representing fiduciary responsibility scenarios emerging from the 
question of to whom asset managers owe their fiduciary responsibility vs forms of 
responsible investment  
 Forms of responsible investment 
Question 2 scenarios (Table 
3.34) 
Business case form Social form 
The members of the fund 
(LS and AMs) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on specific duties 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
specific duties 
The fund itself 
(LS and AMs) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on specific duties 




Possibly a barrier – depends 
on specific duties 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
specific duties 
The fund, the members, 
government and beneficiaries 
(AMs) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on specific duties 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
specific duties 
The investors, pension fund 
shareholders, employees, society 
and the environment 
(AMs) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on specific duties 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
specific duties 




Table 4.6: Interpretation matrix representing fiduciary responsibility scenarios emerging from the 
question of to whom asset consultants owe their fiduciary responsibility vs forms of 
responsible investment  
 Form of responsible investment 
Question 2 scenarios (Table 37) Business case form Social form 
Silence 
(LS only) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on how the silence is 
interpreted 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
how the silence is interpreted 
The fund itself 
(LS and ACs) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on specific duties 




Possibly a barrier – depends 
on specific duties 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
specific duties 
The members of the fund 
(ACs only) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on specific duties 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
specific duties 
First the members then the 
trustees 
(ACs only) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on specific duties 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
specific duties 
First the trustees then the 
members 
(ACs only) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on specific duties 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
specific duties 
Note: LS = legal sources; AC = asset consultant 
 
4.4 QUESTION 3: DESCRIBE THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF THE KEY 
ROLE PLAYERS IN THE PENSION FUND INVESTMENT CHAIN 
In this section, the crucial matrices are displayed on the basis of the preceding 
argument that the barriers depend not so much on who the beneficiaries are, but rather 
on what the specific duties are. This is because these matrices will provide the 
platform for actually addressing the overall research question (Does fiduciary 
responsibility create barriers to the implementation of responsible investment in the 
South African pension fund investment chain?); they are found in Tables 4.7 to 4.9.  
Table 4.7 illustrates the many possible barriers to responsible investment that exist, 
particularly for pension fund trustees. It also illustrates that the legal sources and the 
pension fund trustees were in agreement on five duties, of which three are generally 
recognised common law fiduciary duties. These duties can be divided into those that 
are generally recognised294 and those that are generally not.  
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Table 4.7: Interpretation matrix representing fiduciary responsibility scenarios emerging from the 
question of what are pension fund trustees‟ fiduciary duties vs forms of responsible 
investment  
 Forms of responsible investment 
Question 3 scenarios (Table 
3.32) 
Business case form Social form 
A duty to act in the best interests 
of beneficiaries 
(LS and PFTs) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on definition of “best interest” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
definition of “best interest” 
A duty to act in good faith 
(LS and PFTs) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 




Possibly a barrier – depends on 
the definition of “good faith” 
 
 
A duty to not exceed powers (LS 
and PFTs) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on the content of the 
investment mandate and the 
content of applicable 
legislation 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
the content of the investment 
mandate and the content of 
applicable legislation 
A duty to not make any secret 
profit – (LS) 
No barrier No barrier 
A duty to avoid conflicts of 
interest 
(LS) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on definition of “best interest” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
definition of “best interest” 
A duty to disclose 
(LS and PFTs) 
No barrier No barrier 
A duty to act with impartiality 
(LS) 
No barrier No barrier 
A duty to maintain an unfettered 
discretion – (LS) 
No barrier No barrier 
A duty to act for a proper 
purpose – (LS) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on definition of “best interest” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
definition of “best interest” 
A duty to act with due care and 
diligence 
(LS and PFTs) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on the definition of “care” and 
“diligence” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
the definition of “care” and 
“diligence” 
Measure against correct 
benchmarks – (PFTs only) 
No barrier No barrier 
Ensure that benefits are paid 
(PFTs only) 
No barrier No barrier 
Investing in a responsible 
manner 
(PFTs only) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on the definition of 
“responsible manner” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
the definition of “responsible 
manner” 
Make sure investment returns are 
adequate to cover liabilities 
(PFTs only) 
No barrier No barrier 
Administrative tasks 
(PFTs only) 
No barrier No barrier 
Mitigate risks 
(PFTs only) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on the definition of “risks” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
the definition of “risks” 
No hidden agendas 
(PFTs only) 
No barrier No barrier 
Balance risk and return 
(PFTs only) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on the definition of “risk and 
return” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
the definition of “risk and 
return” 




The duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries poses a theoretical barrier to both 
forms of responsible investment in the following ways. On the one hand, if the duty to 
act in the best interests of beneficiaries is interpreted as meaning that a concern with 
ESG issues is considered to be more in the interests of beneficiaries than better 
financial returns, it presents a barrier to the “business case” form of responsible 
investment. On the other hand, however, if the duty to act in the best interests of 
beneficiaries is interpreted as meaning that risk-adjusted financial returns should be 
maximised, it presents a barrier to the social form of responsible investment. Table 
4.7 also illustrates that the duty to avoid conflicts of interests could pose a barrier to 
either form of responsible investment, depending on the interpretation of best 
interests. This is because the question of whether interests are conflicting will depend 
on the interpretation of what those interests are. 
The duty to act in good faith could present a barrier to the business case form of 
responsible investment if good faith means that ESG issues should be considered over 
and above financial return. Consequently, if good faith is interpreted as meaning that 
risk-adjusted financial returns should be maximised, then it presents a barrier to the 
social form of responsible investment. The possible barriers that these two duties 
present will stay the same for the other two role players as well. 
The duty to not exceed one‟s powers also presents a barrier to the business case form 
of responsible investment if the investment mandate or applicable legislation, for 
instance, requires that ESG issues should be considered above all else. On the other 
hand, this duty could also pose a risk to the social form of responsible investment if 
the mandate states that risk-adjusted returns should be maximised. 
The duty to act for a proper purpose could also present barriers to either the forms of 
responsible investment, depending what is constituted as a “proper purpose”. It has 
been suggested in Section 1.2.2, where short descriptions of the generally recognised 
fiduciary duties were provided, that every action of the fiduciary could be examined 
in order to determine whether it was done for a “proper purpose”. Still, the question 
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that remains is whether the action was in the best interests of beneficiaries. These 
barriers will therefore also depend on the definition of “best interests”. 
Apart from the generally recognised common law duties, four other duties mentioned 
by trustees could also present barriers to both of these forms of responsible 
investment. These barriers exist primarily in the minds of trustees, because they are 
not explicitly mentioned in the legal sources. Nevertheless, whether these barriers are 
factual legal barriers is not of concern; the issue here is the fact that these barriers 
might exist. 
These duties could all present a barrier to the business case form of responsible 
investment if they are interpreted as meaning that ESG issues should be considered 
despite their influence on financial returns. On the other hand, these duties could also 
present a barrier to the social form of responsible investment if they are interpreted as 
meaning that risk-adjusted financial returns should be maximised. 
Table 4.8 illustrates that the same barriers exist for the generally recognised common 
law fiduciary duties for asset managers as for pension fund trustees.295 If the duty to 
take care or be diligent means that ESG issues are so important that they should be 
considered above financial return then this would pose a barrier to the business case 
form of responsible investment. Conversely, if the duty to act with due care and 
diligence includes getting the best possible risk-adjusted financial returns for the 
beneficiaries, it would pose a barrier to the social form of responsible investment. 
Asset managers also listed a number of other duties, besides the generally recognised 
common law fiduciary duties, which they view as fiduciary duties. Four of these other 
duties present possible barriers to the implementation of responsible investment, 
depending on how these duties are defined. Again, these duties could pose a barrier to 
the business case form if they are interpreted to mean that the concern with ESG 
issues should be considered when making investment decisions despite their influence 
on financial returns. They could also present a barrier to the social form of responsible 
  
                                                                                                                                            
295
 Also see the preceding section. 
130 
 
Table 4.8: Interpretation matrix representing the fiduciary responsibility scenarios emerging from the 
question of what asset managers‟ fiduciary duties are vs forms of responsible investment 
 Forms of responsible investment 
Question 3 scenarios (Table 
3.35) 
Business case form Social form 
A duty to act in the best interests 
of the beneficiaries 
(LS and AMs) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on definition of “best interest” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
definition of “best interest” 
A duty to act in good faith 
(LS and AMs) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on the definition of “good 
faith” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
the definition of “good faith” 
A duty to not make any secret 
profit − (LS and AMs) 
No barrier No barrier 
A duty to avoid conflicts of 
interest 
(LS and AMs) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on definition of “best interest” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
definition of “best interest” 
A duty to disclose 
(LS and AMs) 
No barrier No barrier 
A duty to not exceed one‟s 
powers 
(LS and AMs) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on the content of the 
investment mandate and the 
content of applicable 
legislation 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
the content of the investment 
mandate and the content of 
applicable legislation 
A duty to maintain an unfettered 
discretion − (LS) 
No barrier No barrier 
A duty of impartiality 
(LS) 
No barrier No barrier 
A duty to act for a proper 
purpose 
(LS) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on definition of “best interest” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
definition of “best interest” 
The duty to act with due care and 
diligence 
(LS and AMs) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on the definition of “care‟ and 
“diligence” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 




Possibly a barrier – depends 
on the definition of “ethical 
responsibility” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
the definition of “ethical 
responsibility” 
To educate, advocate and train in 
ethics − (AMs only) 
No barrier No barrier 
Gatekeepers 
(AMs only) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on the definition of 
“gatekeepers” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
the definition of “gatekeepers” 
Moral background 
(AMs only) 
No barrier No barrier 
Behave in trust 
(AMs only) 
No barrier No barrier 
Deal fairly in the capital markets 
(AM‟s only) 
No barrier No barrier 
Provide value-for-money service 
(AMs only) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on the definition of “value for 
money” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
the definition of “value for 
money” 
Look after assets in diligent and 
responsible way 
(AMs only) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on the definition of “diligent 
and responsible” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
the definition of “diligent and 
responsible” 
Note: LS = legal sources; AMs = asset managers 
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investment if they were interpreted as meaning that risk-adjusted financial returns 
should be maximised.  
Table 4.9 indicates that there are five generally recognised common law fiduciary 
duties that present a barrier to both forms of responsible investment for asset 
consultants. These duties include a duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries; a 
duty to act in good faith; a duty to avoid conflicts of interest; a duty to not exceed 
one‟s powers and a duty to act for a proper purpose. These duties and the potential 
barriers they present to the implementation of responsible investment were discussed 
in the preceding sections on pension fund trustees and asset managers. 
Table 4.9 also illustrates the fact that two other duties, which were mentioned either in 
the legal sources or by the asset consultants themselves, could possibly present 
barriers to the implementation of responsible investment. These duties could pose a 
barrier to either form of responsible investment, depending on how these duties are 
interpreted. Further, these duties can also present a barrier to the business case form of 
responsible investment if they are interpreted as meaning that ESG issues should be 
considered regardless of their influence on financial returns, as well as the social form 
of responsible investment if they are interpreted as meaning that risk-adjusted 




Table 4.9: Interpretation matrix representing the fiduciary responsibility scenarios emerging from the 
question of what asset consultants‟ fiduciary duties are vs responsible investment forms  
 Forms of responsible investment 
Question 3 scenarios Business case form Social form 
Silence No barrier No barrier 
A duty to act in the best interests 
of beneficiaries 
(LS and ACs) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on definition of “best interest” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
definition of “best interest” 
A duty to act in good faith 
(LS) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on the definition of “good 
faith” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
the definition of “good faith”  
A duty to avoid conflicts of 
interests 
(LS and ACs) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on definition of “best interest” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
definition of “best interest” 
The duty not to make any secret 
profit − (LS) 
No barrier No barrier 
A duty to disclose 
(LS and ACs) 
No barrier No barrier 
A duty to not exceed one‟s 
powers 
(LS) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on the content of the 
investment mandate and the 
content of applicable 
legislation 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
the content of the investment 
mandate and the content of 
applicable legislation 
A duty to maintain an unfettered 
discretion − (LS) 
No barrier No barrier 
A duty to act with impartiality 
(LS) 
No barrier No barrier 
A duty to act for a proper 
purpose 
(LS) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on definition of “best interest” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
definition of “best interest” 
The duty to act with due care and 
diligence 
(LS) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on the definition of “care‟ and 
“diligence” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
the definition of “care‟ and 
“diligence” 
The duty to seek information 
(LS) 
No barrier No barrier 
The duty to give advice 
(ACs only) 
No barrier No barrier 
The duty to educate trustees 
(ACs only) 
No barrier No barrier 
The duty to help trustees do a 
good job − (ACs only) 
No barrier No barrier 
The duty to compile the 
investment strategy 
(ACs only) 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on what the investment 
strategy is 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
what the investment strategy is 
The duty to give advice on the 
investment strategy − (ACs only) 
No barrier No barrier 
Note: LS = legal sources; ACs = asset consultants 
 
It has been established in Sections 1.2.2, 3.2 and 3.3 that the two duties which are 
almost universally recognised are the duty to act in good faith and the duty to act in 
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the best interests of beneficiaries, my attention now turns to these.296 Table 4.10 
presents the interpretations of the duty to act in good faith. As discussed previously, 
Table 3.28 illustrated that the only description of good faith where an intersection 
occurred between all the role players was where this duty was described as acting in 
the best interests of beneficiaries.  
Table 4.10: Interpretation matrix representing the fiduciary responsibility scenarios emerging from the 
descriptions of good faith received from all the key role players  
 Form of responsible investment 
Good faith interpretation Business case form Social form 
Knowledge and skills Possibly a barrier – depends 
on definition of “knowledge 
and skills” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
definition of “knowledge and 
skills” 
No self-interest No barrier No barrier 
The outcome must benefit the 
role player 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on definition of “benefit” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
definition of “benefit” 
Making investments with the 
best possible information 
available 
No barrier No barrier 
The duty to act in the best 
interests of beneficiaries 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on definition of “best 
interests” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
definition of “best interests” 
Trustworthy, reliable, faithful 
and responsible 
Possibly a barrier – depends 
on definition of  these terms 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
definition of  these terms 
Integrity Possibly a barrier – depends 
on the definition of “integrity” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
the definition of “integrity” 
Transparency Possibly a barrier – depends 
on the definition of 
“transparency” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
the definition of 
“transparency” 
Ethics Possibly a barrier – depends 
on the definition of “ethics” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
the definition of “ethics” 
Accountability No barrier No barrier 
Fulfil promises Possibly a barrier – depends 
on the definition of “fulfil 
promises” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
the definition of “fulfil 
promises” 
Moral code Possibly a barrier – depends 
on the definition of “moral 
code” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
the definition of “moral code” 
Behaviour and intentions Possibly a barrier – depends 
on the definition of “behaviour 
and intentions” 
Possibly a barrier – depends on 
the definition of “behaviour 
and intentions” 
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The reduced set of data, obtained from the set comparisons done in Section 3.4,297 
therefore suggests that the interpretation of good faith depends on the interpretation of 
the duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries. This also contributes to the notion 
that the duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries is representative of all other 
fiduciary duties.298 Nevertheless, what remains is the fact that there are indeed possible 
barriers to responsible investment with regards to how the duty to act in good faith is 
interpreted by the key role players in the pension fund investment chain.299  
In this study, the final step in the data reduction process is the focus on the possible 
interpretations of the duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries. This specific 
focus is justified, since it was already suggested at the outset of this study300 that this 
duty is viewed as an overarching fiduciary duty. It was also the only duty where an 
intersection occurred between the two sets of research (Phase I and Phase II) and in all 
three groups of role players. 
However, the final matrix is different in that it only presents two possible 
interpretations for “best interests”, as opposed to including all the descriptions 
provided for this duty in this study. As has already indicated, this was the very last 
step of the data reduction process. This was justified because the coding process 
throughout this study continually presented these two recurring themes.  
The first theme identified in this study is the view that best interests refers to 
maximising risk-adjusted financial returns. This interpretation was expressed in the 
legal sources,301 as well as in the interviews with practitioners.  
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 See Chapter 1 Section 1.2 and specifically Section 1.2.4 where it is stated that the background 
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 See Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2. Also see Browne v South African Retirement Annuity Fund and 
Others [2006] 4 BPLR 311 (PFA). In this case the court compared the relative financial position of 
the trustees with and without the breach of fiduciary responsibility. 
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The second theme is that best interests might well imply pursuing other forms of 
return (e.g. a healthy physical environment and a healthy society) hence sacrificing a 
financial return. This was also established in the practitioners‟ interpretations, where it 
was explicitly stated that “best interests” does not necessarily mean “maximising 
growing assets”.  
Table 4.11 presents these two basic interpretations on the duty to act in the best 
interests of beneficiaries concluded from this study. The first interpretation is the 
interpretation where “best interests” is replaced with “maximising risk-adjusted 
financial return”. The second interpretation, on the other hand, came primarily from 
the interviews with the key role players.  
As a result, if seeking the best interests of beneficiaries is about “other returns” there 
will be a barrier to the business case form of responsible investment. On the other 
hand, when best interests means maximising risk-adjusted financial returns, there is 
clearly a barrier to the pursuit of the social form of responsible investment. 
Table 4.11: Interpretation matrix representing the fiduciary responsibility scenarios emerging from the 
descriptions of best interests received from all the legal sources and the key role players 
 Form of responsible investment 
“Best interest” interpretation Business case form Social form 
Maximising risk-adjusted 
financial returns  
(LS & KRPs) 
No barrier Barrier 
Other returns 
(KRPs) 
Barrier No barrier 
Note: LS = Legal sources; KRPs = Key role players 
 
4.5 CONCLUSION  
The purpose of this chapter was to further reduce the data and draw conclusions from 
the results that were displayed in Chapter 3. This was done in order to provide 
answers to the overall research question. Special interpretation matrices were used to 




This chapter was presented in three major parts, which were aligned with the three 
key questions that were used throughout this study to inform the interpretations of 
fiduciary responsibility. Firstly, the data reduction process indicated that that there can 
only be a barrier to the implementation of responsible investment if the key role 
players are fiduciaries. Secondly, it indicated that the barrier will not be determined 
by the fiduciary or the beneficiary of the fiduciary responsibility, but rather by the 
content and meaning of the fiduciary duties. Thirdly, it indicated that the duty to act in 
the best interests of beneficiaries is an overarching fiduciary duty.  
As a result, the final and concluding interpretation matrix302 displayed the two main 
interpretations of this duty concluded from this study, as they relate to the two forms 
of responsible investment described in this dissertation. This final interpretation 
matrix illustrates that there are indeed possible barriers to both forms of responsible 
investment, depending on the interpretation of best interests. If best interests imply 
that other returns should be sought then there is a barrier to the business case form of 
responsible investment. However, if best interests stand for maximising risk-adjusted 
financial returns, then there is a barrier to the social form of responsible investment. 
The notion of what the best interests of beneficiaries might entail was recently 
considered by Richardson.303 In his exploration of this concept, one of the key issues 
that were addressed was how these best interests can be determined. Accordingly, the 
determination of the best interests of beneficiaries is also one of the major concerns 
identified in this dissertation. It is therefore suggested that this could be a theme for 
future research in the South African pension fund context. 
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 Richardson “From Fiduciary Duties to Fiduciary Relationships for Socially Responsible Investing: 
Responding to the Will of Beneficiaries” 5–19. He mentions a number of ways in which this could 
be done: “finding unanimity; following social customs; third-party stakeholders; consultation with 
and representation of beneficiaries”. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study was to answer the question of whether fiduciary 
responsibility creates barriers to the implementation of responsible investment, 
specifically for the key role players in the pension fund investment chain of South 
Africa. Although this question has been addressed in research elsewhere, the focus 
was never on the key role players in the South African pension fund investment chain.  
The research question clearly contains two key concepts: fiduciary responsibility and 
responsible investment. Accordingly, two specific interpretations of responsible 
investment were described at the beginning of this dissertation in Chapter 1: a 
business-case304 form and a social form. The interpretations and descriptions of 
fiduciary responsibility are contained in Section 1.2 and Chapter 3 of this dissertation.  
In order to address the research question, the research was divided into three distinct 
phases of qualitative research. Phases I and II were dedicated to describing fiduciary 
responsibility in terms of the key role players in the pension fund investment chain in 
South Africa, while Phase III consisted of conclusion-drawing and verification. In 
order to draw these conclusions, a systematic data reduction process was performed, 
firstly, by making comparisons between Phase I and II, and finally, by means of 
special interpretation matrices,305 where the two key concepts were integrated. 
This process included the use of a research journal and field notes throughout Phases 
I, II and III in order to note recurring themes. It also involved a coding process during 
which the data gathered from the interviews conducted in Phases I and II was coded. 
Throughout this process, the background literature, which was discussed in Chapter 1 
of this dissertation, was used to form a framework for the study and, in addition, a 
literature control was performed, especially with regard to the notion of the generally 
recognised common law fiduciary duties. After the coding process was complete, the 
data was further reduced, using interpretation matrices to display the data in a format 
that is easy to assimilate.   
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The data reduction process indicated that there can only be a barrier to the 
implementation of responsible investment if the key role players are fiduciaries. It 
further indicated that the barrier will not be determined by the fiduciary or the 
beneficiary of the fiduciary responsibility, but rather by the content and meaning of 
the fiduciary duties. It was subsequently illustrated that a number of the generally 
recognised common law fiduciary duties and some of the other duties mentioned by 
the practitioners present barriers to the implementation of responsible investment; 
hence, potential fiduciary barriers not only arise from the current South African legal 
framework (as presented in the legal sources), but also exist in the minds of the key 
role players in the pension fund investment chain.   
In addition, the data reduction process uncovered four prominent issues in the context 
of the fiduciary responsibility of the key role players in the South African pension 
fund investment chain. Firstly, the legal sources in South Africa are not particularly 
explicit on the fiduciary duties of the key role players, especially not about the 
fiduciary duties for asset managers and asset consultants. This observation could point 
to the notion that pension fund law in South Africa is inadequate and that the specific 
duties of all the key role players in the pension fund investment chain should be 
outlined more clearly in pension law. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that the 
vagueness of the legislation in respect of fiduciary responsibility is intended by the 
legislature in order to create space for specific situations to be interpreted in case 
law.306 
                                                                                                                                            
306
 In the meantime, the revised Regulation 28 was produced in which the words “fiduciary duty” are 
mentioned explicitly; in addition it states that fiduciary responsibility includes the consideration of 
ESG issues in investment decisions. This demonstrates two things: there was a definite gap 
concerning the issue of fiduciary responsibility in the pension fund industry and this has been 
identified and addressed by the legislature. It also proves that there was a need for the research 
question in this study to be addressed. The fact that the revised Regulation 28 was published after 
the research project was concluded and its possible influence on this study is considered in an 




Secondly, the fiduciary duties for the different types of pension fund might differ, but 
this is not acknowledged in the legal sources.307 This study pointed to the fact that the 
main difference between DB and DC funds are the bearers of the risk.308 In DB funds 
the sponsoring employer takes on the risk and in DC funds it is the members 
themselves that carry the risk. A logical conclusion would therefore be that a fiduciary 
responsibility is owed to the sponsoring employer by all the key role players in the 
pension fund investment chain in the case of a DB fund and to the members in a DC 
fund. The members‟ choice also becomes a major issue for DC funds, as one could 
reasonably expect that a person should have more control if they carry more risk.  
Thirdly, a recurring dispute that was identified in Sections 1.2.2 and 3.4 of this 
dissertation is whether the duty of care and diligence is indeed a fiduciary duty. It was 
suggested that laymen might not be able to differentiate between this duty and the 
generally recognised common law fiduciary duties; although the legal position in 
South Africa might be that the duty of care is a separate duty. The notion that people 
generally think of this duty as a fiduciary duty was also revealed in the interviews 
with the key role players in the pension fund investment chain, because this duty was 
listed a number of times when they were asked to describe their fiduciary duties.  
Fourthly, it was indicated that the duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries is an 
overarching fiduciary duty. For this reason, the possible interpretations of the duty to 
act in the best interests of beneficiaries were used in the final and concluding 
interpretation matrix (Table 4.11) as representing the interpretations of fiduciary 
responsibility gathered from this study. The two most likely interpretations of best 
interests that were deducted from the interviews with legal sources and the key role 
players were either “maximising risk adjusted financial returns” or “seeking other 
returns”.   
This study consequently points to three burning questions that still need answers 
within the pension fund law landscape of South Africa. The first is whether the 
fiduciary responsibility of the key role players in the pension fund investment chain 
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should be outlined in legislation more clearly. The second is whether fiduciary 
responsibility for the key role players would differ for a DB as supposed to a DC 
fund. The third is whether the best interests of pension fund members can be defined 
and, if so, how these interests can be determined. It will only be possible for the 
fiduciaries in the pension fund investment chain to act in the best interests of 
beneficiaries if they know and understand the “interests” of these beneficiaries.  
Finally, this study illustrated that, contrary to popular rhetoric,309 fiduciary 
responsibility can be a barrier to the pursuit of responsible investment. This study 
clearly illustrated that a number of the fiduciary duties of the key role players in the 
pension fund investment chain present possible barriers to the implementation of 
responsible investment. The answer to the overarching research question is therefore: 
it depends. Under certain interpretations of fiduciary responsibility and some 
interpretations of responsible investment, there are barriers to the implementation of 
responsible investment, while for other interpretations there are no barriers.  
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CHAPTER 6: EPILOGUE 
6.1 FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN 
PENSION FUND LEGISLATION 
The revised Regulation 28310 was published in Government Gazette 34070 on 4 March 
2011 and came into effect on 1 July 2011. It seems to have caused a significant 
amount of discussion in the pension fund industry, especially with regard to the 
question of whether fiduciaries have a fiduciary responsibility to consider ESG issues 
when investing pension fund money.311 The burning issue with regard to this 
dissertation is how the revised Regulation 28 would influence the answers to the three 
key questions used throughout this study to inform the definitions, descriptions and 
interpretations of fiduciary responsibility.  
In other words, would the answers from the South African legal sources and the key 
role players be different, if the interviews had been done after the publication of the 
revised Regulation 28. Obviously, it is not possible to address these questions in their 
entirety in an epilogue, but it is necessary to consider at least the following three key 
questions, which can be put to the revised Regulation 28. In other words, what can be 
provided in this section are answers to the following questions as obtained from the 
revised Regulation 28: 
1. Are the key role players in the pension fund investment chain fiduciaries? 
2. To whom do they owe their fiduciary responsibility? 
3. What are their fiduciary duties? 
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It is not, however, possible to conclude how the Revised Regulation 28 has changed 
the perspectives and opinions of the key role players with regard to fiduciary 
responsibility, as this would require a completely new research project.  
It is also essential to acknowledge at the outset of this discussion that regulations to 
statutes are “delegated or subordinate legislation”,312 which, should not be in conflict 
with original legislation.313 At this stage it is still unclear whether the revised 
Regulation 28 is in conflict with the Pension Funds Act and this question should be 
answered by the courts. I can, however, speculate that there are some conflicts: the 
fact that the Act defines a benefit as “an amount payable” suggests that the legislature 
places a purely financial connotation on the word benefit. Yet, the revised regulation 
forces fiduciaries to consider ESG issues. Considering these issues might be 
beneficial on many levels, especially in terms of the conscience of the investor, but it 
might have a negative impact on financial return. This might mean that the revised 
regulation is in conflict with the Act.314 
Consequently, even if the revised Regulation 28 could potentially provide different 
answers to the three key questions to the ones obtained from the South African legal 
sources, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, it still would not mean that the 
overall answers from the South African legal sources would change. It is suggested 
that the major difference between the legal sources that were questioned in Chapter 3, 
and the revised Regulation 28, is the fact that the words “fiduciary duty” are 
mentioned explicitly in the revised Regulation 28 (and the fact that it is mentioned 
together with the consideration of ESG issues, is most possibly also the reason for the 
stir it has caused). However, these words appear in the preamble to the revised 
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Regulation 28. Although the preamble is seen as part of the full text of an enactment, 
its intention is mainly to set out the purpose of the Act or, in this case, the Regulation. 
Furthermore, it is said that the preamble should only be used to interpret an Act “with 
regard to the obscure meaning of provisions in an Act”, but that the “preamble cannot 
be used when the enacting clause is clear and plain”.315 It can, of course, be argued in 
this specific case that the inclusion of the term fiduciary duty in the revised 
Regulation 28 is significant, specifically because it is not mentioned in the Pension 
Funds Act and because it serves to address what might appear to be a gap in the 
Pension Funds Act. Furthermore, the purpose of Regulation 28 should always be at 
the forefront when considering the impact it has on the whole Act. The main purpose 
of Regulation 28 is to provide limits for a pension fund‟s investment into different 
asset classes. Therefore, it still remains unclear to what extent the law on fiduciary 
duty in the pension fund industry has now changed. 
The following section only includes the answers to the three key questions from the 
revised Regulation 28. Two sections will follow below – the first section contains the 
answers to the key questions for trustees and the second the answers to the key 
questions for asset managers and asset consultants. The latter two role players are 
grouped together in one section to avoid duplication, as the answers to the questions 
for both these role players are the same. 
6.2 TRUSTEES 
The answers to all three the key questions as they relate to pension fund trustees, are 
found in the preamble to the revised Regulation 28. This preamble commences by 
saying that: 
A fund has a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of its members whose benefits 
depend on the responsible management of fund assets. This duty supports the 
adoption of a responsible investment approach to deploying capital into markets that 
will earn adequate risk adjusted returns suitable for the fund‟s specific member 
profile, liquidity needs and liabilities. Prudent investing should give appropriate 
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consideration to any factor which may materially affect the sustainable long-term 
performance of fund‟s assets, including factors of an environmental, social and 
governance character. This concept applies across all assets and categories of assets 
and should promote the interests of the fund in a stable and transparent 
environment.316 
On the first question of whether trustees are fiduciaries, the revised Regulation 28 
provides a relatively clear answer. It is said that “[a] fund has a fiduciary duty …” 
Although a pension fund is seen as a legal entity, the fund cannot act on its own and is 
therefore represented by a board of trustees. Consequently, it is this board of trustees 
that has that fiduciary duty and it is reasonable to conclude that having a fiduciary 
duty means you are a fiduciary. 
With regard to the second question as to whom the trustees owe their fiduciary 
responsibility, the same sentence applies. It is stated that “[a] fund has a fiduciary 
duty to act in the best interests of its members whose benefits depend on the 
responsible management of fund assets”. This sentence highlights the fact that the 
fiduciary duty is owed to the members. The answer to the second question, according 
to the revised Regulation 28, is therefore that the trustees owe their fiduciary 
responsibility to the members of the fund. This answer is in line with what was found 
in the other legal sources, although other parties were also listed in some of these 
sources.317 
The above-mentioned sentence also highlights the idea that “to act in the best interest 
of” is viewed as an overarching fiduciary duty. This idea leads to the third question of 
what the trustees‟ fiduciary duties are. The answer to this question is also found in the 
section from the preamble quoted above. The duty to act in the best interests of 
members is mentioned unambiguously and the meaning of this duty is then described 
a little further on in the sentence that follows.318 This explanation seems to state that 
the duty to act in the best interests of members in the pension fund context is to adopt 
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a “responsible investment approach” and that this approach includes earning 
“adequate risk adjusted returns”. 
Of particular importance are the term adequate and the way such a term would be 
interpreted by our courts. It is, however, possible to speculate on an interpretation by 
reflecting on the meaning of another specific piece of the sentence, “… whose 
benefits depend on a responsible investment approach”.  If the members‟ benefits 
depend on the type of investment approach and the word benefit is defined as “amount 
payable”319 in the Act, the issue seems to be purely a financial one. In my view, it 
seems to say that the investment approach should be responsible in the sense that it 
should ensure a good “amount payable”. It does not seem to refer to the “social” form 
of responsible investment as described in this dissertation. 
Therefore, the revised Regulation does seem to allude to the “business case” form of 
responsible investment as expressed in this dissertation and elsewhere,320 in the sense 
that ESG issues should be considered in so far as they influence returns. The fact that 
the definition of the word benefit in the Pension Fund Act is still unchanged further 
supports the notion that benefit has a purely financial meaning and that if other issues 
are considered over financial return, one would be infringing those members‟ benefits. 
The term prudent investing is also discussed in the following section of the preamble. 
This term takes us back to the fact that authors like Richardson refer to the duty of 
care and diligence in the context of investment as “the prudent investor rule”.321 
Whether this specific discussion could be a reference to the duty of care is not clear, 
but a case could be made for this argument.  
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An “Explanatory Memorandum on the Final Regulation 28 that gives effect to section 
36(1)(b) of the Pension Funds Act 1956” was also published in the Government 
Gazette of 4 March 2011. A discussion on the preamble and the principles of the 
Revised Regulation 28 is provided in this memorandum and is also useful for 
analysing the trustees‟ fiduciary responsibility further according to the revised 
Regulation 28. An excerpt from the section is included below for exactly the same 
purpose as an explanatory memorandum is compiled in the first place: to provide the 
reader with guidance and explanations in order to better understand the revised 
Regulation 28: 
A preamble frames the Regulation. It highlights the fiduciary responsibility of a 
retirement fund‟s board to invest members‟ savings in a way that promotes the long-
term sustainability of the asset values when taking into account environmental, social 
and governance (ESG) issues. Read together with the principles, the preamble 
represents a new approach to Regulation 28, and better guides trustees to consider 
what investment strategy would be appropriate for the specific nature and obligations 
of their fund. Recognition is given to the fact that an overly conservative investment 
strategy (dominated for example by cash and non inflation-linked bonds) can be as 
damaging to long-term savings as one that is overly exposed to perceived risky assets. 
The memorandum does not shed any particular light beyond what is already apparent. 
It confirms the fact that trustees have a fiduciary responsibility and that this 
responsibility involves protecting of the “long-term sustainability” of the assets by 
considering ESG issues. As mentioned in this memorandum, the preamble to the 
revised Regulation 28 is nonetheless a “new approach”, because the term “fiduciary 
duty” is actually used and because it links this duty with the consideration of ESG 
issues. The question of to what extent ESG issues should be considered is, however, 
still open for interpretation. In this regard an explanation of the word adequate would 
be especially helpful, because it is not clear whether “adequate risk adjusted returns” 
is a reference to profit maximisation or not. Nonetheless, the indication is that the 
revised Regulation 28 supports the business case form of responsible investment. In 




6.3 ASSET MANAGERS AND ASSET CONSULTANTS 
These role players are not expressly mentioned anywhere in the revised Regulation 
28, nor is it said that they are fiduciaries. The revised Regulation 28 is therefore silent 
on the three key questions for asset managers and asset consultants. 
The only reference to other role players in the revised Regulation 28 is in sub-
regulation 2(d), where it is stated that:  
(d) With the appointment of third parties to perform functions which are required to 
be performed in order to comply with the principles in (c) above, the fund retains the 
responsibility for compliance with such principles. 
This sub-regulation therefore acknowledges the fact that it is common practice for 
pension funds to appoint third parties, but emphasises that the fund (represented by 
the trustees) cannot abdicate any of its responsibilities, including their fiduciary 
responsibility to any other party. There is, however, no reason why other fiduciary 
relationships and responsibility cannot emerge in addition to the trustees‟ 
responsibility. The idea that fiduciary relationships can emerge from a variety of 
situations depending on the specific facts was discussed in Section 1.2.1 of this 
dissertation. It was then explained that one can assume that such a relationship exists 
between the fund and asset managers, as well as asset consultants, based on the power 
and influence these role players have in terms of the decisions of a fund, because they 
act as agents and representatives of the fund. It is also important to acknowledge that 
the submission that was made in Section 3.2 that they are indeed fiduciaries, because 
legislation prescribes what are generally recognised to be fiduciary duties for these 
two role players.322 
6.4 SUMMARY 
While the preamble to the revised Regulation 28 might indeed frame certain important 
contextual considerations which pertain to responsible investment (as defined in this 
dissertation), these comments remain bound to the preamble with all of the legal 
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limitations inherent in it. In addition to this, the ambiguity surrounding the concept of 
adequate risk adjusted returns stands. This revised Regulation does not, therefore, 
bring about any significant changes to the definitions, descriptions and interpretations 
provided for the fiduciary responsibility of the key role players in the pension fund 
investment chain by the South African legal sources in this dissertation.  
It might be possible to speculate that revised Regulation 28 has influenced the role 
players‟ perspectives on fiduciary responsibility. It should surely at least encourage 
trustees to consider ESG issues. However, it is not reasonable to draw any conclusions 
with regard to how the revised Regulation 28 would have influenced the answers to 
the overall research question in this dissertation. 
In summary, the revised Regulation 28 only confirms my earlier submissions that 
 pension fund trustees are fiduciaries 
 they owe their fiduciary duties to the members of the fund 
 their overall fiduciary duty is to act in the best interests of beneficiaries  
 the revised Regulation 28 (as the other legal sources) is explicitly silent on 
the fiduciary responsibility of the other two role players.  
What makes the revised Regulation 28 “new” then? It describes the duty to act in the 
best interests of beneficiaries to include the implementation of a responsible 
investment approach which includes earning “adequate risk adjusted returns”. It is 
not, however, clear what the legislature intended with the use of the terms responsible 
investment approach and adequate risk adjusted returns.  
This revised Regulation also mentions the fact that ESG issues must be considered in 
so far as these might be deemed material in achieving the adequate risk adjusted 
returns. This is all “new” in terms of what has been communicated by the legal 
sources up to this point. The difficulty, however, is that a “responsible investment 
approach” and “adequate” are not defined or described. Consequently, it is still not 
clear whether ESG issues are more important or should be considered over and above 
maximising financial return. Hence, it is uncertain whether the revised Regulation 28 
therefore supports either one of the two forms of responsible investment as defined in 
149 
 
this dissertation. This, in turn, would mean that even if the revised Regulation 28 were 
to have been considered in this study, there would most probably still be two answers 
to the research question. In certain instances and under certain circumstances there 
will be no barrier to the implementation of either form of responsible investment, but 
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Thank you for making the time to participate in our Fiduciary Responsibility Study.  
Our interview time is confirmed for <time> on the <date>. 
 
Please find attached a confidentiality agreement confirming that comments made 
during the interview will not be published in such a way that content can be linked to 
the interviewee. 
 





UNISA Centre for Corporate Citizenship 
Email: dklerrl@unisa.ac.za 






This agreement is made as of the , by and between: 
RENE SWART 
 (the Researcher) 
and 
 (the Interviewee),  
of   (the Company). 
 
This Agreement shall govern the conditions of disclosure by the Researcher of any 
information provided by the Interviewee during the course of the Fiduciary 
Responsibility Study. 
 
With regard to the above stated information, the Researcher hereby agrees: 
1. To submit a transcript of the interview to the Interviewee for scrutiny and 
comment on content. 
2. Not to publish any of the interview content in such a way that that content can be 
related to the interviewee (either in their personal capacity, or as a representative 
of the Company) without prior written consent of both the Interviewee and the 
Company. 
 
The Researcher reserves the right to:  
1. Publish the interview content as part of bulked statistical data or as anonymous 
quotes that can in no way be linked to the Interviewee or the Company, without 
prior written consent of either the Interviewee or the Company.   
 















The information gathered from me will be held in strictest confidence, and its primary 
use is in partial completion of the Research Project for the LLM degree at the Centre for 
Corporate Citizenship of the University of South Africa. I hereby agree that I will comply 
with the ethical principles set out in the UNISA Policy on Research Ethics. It is 
understood by me that the results hereof will be used for research purposes only, and that 
there are no known risks or dangers to me associated with this study.   
 
 
Please circle one choice out of the two possibilities below (if research permission has 
been given):  
 
- Rene Swart may conduct such research, drawing out trends and themes from 
my interview, and MAY use my name and appropriate quotations to highlight  
key areas/themes in the research, and in publication. 
 
- Rene Swart may conduct such research, drawing out trends and themes from 
my interview, but MAY NOT use my name, and any other information that 
can uniquely identify me in the research, or in publication. 
 
 
I acknowledge that I am participating in this study of my own free will.  I understand that 
I may refuse to participate or stop participating at any time without penalty.  I agree to 
hold the University of South Africa, and Rene Swart, harmless from any liability, loss or 
damage caused by my statements or materials furnished by me.  If I wish, I will be given 
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The information gathered from me will be held in strictest confidence, and its primary 
use is in partial completion of the Research Project for the LLM degree at the Centre for 
Corporate Citizenship of the University of South Africa. I hereby agree that I will comply 
with the ethical principles set out in the UNISA Policy on Research Ethics. It is 
understood by me that the results hereof will be used for research purposes only, and that 
there are no known risks or dangers to me associated with this study.   
 
All participants received a confidentiality agreement before the interview was 
undertaken. The confidentiality agreement stated that the researcher reserves the right to 
publish the interview content as part of bulked statistical data or as anonymous quotes 
that can in no way be linked to the Interviewee or the Company, without prior written 
consent of either the Interviewee or the Company. The purpose of this release form is 
therefore to give all the participants the option to either withdraw or give that written 
consent. Please circle one choice out of the two possibilities below:  
 
- Rene Swart may conduct such research, drawing out trends and themes from 
my interview, and MAY use my name and appropriate quotations to highlight  
key areas/themes in the research, and in publication. 
 
- Rene Swart may conduct such research, drawing out trends and themes from 
my interview and use appropriate quotations, but MAY NOT use my name, 
and any other information that can uniquely identify me in the research, or in 
publication. 
- Rene Swart may conduct such research, drawing out trends and themes from 
my interview, but MAY NOT use my name, quotations or any other 





I acknowledge that I am participating in this study of my own free will.  I understand that 
I may refuse to participate or stop participating at any time without penalty.  I agree to 
hold the University of South Africa, and Rene Swart, harmless from any liability, loss or 
damage caused by my statements or materials furnished by me.  If I wish, I will be given 
a copy of this release form. 
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